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INTRODUCTION

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer
v.Heitner' is an obvious and appropriate point of entry into this
survey of developments in 1977 in Tennessee civil procedure.'
After avoiding judicial jurisdiction questions for nearly two decades,1 the Court in Shaffer held that the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction traditionally justified by the mere presence of property within the forum must now be evaluated according to the due
process standard of reasonableness initially embraced in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.' While the precise impact
Shaffer will have in this area of the law remains somewhat uncertain, "it is quite clear that the consequences will be many and
substantial."' In addition to the obvious significance of the decision itself, Shaffer is also an appropriate point of entry into this
survey because selection of a proper forum lies at the threshold
of the litigation process.

A.

11. SELECTING A PROPER FORUM
Jurisdictionover the Person or His Property

Shaffer involved a shareholder's derivative action brought in
Delaware by a nonresident owner of one share of stock in the
Greyhound Corporation, incorporated in Delaware with its prin1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. This survey encompasses state and federal decisions concerning Tennessee procedure reported in the National Reporter System during the calendar
year 1977. Shaffer is also included because it is a federal constitutional decision
binding on all the states.
3. Prior to Shaffer, the Court's latest decisions in the area were McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958).
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. W. Rnsa & M. RoSENBERG, CoNFucr oF LAws: CAss AND MATMALS
xix (7th ed. 1978).

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

cipal place of business in Arizona. The defendants included
twenty-eight present and former officers and directors of Greyhound and a wholly-owned subsidiary, which along with Greyhound was also a defendant. Plaintiff alleged that as a result of
a breach of their duties owing to the corporation, the individual
defendants caused Greyhound to be subjected to substantial antitrust damages and a large fine for criminal contempt. To obtain
jurisdiction over the individual defendants, shares of common
stock belonging to nineteen of the defendants and options belonging to two others were seized pursuant to a Delaware sequestration statute.' Seizure was effected by placing stop-transfer orders
or their equivalents on the books of Greyhound, none of the certificates representing the seized property being physically present
in Delaware. Defendants were notified of institution of plaintiffs
lawsuit by certified mail and publication. Those defendants
whose shares and options had been seized appeared specially and
sought dismissal of the action on the ground that under
International Shoe they did not have the requisite contacts with
Delaware to sustain the assertion of jurisdiction by that state's
courts. The chancery court and supreme court of Delaware rejected defendants' jurisdictional challenge;' on appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed.
After a lengthy discussion of the evolution of the law of in
personam jurisdiction from the physical presence rule of
Pennoyer v. Neff' through the reasonableness standard of
InternationalShoe,"0 the Court noted the absence of a corresponding evolution of the law of in rem jurisdiction," which the Court
defined to include both strict in rem actions as well as quasi-inrem actions." The Court's case for applying the minimum con6. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1974),
7. Defendants also argued that the sequestration statute was inconsistent
with the due process line of analysis initially enunciated in Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 US. 337 (1969). See also North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The Supreme Court in Shaffer did not
reach this procedural due process issue.
8. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976), rev'd sub nom.,
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).

9. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
10. 433 U.S. at 196-205.
11. Id. at 205-06,
12. Id. at 199 n.17.
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tacts standard of InternationalShoe to in rem actions was based
on the fact that the traditional distinction between in rem and
in personam actions isnot airtight. Jurisdiction in rem is, in
reality, jurisdiction over the interests of people, and its assertion
affects their interests in important ways. 3 Recognition of this fact
led the Court to conclude that the jurisdictional standards of
InternationalShoe and its offspring must be satisfied in order to
exercise jurisdiction in rem. 4
The Court was careful to point out, in what must be considered conscious dictum, that not all assertions of jurisdiction
based solely on the presence of property within a state would
violate due process:
[Tihe presence of property in a State may bear on the existence
of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the
defendant, and the litigation. For example, when claims to
property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for
the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction.
In such cases, the defendant's claim to property located in the
State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from
the State's protection of his interest. The State's strong interests
in assuring the marketability of property within its borders and
in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes
about the possession of that property would also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses will be found in the State. The presence of property may
also favor jurisdiction in cases, such as suits for injury suffered
on the land of an absentee owner, where the defendant's ownership of the property is conceded but the cause of action is otherwise related to rights and duties growing out of that ownership."
On the other hand, in quasi-in-rem actions like Harrisv. Balk"
and Shaffer, in which the property that supplies the basis of the
court's adjudicatory authority is completely unrelated to plaintiff's claim for relief,'7 "the presence of the property alone [will]
13. Id. at 207 & n.22.
14. Id. at 207, 212.

15. Id. at 207-08 (footnotes omitted); see Smit, The Enduring Utility of
In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v.Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600
(1977); Developments in the Law-State-CourtJurisdictidn,73 HAv. L. Riv.
909, 955-66 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
16. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
17.

433 U.S. at 208-09.
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not support the State's jurisdiction.""
The Court rejected the traditional justification for quasi-inrem jurisdiction-that a debtor should not be able to avoid payment of his obligations by removing his assets to a jurisdiction
where he is not subject to an in personam action-maintaining
that this rationale "does not explain why jurisdiction should be
recognized without regard to whether the property is present in
the State because of an effort to avoid the owner's obligations.""
Moreover, if the justification for attaching the defendant's property is simply to assure satisfaction of the judgment, this purpose
requires only that the assets be seized pending a judgment, not
that the underlying controversy be litigated in the forum in which
attachment is accomplished. "[A] State in which property is
located should have jurisdiction to attach that property, by use
of proper procedures, as security for a judgment being sought in
a forum where the litigation can be maintained consistently with
International Shoe.""' Besides, the Court continued, in light of
the full faith and credit clause, which makes a valid in personam
judgment of one state enforceable in others, there is little to justify the assumption that a debtor can avoid his obligations simply
by removing his property to a jurisdiction in which his creditor
cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over him.1
Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there
would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize
on that debt in a State where the defendant has property,
whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine
the existence of the debt as an original matter."
The Court also rejected the arguments that permitting in
rem jurisdiction assures the plaintiff a forum and avoids the uncertainty inherent in International Shoe's rather vague tests of
"minimum contacts"" and "fair play and substantial justice.""1
"This case," the Court responded, "does not raise, and we therefore do not consider, the question whether the presence of a defen18.
19.
20,
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 210.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
at 210 n.36.
326 U.S. at 316.

24. Id,
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dant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction
when no other forum is available to the plaintiff."5 1 The Court
was of the opinion that in most cases the InternationalShoe tests
can be easily applied,"6 and that the price of not applying the
InternationalShoe standards to in rem actions is simply too
great. The history of permitting states to exercise jurisdiction
based solely upon the presence of property, the Court concluded,
did not require a different result."
Applying the InternationalShoe tests to the facts of Shaffer,
the Court held that jurisdiction could not be sustained. The
seized shares of stock and options were not the subject matter of
the litigation, nor was the underlying claim of breach of duty to
the corporation related to the seized property."8 In addition, the
Court noted that it was not alleged or argued that defendants
whose property had been seized had "ever set foot in Delaware,"
nor had any "act" related to the underlying claim "taken place
in Delaware." 3 With regard to the argument that Delaware had
an interest in asserting judicial jurisdiction over defendants because they were officers and directors of a Delaware corporation,
the Court stated that "[tihis argument is undercut by the failure
of the Delaware Legislature to assert the state interest appellees
find so compelling. Delaware law bases jurisdiction not on appellants' status as corporate fiduciaries, but rather on the presence
of their property in the State." Moreover, even if Delaware had
such an interest, the Court found it insufficient to demonstrate
that Delaware was a fair forum. Delaware law may be applicable
but that fact standing alone did not justify adjudication of the
25. 433 U.S. at 211 n.37. It has been suggested that Shaffer could have
upheld the assertion of jurisdiction on this rationale. The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, 91 HARV. L. Rev. 72, 162 (1977).
26. 433 U.S. at 211.
27. Id. at 211-12.

28. Id. at 213.
29. Id. Given the fact that International Shoe, the principal case upon
which the majority relied in Shaffer, repudiated the physical presence rule of
Pennoyer, it is difficult to understand the relevance of the fact that defendants
never set foot in Delaware. Also, the intangible nature of defendants' breach of
their duties to the corporation makes it somewhat unrealistic to speak of
"where" the cause of action arose. In a realistic sense, the location of the cause
of action is indeterminable. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 25,

at 162.
30. 433 U.S. at 214.
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action in Delaware?' Finally, the Court rejected the idea that
defendants impliedly consented to suit in Delaware. Unlike other
states, Delaware did not by statute treat acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction, and thus defendants had "no rea.
son to expect to be haled before a Delaware court.' 2 Also, it was
unreasonable to suggest that "anyone" buying securities in a Delaware corporation impliedly consents to subject himself to jurisdiction in Delaware on "any" cause of action.3 Whatever else due
process may mean, the Court concluded that it is clear that a
state may not make binding a judgment against individuals who,
like the defendants in Shaffer, "had nothing to do with. ... Delaware."U
In separate concurring opinions, Justices Powell" and StevensO stated that perhaps quasi-in-rem jurisdiction based on real
property would he constitutional. Justice Stevens also stressed
that fair warning of amenability to suit should be considered an
essential element of due process? Justice Brennan concurred in
the entire majority opinion of the Court' except that portion
holding that officers and directors are not amenable to suit in the
state of incorporation.'
Justice Brennan's partial dissent was prompted by his belief
that it was not necessary to reach the question of whether the
minimum contacts standard of International Shoe was satisfied.
In his opinion it was sufficient to hold only that the asserted basis

31. Id. at 215.
32. Id. at 216. In an earlier portion of its opinion, the Court stated that
nothing in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), was inconsistent with the
essential meaning of International Shoe. In Hanson the Supreme Court stated
that restrictions on state court jurisdiction "are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective states," Id. at 251. Thus, Hanson
could be viewed as at least a partial return to the territorialist theory of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). However, the Court in Shaffer explained that
the language in Hanson quoted above "simply makes the point that the States
are defined by their geographical territory." 433 U.S. at 204 n.20. This explanation is irrefutable, if somewhat disingenuous.
33. 433 U.S. at 216 (citing Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware:A
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 73 COLUM. L. Rev. 749, 785 (1973)).

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 217-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).

38.
39.

Id. at 219-20 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
Id. at 220-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).

1979]

CIVIL PROCEDURE

of jurisdiction-mere presence of the stock within Delaware-did
not provide the requisite minimum contacts among the parties,
the forum state, and the litigation." Since the majority did rule
on the minimum contacts question, however, Justice Brennan
expressed his conviction that "as a general rule a state forum has
jurisdiction to adjudicate a shareholder derivative action centering on the conduct and policies of the directors and officers of a
corporation chartered by that State.""
Some of the legal literature that has emerged since Shaffer
has found Justice Brennan's dissent persuasive,'2 and the majority opinion itself left open the possibility that the outcome might
have been different if Delaware had enacted a statute treating
acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction"
-something that came to pass within days after announcement
of the decision in Shaffer." It seems premature, therefore, to
administer last rites to the assertion of judicial jurisdiction over
directors and officers by the state of incorporation, but it is far
from clear what precise sin, if any, the Court might identify as
the source of its condemnation in Shaffer. InternationalShoe, the
cornerstone on which the Court built its Shaffer opinion, recognized that implied consent is simply a legal fiction that can justify the assertion of jurisdiction only if the minimum contacts test
is otherwise satisfied." As one commentator has observed, "[ijf
expression of interest by the state were a determinative factor, a
state might bootstrap itself into jurisdiction simply by enacting
a statute expressing its interest."" On the other hand, there appears to be no vice in the absence of a statute expressly authorizing the assertion of judicial jurisdiction, unless the Court is prepared to hold that the Constitution requires the bases of adjudicatory authority to be prescribed by statute, not by adjudication
or, alternatively, that the Constitution would prohibit the retroactive application of a statute authorizing the assertion of juris40. Id. at 220-22 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
41. Id. at 222 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
42. E.g., Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction,66 Ky. L.J. 1, 20-23 (1977) Comment, The Expanded Scope of the
Sufficient Minimum Contacts Standard: Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. Rzv.
504, 523-25 (1977); 45 TENN. L. REV. 501, 510-13 (1978).
43.
44.

433 U.S. at 216.
See DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1977).

45.
46.

326 U.S. at 318.
Comment, supra note 42, at 519.
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diction over directors and officers of a domestic corporation. 7
Delaware's recent enactment of a consent statute may afford the
Court an opportunity to clarify this portion of its opinion sooner
than it imagined.
It does seem reasonably clear, however, that jurisdiction
based solely on the presence of property within the forum is constitutionally impermissible, even if judgment were limited to the
value of the property that provided the basis of jurisdiction. Delaware law did not permit defendants in Shaffer to enter a limited
appearance,' and they were therefore faced with the difficult
choice of either appearing and thereby submitting to personal
jurisdiction or defaulting and losing the seized property. The
Court could have held that limited appearances in cases like
Shaffer are required by due process.4 ' Instead, it concluded that
"[tihe fairness of subjecting a defendant to state court jurisdic'
tion does not depend on the size of the claim being litigated,' W
but rather is a function of the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation.5 '
Perhaps paradoxically, limited appearances may play a more
important role in post-Shaffer adjudication. For example, if, as
suggested by the Court,' property is attached as security for a
judgment being sought in another forum in which the litigation
can be maintained consistently with the standard of
InternationalShoe, the forum attaching the property would apparently not be able to assert personal jurisdiction based solely
on the defendant's appearance to contest the attachment."' Similarly, limited appearances may be constitutionally compelled in
cases in which the forum adjudicates the interests of nonresidents
based on a foreign transaction concerning property located within
the forum." In this situation the justifications identified by the
47.
48.
49.
50.

But see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957).
See Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 117 A.2d 365 (Del. 1955).
See Leathers, supra note 42, at 11.
433 U.S. at 207 n.23.

51.

Id. at 204, 207, 209.

52. Id. at 210.
53. In this respect the holding in Shaffer increases the expense of collecting on a judgment, "taind there can be no assurance that some debtors may
not again remove their assets, making it difficult for creditors to rediscover them
before other-state personal judgments can be secured." R. LtErYia, AMERICAN
CONFLicrs LAW § 24, at 43 (3d ed. 1977).
54. See, e.g., Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 189
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Supreme Court" for the assertion of judicial jurisdiction by the

forum over property within its borders-that is, the interests in
assuring the marketability of property and in providing a procedure for the peaceful resolution of disputes about possession-may mark the limits of the forum's adjudicatory authority.
Although Shaffer holds the mere presence of a defendant's
property insufficient to support judicial jurisdiction over claims
unrelated to that property, other relationships between the defendant and the forum may permit the adjudication of claims arising
out of facts unrelated to the forum. For example, as noted in one
commentary, "a defendant who is domiciled or who resides
within the forum is likely to have an extensive network of contacts sufficient to support jurisdiction over any claim asserted
against him."4 In the case of a corporation, it would seem constitutionally permissible to subject a corporation to suit on any
claim in a forum in which it either maintains its principal place
of business or is engaged in systematic and continuous business
activities. In addition, nothing in Shaffer would appear to proscribe the assertion of jurisdiction by a forum in which the defendant expressed a willingness to be sued, regardless of the relationship between the forum and the underlying claim. 7 On the other
hand, since the mere presence of the defendant's property is insufficient to support jurisdiction, the mere presence of the defendant's person (and perhaps the mere incorporation within a state)
would also seem insufficient to permit adjudication of claims
unrelated to the defendant's activities within the forum.
Similarly, although Shaffer stressed the critical importance
of the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, the Court was not prepared to state that "the particularized rules governing adjudications of status"-which often depend on the plaintiff's relationship to the forum-"are inconsisMiss. 73, 191 So. 94 (1939). Shaffer does not expressly preclude actions related
to intangible property located within the forum, but it offers no guidance on
locating intangibles consistent with due process. See The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, supra note 25, at 160.
55. 433 U.S. at 208. The Court made clear, however, that this list of the
interests of the state in which property is located is not necessarily complete.
Id. at 208 n.28.
56. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 25, at 160 (emphasis in
original).
57. Id.
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tent with the standard of fairness."" The most obvious example
is jurisdiction over divorce, which may be granted by a state that
is the domicile of the plaintiff alone." It seems likely that this
jurisdictional rule will survive Shaffer and at least one court has
so held." As Justice Traynor argued:
[A] court could reason that even a defendant who had no contacts whatever with the forum state would not be gravely affected by a decree enabling the plaintiff to remarry, since there
would be no way of compelling the plaintiff to cohabit with
defendant and no effective way of preventing the plaintiff from
cohabiting with anyone else. Moreover, divorce proceedings are
not for the most part adversary except in name. In any event, a
defendant's purposeless interest in barricading the plaintiff's
avenue to freedom is overwhelmingly outweighed by the plaintiffs purposeful interest in securing freedom. Finally, the dubious interest of defendant's state in perpetuating a broken marriage in limbo is overwhelmingly outweighed by the forum
state's major interest in the orderly resolution of a plaintiff domiciliary's marital status."
The unique factors of divorce litigation stressed by Justice Traynor suggest that recognition of the authority of the state of a
plaintiff's domicile to grant a divorce is unlikely to have an immediate or significant impact on other types of litigation, which
generally express a jurisdictional bias in favor of the defendant.
It is not too early, however, to begin thinking seriously about the
contemporary legitimacy of this traditional jurisdictional bias.'2
A different kind of question concerning judicial jurisdiction
was raised in the Tennessee Supreme Court during the survey
period, although whether the court's opinion was directed to that
question is somewhat unclear. In Donaldson v. Donaldson 3 a husband brought a damage action against his nonresident wife for an
58. 433 U.S. at 208 n.30.
59. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
60. In re Marriage of Rinderknecht, 367 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
61. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. Rav. 657, 661
(1959).
62. See generally Seidelson, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Defendants:
Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long-Arm Statutes, 6 DuQ. L. REv. 221
(1970); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 1121, 1127-28, 1167-73 (1966).
63. 557 S.W.2d 60 (Tenrn.'1977).
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alleged "abuse of court process."' Plaintiff alleged that he suffered injury as a result of "the malicious, willful, and intentional"'5 institution against him of two actions, both in Arizona
and both "providing for the identical remedy of 'imprisonment
that is criminal [in] nature.' "" One action was brought under
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, and the
other sought to have plaintiff held in contempt, apparently because plaintiff failed to make support payments as previously
ordered by an Arizona court. Defendant appeared specially to
contest her amenability to suit under that portion of the Tennessee long-arm statute subjecting nonresidents to suit on any claim
for relief arising from "any tortious act or omission within this
state ... ."61 Defendant also sought dismissal on the ground

that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief, The trial court
dismissed for want of judicial jurisdiction, and the supreme court
affirmed.
The court began its opinion by citing Hanvy v.Crosman
Arms Co." for the proposition that the long-arm statute "has
been held to confer jurisdiction over nonresident tortfeasors in
situations where the alleged tortious conduct took place outside
the state but the resulting injury occurred within the state."" The
court, however, disagreed with plaintiff's contention that the
complaint adequately stated a claim for relief. Only two actions
are available for misuse of the legal process: abuse of process and
malicious prosecution. Abuse of process lies only if the legal process is utilized for a wrongful purpose, and plaintiffs complaint
contained no allegation "or even intimation .

.

. that the

[defendant] employed legal process to obtain an end that the
process was not intended to effect."7 ' This assertion of the court
seems debatable in view of plaintiff's allegation of malice, a matter that may be pleaded generally. 7' Malicious prosecution, on the
other hand, requires proof that the legal proceedings terminated
in favor of the plaintiff, and again the court found plaintiff's
Id. at 61.
65. Id.
64.

66.
67.
68.
son, 557
69.
70.
71.

Id. (quoting from plaintiffs complaint).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-235 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
225 Tenn, 262, 466 S.W.2d 214 (1971), cited in Donaldson v. DonaldS.W.2d at 61.
557 S.W.2d at 61.
Id. at 62.
See TENN. R. Civ. P. 9.02.
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complaint fatally defective because it contained no allegation
that either of the two Arizona suits were resolved in plaintiff's
favor.72 Finding "no duty on the part of the court to create-a claim
the pleader does not spell out in his complaint," 3 and citing two
federal cases concerning a trial court's authority to dismiss a
pleading on its own motion for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted,' the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal.
Donaldson may have decided nothing more than that plaintiff failed to allege either directly or inferentially every material
element of either abuse of process or malicious prosecution. It
seems odd, however, to pass on the sufficiency of a plaintiff's
complaint prior to a determination of whether the defendant is
amenable to suit. Alternatively, Donaldson may have held that
because plaintiff failed to allege a claim for relief, defendant had
not committed any tortious act or omission within Tennessee
upon which to predicate the assertion of personal jurisdiction.
The effect of such a holding is to equate the circumstances permitting the assertion of personal jurisdiction under the long-arm
statute with the substantive validity of plaintiff's claim for relief.
Such an equation of the merits and the scope of jurisdiction has
been wisely rejected by other courts, 5 since, as Justice Traynor
noted, it might encourage "a defendant [to] take a default judgment and resist subsequent enforcement in his own state by collateral attack for lack of jurisdiction, thus compelling plaintiff to
litigate the merits there.""
Perhaps the court in Donaldson failed to see any practical
difference between affirming a dismissal because a defendant was
not amenable to suit and affirming a dismissal because a plaintiff
failed to state a claim for relief. The res judicata consequences of
these bases for dismissal are not necessarily identical, however.
A dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits and therefore does not preclude a subsequent
72.

557 S.W.2d at 62.

73. Id.
74. Dodd v. Spokane County, 393 F.2d 330 (9th Cir, 1968); Clinton Community Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Md. Medical Center, 374 F. Supp. 450 (D. Mo.
1974), af('d, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975).
75. E.g., Nelson v. Miller, 11111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680-82 (1957).
76. Traynor, supra note 61, at 659.
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action," while a dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief,
although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, may well bar
a subsequent action. 8 Despite the seeming oddity of such a holding, it may be best to construe Donaldson as simply a determination that plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief, leaving wholly
unresolved the further question whether plaintiff might amend
his complaint to cure the defects detailed by the court.7 '
The only other development in the area of Tennessee judicial
jurisdiction was an amendment to the Tennessee Code permitting
any person to appoint any other person as trustee of a personal
or corporate trust regardless of the residence of the proposed trustee." The amendment also provides that
all such trustees . . . who are not residents of the state of Tennessee shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state as to any action or claim for relief arising from any trust
within this state for which such nonresident person is acting as
trustee in the manner described in [Tennessee Code Annotated
sections] 20-235-20-240. Any nonresident who becomes a trustee or fiduciary for a Tennessee resident shall appoint the secretary of state as an agent for service of process.",
While the provision for in-state service on the secretary of state
is a nod toward the now moribund jurisdictional theory of
Pennoyer v. Neff,"' nothing in Shaffer v. Heitner would seem to
cause the constitutionality of this amendment to be called into
question since nonresident trustees are amenable to suit only on
claims arising from trusts within this state.
B.

Jurisdictionover the Subject Matter

In addition to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
or his interest in property, an action may be adjudicated in a
particular court only if that court has jurisdiction over the type
of case involved and is a proper venue for the action, and if no
7,7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973).
78, Id. § 48, Comment d.
79. See generally Phillips, Civil Procedureand Evidence-Tennessee Survey 1970, 38 TENN. L. REV. 127, 141-43 (1971).
80. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 35-610 (Cur. Supp. 1978).
81. Id.

82.
83.

95 U.S. 714 (1877).
433 U.S. 186 (1977); see text accompanying notes 4-62 supra.
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statute or doctrine exists under which the court, otherwise qualified to proceed, may or must dismiss the action. Each of these
areas will be discussed successively.
During the survey period the developments in the area of
subject-matter jurisdiction were entirely statutory and, with one
or two exceptions, relatively insignificant. Most notably, the circuit and chancery courts of Davidson County have been given
"original jurisdiction to enter judgments against the state
founded upon any express or implied contract or breach thereof
with the state.""8 Such actions, previously brought before the
Tennessee Board of Claims, are to be tried before the court without a jury," and "no action [may] be maintained based on any
contract or any act of any state officer which the officer is not
authorized to make or do by the laws of this state.""
Juvenile courts in counties with a population of 600,000 or
more may now exercise jurisdiction concurrent with circuit courts
in actions under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act."' The jurisdiction of justices of the peace and courts of general sessions has been increased from $3,000 to $5,000 in all civil
cases except in equity causes, in which the jurisdictional competence was raised from $250 to $1,500." Finally, chancery courts
may now transfer to circuit court or, alternatively, hear and determine "upon the principles of a court of law" actions "for unliquidated damages for injuries to person or character, and. . . for
unliquidated damages for injuries to property not resulting from
a breach of oral or written contract.""
C.

Venue

The importance of distinguishing the concepts of jurisdiction
over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant from the concept of venue in determining the validity
of a prior adjudication is reflected in the opinion of the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Kane v. Kane." The case involved the all-toocommon problem of senselessly repetitive child custody litigation
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

§ 23-3601 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 36-902(4).
Id. § 19-301.
Id. § 16-602.
547 S.W.2d 559 (Tenn. 1977).
TENN. CODE ANN.

197/91
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by a divorced couple. The parties had been divorced in 1964 in
Robertson County, even though at that time they were residents
of Davidson County and had separated there. The divorcing court
originally awarded custody of the couple's daughter to the
mother, but seven years later it modified the decree and awarded
custody to the father. To regain custody the mother brought an
action raising in the divorcing court the same issues that had
been litigated in the modification action. Dissatisfied with the
divorcing court's decree in her action to regain custody, the
mother brought yet another action, this time in Davidson
County. The Davidson County court declined plaintiff's invitation to second-guess the Robertson County court, and the state
supreme court affirmed.
Apparently plaintiff recognized the well-established rule in
Tennessee that the divorcing court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters until a child reaches majority." However, plaintiff sought to avoid application of this rule by relying
on that portion of the Tennessee Code specifying "the county
where the parties reside at the time of their separation, or in
which the defendant resides, if a resident of the state""2 as the
proper venue for a divorce action. Because the parties did not
reside in Robertson County at the time of their separation or
divorce, plaintiff argued that the Robertson County court never
acquired jurisdiction and that its decrees were therefore void and
open to collateral attack.
The supreme court rejected plaintiff's argument for two reasons. First, the venue provision relied upon by plaintiff provides
that "[ainy divorce granted prior to May 4, 1967 will not be
deemed void solely on the ground that the parties to the divorce
action were residents of a county or counties other than the
county in which said divorce decree was entered.""3 Thus, even if
plaintiff were correct in her argument that the Robertson County
court was without jurisdiction, the statute precluded a collateral
attack on its decree.' Moreover, the supreme court also rejected
plaintiffs argument that jurisdiction and venue are synonymous.
"Venue," the court stated, "is the personal privilege of a defendant to be sued in particular counties; it may be waived and is
91.
92.
93.
94.

See, e.g., Sutton v. Sutton, 220 Tenn. 410, 417 S.W.2d 786 (1967).
TW"N. CODE ANN. 4 36-804 (1977).
Id,
547 S.W.2d at 560.
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waived by a defendant who defends upon the merits without first
interposing an objection to improper venue."" Jurisdiction, on
the other hand, is of two types: jurisdiction over the subject matter, which is conferred by the constitution and statutes, and jurisdiction over the person, which "is acquired by service of process."' The statute relied upon by plaintiff, the court continued,
"merely deals with venue of divorce actions . . . [and] nothing
in this record . . . indicate[s] that the defendant in the original

divorce suit objected to the bringing of the action in Robertson
County; thus, the right of venue was waived."' 7 Also, there was
no "suggestion that the defendant was not served with process,
hence no lack of jurisdiction of the person is shown."" Since the
Robertson County court that granted the divorce was statutorily
empowered to entertain suits for divorce and award custody,
subject-matter jurisdiction was also present." The decrees of the
Robertson County court were therefore valid, and "the jurisdiction of that court over the custody of the child of these parents
continues to be exclusive, under the circumstances shown in this
case."'"
The court's holding that a judgment is valid even if rendered
by a court without proper venue for the action is consistent with
the prevailing rule that a judgment is valid if rendered by a court
with subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant (or his property), as long as the defendant is
given reasonable notice of the action and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.'' The court's treatment of jurisdiction over the
person as being the equivalent of service of process, however,
confuses two distinct concepts. Service of process is a method by
which a defendant is notified of the pendency of an action. "If the
defendant is not notified of the proceedings, he has no opportunity to defend himself, and he is deprived of his property or liberty without due process." 02 Jurisdiction over the person of the
95. !d.
96. id.

97.

Id.

98. Id.
99, Id.
100. Id.
101.

See 1 RESTATEMENT (S.coNt) OF CONFLICT oF LAWS § 92 (1971);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4

102.

(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).

R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS; CASES-

COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 511

(2d ed. 1975).
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defendant, on the other hand, refers to the due process problem
of locating the place of trial and the reach of a jurisdiction's
3 makes clear, notice to
long-arm statute. As Shaffer v. Heitner1
the defendant cannot by itself confer jurisdiction over the person. There, defendants clearly had notice of the derivative action
brought against them in Delaware, even though the Court held
that the assertion of jurisdiction by Delaware violated the due
process clause.'04 Amenability of the defendant to suit instead
depends upon the minimum contacts standard of International
Shoe and the applicable long-arm statute.
As my colleague Professor Cohen points out in his recent
survey of Tennessee family law, '" the court's holding in Kane can
be criticized for freezing the place of trial at what may prove to
be an inconvenient forum. Although the court's attempt to curtail
needlessly repetitive litigation is understandable, this objective
might be as effectively realized by application of normal res judicata principles as long as the legal and factual circumstances
remain constant. '
A different sort of venue problem was involved in Rornines
v.K & S Engineering & Contracting Co.,""1 which arose out of
an automobile accident in Rutherford County. Plaintiffs commenced a damage action in Knox County against three corporate
defendants. One of the defendants was a Delaware corporation
that maintained an agent for service of process in Knox County,
and the other two defendants were apparently domestic corporations with places of business outside Knox County. Service of
process was effected on the Delaware corporation in Knox
County with counterpart process being served on the two domestic corporations at their places of business in Wilson and Lawrence Counties. At some point before trial, a motion for summary
judgment filed by the foreign corporation was granted. Motions
to dismiss filed by the other two defendants were then granted on
the ground of improper venue. The issue, as defined by the state
supreme court, was: "When properly attacked by motion, can
103. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
104. See text accompanying notes 4-34 supra.
105. Cohen, A CriticalSurvey of Developments in Tennessee Family Law,
1976-77, 45 TENN. L. REv. 427, 455 (1978).
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP JUDGMENTS § 41, Comment c (Tent.

Draft No. 1, 1973).
107.

556 S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. 1977).
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counterpart service of process be sustained where the only resident defendant was dismissed by the trial judge in ruling on
motions filed preliminary to trial?"'0 8 The court held that it cannot.
By statute the proper venue for transitory civil actions is the
county in which the cause of action arose or in which the defendant resides or is found.'" In actions involving multiple defendants residing in different counties, "original" process is served
on the defendants residing or found in the county where the action is commenced, and "counterpart" process, which "may be
sent to another county as in local action[s],""" is served on the
other defendants residing outside the county in which the action
is pending.
In an apparent effort to thwart evasion of the statutory restrictions on venue, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held on
numerous occasions prior to Romines that venue cannot be fixed
in an otherwise improper forum by serving a fictitious or immaterial defendant with counterpart process issuing against the defendants who are the persons against whom the plaintiff's claim
for relief in fact lies." The supreme court followed this wellestablished law in Romines though in language that blurs the
line drawn in Kane between venue and jurisdiction.
Where a transitory action is filed in a county other than the one
where the cause of action arose, if service of original process is
on a party that is not a real and material defendant, venue does
not lie in the county where the action was commenced and the
trial court is not able to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
defendants summoned by counterpart process, in the face of a
motion to dismiss the action for lack of venue."2
Thus the crucial question was whether the Delaware corporate
defendant was "a real and material defendant so as to locate
venue and legitimate the service of counterpart process on the
other defendants," ' 3
Plaintiff argued that because the action was filed with the
108. Id. at 85-86.
109. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-401 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
110. Id. See generally Comment, Venue Alternatives in Transitory Actions: Legislative Amendment, 39 TENN. L. Rav. 118 (1971).
111. See, e.g., Achy v. Holland, 76 Tenn. 510 (1881).
112. 556 S.W.2d at 86.
113. Id.
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good faith belief that "plaintiff had a cause of action against [the
Delaware corporation] . . . and not with the fraudulent intention of depriving the nonresident defendants of their right to be
sued in their own county or in the county where the cause of
action arose,""' it followed that the Delaware corporate defendant was a real and material defendant. The supreme court disagreed. "[tirrespective of the motive of a plaintiff in bringing an
action against a resident defendant," the court held, "if the action cannot survive motions made preliminary to trial, the resident defendant is not a real and material defendant for the purpose of locating venue or the acquisition of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by counterpart process.""'
The court's rejection of plaintiff's proffered test for determining whether a party is a real and material defendant seems
sound since that test would entail a difficult and uncertain factual inquiry into a matter in which certainty and ease of application of the law to be applied are of paramount importance. On
the other hand, some uncertainty lingers after Romines since the
opinion does not specify precisely when a defendant must move
to dismiss for lack of venue. By virtue of rule 12 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant generally must object to
improper venue either in a pre-answer motion or in his answer
itself. If he does not, an objection to venue is considered waived."'
However, at the time of service of the plaintiff's complaint and
prior to dismissal of the resident defendant, a nonresident defendant cannot ascertain whether venue is improper. It seems unlikely, therefore, that he would object to venue either prior to
answering or in his answer. As a consequence, it may be only fair
to permit a nonresident defendant to move to dismiss for improper venue within a specified time after the resident defendant is
dismissed from the action, even if he has previously moved under
rule 12 or answered without interposing an objection to venue.
This result is consistent with the spirit of rule 12.07, which permits a defendant to include in his answer rule 12 defenses and
objections not previously available, even though they were not
raised in a pre-answer rule 12 motion. Yet, to eliminate the expense and inconvenience of requiring a plaintiff to recommence
his action, it would seem most desirable in the context of cases
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. TENN. R. Civ. P. 12.07-08.
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like Romines to deny a defendant's motion to dismiss and, instead, to transfer the action to an appropriate venue.
D. Refusal to Take Jurisdiction
Although discretionary refusals to take jurisdiction have become increasingly important as the scope of jurisdiction over the
defendant has expanded, they remain relatively rare. One situation in which courts have refused to exercise their authority to
adjudicate involves suits that fall under the heading of "internal
affairs" of foreign corporations."' If the discussion of the federal
district court in McLouth Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co."'
is an accurate reflection of Tennessee law, the internal affairs
doctrine is simply an aspect of the broader doctrine of forum non
conveniens and is of dwindling importance.
McLouth was a diversity action by a minority shareholder,
a Michigan corporation, to compel the payment of dividends.
Defendants were two Virginia corporations and their directors,
who were citizens of Tennessee. The corporate defendants were
engaged in manufacturing and mining operations primarily in
Virginia, but their executive and sales offices were in Tennessee.
The refusal to declare dividends occurred at meetings of the
board of directors of defendant corporations in Tennessee. Defendants sought discretionary dismissal on the ground that the action involved the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
refused to dismiss the action.
The district court recognized that there is authority for the
proposition that federal courts are not required by the Erie doctrine' to follow state decisions concerning forum non conveniens.'1 Nevertheless, the federal district court perceived little difference between Tennessee law"' and the approach of the United
States Supreme Court in the classic case of Koster v. (American)
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.' In that case the Supreme
Court treated the internal affairs doctrine not as an invariably
117. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 53, § 255.
118. 432 F. Supp. 10 (ED. Tenn. 1976).
119. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
120. See 1A MOORE'S FEDEHAL PRAnrtcE 0.317121 (2d ed. 1978).
121. The district court relied upon the unpublished opinion in Brown v.
Greer, No. 146-Knox (Tenn. Sup. Ct. Feb. 19, 1974).
122. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).

CIVIL PROCEDURE

1979]

applicable rule of law but rather as an aspect of the flexible and
discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens.
There is no rule of law, moreover, which requires dismissal of a
suitor from the forum on a mere showing that the trial will
involve issues which relate to the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation. That is one, but only one, factor which may show
convenience of parties or witnesses, the appropriateness of trial
in a forum familiar with the law of the corporation's domicile,
and the enforceability of the remedy if one be granted. But the
ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the convenience
of the parties and the ends of justice. Under modern conditions
corporations often obtain their charters from states where they
no more than maintain an agent to comply with local requirements, while every other activity is conducted far from the
chartering state. Place of corporate domicile in such circumstances might be entitled to little consideration under the doctrine of forum non conueniens, which resists formalization and
looks to the realities that make for doing justice. 23
The district court stated dismissal under Koster is appropriate
only "on a showing of 'much harassment' by a defendant and I a
showing that] the forum chosen 'would not ordinarily be thought
a suitable one to decide the controversy' "I" and concluded that
"under the facts and circumstances of this case . . . the Eastern
District of Tennessee is [not] so unsuitable as a forum to warrant
invocation of this rather extreme doctrine."'2 5 Although the district court did not delineate the factors making it a convenient
forum, the presence of the directors and other evidence in Tennessee certainly support the court's refusal to dismiss. Moreover,
the soundness of the court's approach to the internal affairs doctrine should commend itself to the Tennessee courts.
E.

Giving Notice of the Action

In order to satisfy the dictates of procedural due process, the
applicable statute or rule of court must establish a reasonable
method of notifying the defendant of the institution of an action
against him, and he must be given a reasonable opportunity to
be heard.' It is also generally held that the described method of
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 527-28.
432 F. Supp. at 15 (quoting 330 U.S. at 532).
Id.
See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
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notification must be followed even though the method of notification actually utilized comports with procedural due process.'
Only one of the cases decided during the survey period purported
to involve procedural due process; the remaining cases involved
disparate problems regarding the prescribed method of notification.
Solida v. Ledford," the one due process case, was a diversity
action in which plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result of a vehicular collision. One of the
defendants, the operator of a vehicle involved in the collision,
appeared specially and moved to quash service or, alternatively,
to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of service of process. The
initial summons had been returned "Not to be Found." Thereafter plaintiff filed an amended complaint, and an alias summons
was issued for service on the Tennessee secretary of state pursuant to the nonresident motorist provisions of the Tennessee
Code.'n Those provisions require the secretary of state to forward
a certified copy of the summons to the defendant by registered
return-receipt mail." The Code also requires "the return-receipt
signed by, or duly in behalf of, the defendant"'' to be sent to the
clerk of the court in which the action was brought. The returnreceipt filed in Solida bore the notation "Addressee Unknown."
Defendant argued that, because there was no return-receipt
signed by him, service was constitutionally infirm as well as
defective under the Tennessee Code. Plaintiffs contended, on the
other hand, that as long as service is made on the secretary of
state who in turn mails a copy of the summons to the defendant,
service is valid, and a return-receipt signed by the defendant is
not required. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee granted defendant's motion to quash service
"because the Court believes due process requires, and the statutory scheme contemplates, evidence of service through notice by
mail upon a defendant or his agent as a minimum." ' :2
306 (1950); 1 RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

(SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 25, 57, 69 (1971);
JUDGMENTS § 5 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).

See, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
75 F.R.D. 529 (W.D. Tenn. 1977).
TENN. CODE ANN. §H 20-224 to 227 (1955 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
Id. § 20-226 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Id. § 20-227 (1955).
75 F.R.D. at 531.
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The district court's holding that the nonresident motorist
statute requires evidence of actual service on the defendant may
have been correct though a recent amendment to another section
of the Code'3 that was in effect when Solida was decided suggests
otherwise. The court's further holding that due process was not
satisfied, however, seems clearly wrong. In the first place, it is by
no means certain that due process requires actual service. Professor Hazard has taken the position that it does not:
Can a valid judgment for compensatory relief be granted [if a
reasonable effort is made to deliver notice but notice is in fact
not delivered to the defendant]? This depends on whether the
condition of rendering a valid judgment under the Due Process
Clause is defined as the giving of notice or the making a reasonable effort to give notice. If the former, then the plaintiff is helpless to obtain compensation

. . .

unless he can actually deliver

notice to the defendant. The Supreme Court has never gone
beyond holding that due process requires a reasonable opportunity to be heard and that reasonable effort to give notice of
the hearing sufficiently affords that opportunity. But the Supreme Court has never passed on the precise question raised,
although many lower courts have. The problem has arisen recurrently under the automobile "long-arm" statutes. Most courts
have ducked the issue by reading-sometimes by straining to
read-the local state statute to require actual notice. Those
courts that have faced the issue all appear to have held that
failure of actual delivery of notice does not preclude valid judgment, so long as a reasonable and technically punctilious effort
has been made, i.e., there has been compliance with a statutory
procedure that is itself reasonable. And this seems a correct
analysis of the due process requirement as established by the
Supreme Court."'
Moreover, if due process requires actual notice, defendant's special appearance in Sotida demonstrates that he apparently did in
fact receive adequate and timely notice of the lawsuit pending
against him."'
133. TmN. CODE ANN. § 21-218 (Cur. Supp. 1978); see text accompanying
notes 189-94 infra.
134. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,1965 SuP. CT.
Rev. 241, 286-87 (footnotes omitted); see 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAws § 25, Comment e (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 5,
Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
135. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 5, Comment d (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1978).
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The service requirements of the Tennessee long-arm statute 3 ' also received federal scrutiny in Shires v. Magnavox Co.':"
Individual defendants in an antitrust action moved to quash service of process on the ground that the person signing the returnreceipts was not authorized to accept service on their behalf. A
corporate defendant also moved to quash service on the same
ground although service was made on an agent of a wholly-owned
subsidiary. Plaintiffs offered no proof that the return-receipts
were signed by or on behalf of the moving defendants. ' Because
plaintiffs had the burden of establishing the validity of service
but did not do so, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee granted defendants' motions to quash.
Shires did not present a due process problem because defendants were in fact given adequate and timely notice of the action
against them"' although there is some indication the district
court thought due process was involved.4 0 The only apparent
practical effect of quashing service, therefore, is to ensure strict
compliance with the prescribed method of giving notice, an advantage of questionable value when measured against the expense and inconvenience of requiring the plaintiffs to serve the
defendants a second time.
Three decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court dealt with
more substantial problems concerning the prescribed method of
notification. In Saylors v. Riggsbee"' plaintiffs brought an action
on March 13, 1970, for damages for wrongful death resulting from
an automobile accident that occurred on March 14, 1969. At the
time of the accident the nonresident motorist statute provided
that "[t]he agency of the secretary of state to accept service of
process shall continue for a period of one (1) year from the date
of any accident or injury ....
142 Prior to institution of the
action in Saylors, however, the statute was amended to provide
that "It]he agency of the secretary of state to accept service of
process for both personal injuries and property damages shall
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
§ 20-224

See TENN. ConE ANN. §§ 20-235 to 240 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
74 F.R.D. 373 (ED. Tenn. 1977).
See TENN. CoDE ANN. § 20-237 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
See text accompanying note 135 supra.
74 F.R.D. at 376.
544 S.W.2d 609 (Tenn. 1976).
1949 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 47, § 2 (current version at TENN. CODE
(Cum. Supp. 1978)).

ANN.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

1979]

continue for such period of time or so long as the cause of action
is not barred by the statute of limitations of this state ... ,,.
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their action on June 22, 1972,
and, pursuant to the saving statute,' reinstituted the action on
June 22, 1973. Again, process was served on the secretary of state,
who accepted service of the reinstituted action on June 28, 1973.
Defendants argued that the amended statute increasing the duration of the secretary's fictitious agency could not be applied retroactively to accidents occurring prior to its enactment and that
therefore, the action had not been reinstituted in timely fashion.
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the amended statute
should and constitutionally could be given retroactive application, and accordingly reversed the trial court's quashing of process and abatement of the action.
"[P]rocedural statutes," the court noted, "apply retrospectively not only to causes of action arising before such acts become
law, but to all suits pending when the legislation takes effect
unless the legislature indicates a contrary intention or
immediate application would produce an unjust result ....
,'
The test for determining whether a statute iAprocedural or substantive depends upon whether it deals with" 'the mode or proceeding by which a legal right is enforced,'" on the one hand, or
whether it" 'gives or defines the right,' "on the other hand.'" The
process statute under consideration, the court stated, "created no
rights and imposed no liabilities."'4 7 Accordingly, the amendment
to the nonresident motorist statute was procedural and was given
retroactive application.
The court acknowledged"' that the holding in Saylors was
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-224 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
144. Id. § 28-106 (1955) provides:
If the action is commenced within the time limited by a rule or statute
of limitation, but the judgment or decree is rendered against the plain-

143.

tiff upon any ground not concluding his right of action, or where the
judgment or decree is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and is arrested,
or reversed on appeal, the plaintiff, or his representatives and privies,
as the case may be, may, from time to time, commence a new action
within one (1) year after the reversal or arrest.
145. 544 S.W.2d at 610.
146. Id. (quoting Jones v. Garrett, 192 Kan. 109, 114, 386 P.2d 194, 198

(1963)).
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 611.
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foreshadowed by the decision in Speight v.Miller."IIn that case
the court permitted retroactive application of an amendment to
the nonresident motorist statute, which increased the secretary's
fictitious agency from one to three years after the accident in
actions for property damage.'" The only decision that tended to
block the court's path was Henderson v. Ford,' which refused to
permit retroactive application of the same amendment to the
nonresident motorist statute involved in Saylors. Although the
court in Saylors did not expressly overrule Henderson, it quite
rightly rejected the theoretical foundation upon which Henderson
was built,"' Henderson, it would therefore appear, lives on in
name alone.
Herring v. Estate of Tollett
the second decision of the
Tennessee Supreme Court during the survey period concerning
the appropriate method of notification, involved the proper procedure to be followed for filing notice in probate court of the
pendency of a tort action in circuit court. Appellants commenced
a damage action against decedent's administrator in the circuit
court of Cumberland County for injuries and loss of services arising out of a vehicular accident. Appellants also filed a claim, with
a copy of their previously filed complaint appended, in the county
court of Cumberland County where deceased's estate was being
administered. This claim was filed within six months after the
statutorily mandated notice to creditors by the administrator.'
The administrator excepted to appellants' claim principally on
the ground that it was an unliquidated tort claim pending in
circuit court. The county judge disallowed and dismissed the
claim, reasoning that the claim" 'is one sounding in tort and the
claimants cannot be deemed creditors until they obtain judg149. 223 Tenn. 259, 443 S.W.2d 657 (1969).
150. 1968 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 574, § 1 (current version at TENN. COD
ANN. § 20-224 (Cum. Supp. 1978)).
151. 488 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. 1972), noted in 40 TENN. L. REv. 746 (1973).
152. 544 S.W.2d at 611. Henderson can be distinguished from Saylors on
its facts since in Henderson, unlike Saylors, the statute extending the agency
of the secretary of state was not in effect when the action was initially commenced. However, if, as the supreme court correctly noted in Saylors, the secretary of state's statutory " 'agency' exists only in theory and is a pure fiction,"
id., then this difference is inconsequential.
153. 550 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1977).
154. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-509 (1977).
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ments.' "'I' The state supreme court reversed.
The source of the problem confronting the court in Herring
was the 1947 decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Collins
v. Ruffner.' 51 Collins arose when two automobiles collided, instantly killing both drivers. Plaintiff, as administratrix of the
estate of one of the deceased drivers, brought a damage action in
circuit court against the administrator of the estate of the other
driver. The Tennessee statute then in effect dealing with the
inventory and management of estates provided that "within
twelve (12) months from the date of the notice to creditors...
all persons . . . having claims against the estate of the decedent
• . .shall file them . . with the clerk of the Court in which the
estate is being administered.""' Another section of the Code provided: "Duplicate copies of the first pleading filed in original
actions against a personal representative, shall be filed with the
Clerk of the Court where the administration originated, to be
noted by him in the record of claims as are other claims filed.""'
Defendants in Collins sought dismissal of plaintiffs circuit court
damage action on the ground that plaintiff failed to file either a
claim or copies of the pleadings in that action with the county
court where defendant's decedent's estate was being administered. The supreme court held that plaintiff's action should not
have been dismissed by the circuit court,
For present purposes it is sufficient to note only two of the
reasons offered by the court for its holding in Collins. One was
that the only persons required to file claims in probate are creditors of the deceased, and the holder of a cause of action in tort is
not a creditor until his claim is reduced to judgment. 5' Another
reason was far more practical: "No jurisdiction is conferred...
on the county judge to try, adjudge, and render judgment in a
negligence case. No machinery is set up in that court and no
procedure prescribed.""'
155. 550 S.W.2d at 661 (quoting the judge of the county court of Cumberland County).
156. 185 Tenn. 290, 206 S.W.2d 298 (1947).
157. 1939 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 175, § 2 (current version at
ANN. § 30-510 (1977)).
158. 1939 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 175, § 6 (current version at
ANN. § 30-511 (1977)).
159.

185 Tenn. at 295-96, 206 S.W.2d at 300.

160. Id. at 296, 206 S.W.2d at 301.
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These are not entirely satisfactory explanations for the result
in Collins. In the first place, the statute being construed by the
court did not speak of creditors but rather of "all persons . . .
having claims against the estate of the decedent . .. ."' The
holder of an unliquidated chose in action would seem to fall
within the scope of this statutory language since ultimately he
seeks recovery out of the assets constituting the decedent's estate.
Second, requiring a copy of the first pleading in an unliquidated
tort case to be filed with the court where decedent's estate is
being administered does not necessarily mean, as the court apparently assumed, that the action has to be adjudicated there.
The action could be adjudicated in another court of competent
jurisdiction, while filing a copy of the first pleading would serve
to notify the probate court to hold in abeyance final distribution
of the estate pending the outcome of the tort action. On the other
hand, nothing in the statute construed in Collins expressly authorized such bifurcated proceedings."" Moreover, since plaintiff
commenced her action within the twelve-month limitation period
prescribed by the statute, the administrator of decedent's estate
had timely notice of plaintiffs inchoate claim. While the opinion
in Collins is silent on the matter, it seems entirely probable that
there had not yet been a final distribution of the estate. Thus the
Collins court quite understandably may have perceived no good
reason to dismiss plaintiff's action.
Regardless of their deficiencies, each of these reasons offered
by the court for its holding in Collins took on new and independent life in subsequent decisions of the Tennessee Supreme
Court. For example, in McMahan v. Beach,6 3 a tort action for
damages occasioned by a traffic accident was commenced against
the administrator of decedent's estate less than six months after
issuance of letters of administration. At that time the Code exempted an administrator from suit for a period of six months after
issuance to him of letters of administration,1 4 a provision apparently designed to afford the administrator time in which to decide
161.

1939 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 175, § 2 (current version at TENN.

CODE

ANN. § 30-510 (1977)); see text accompanying note 157 supra.

162.

1939 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 175, §§ 1-12 (current version at TENN. CODE

ANN. §§ 30-501 to 527 (1977)).

163. 198 Tenn. 168, 278 S.W.2d 680 (1955).
164. 1939 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 175, § 6 (current version at TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-511, -1001 (1977)).
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whether to pay claims against the estate. Nonetheless, relying on
that portion of Collins in which the court noted that county courts
are not empowered to adjudicate tort claims, the court in
McMahan held that "the exemption of an administrator from
suit for a period of six months after issuance of letters does not
apply to tort actions."'6 5 So too, in Darby v. Union PlantersNational Bank'" appellant filed a medical malpractice claim against
the estate of a deceased doctor but apparently did not commence
an independent action in a court empowered to adjudicate such
a claim. The executor excepted to appellant's claim, and the probate court dismissed it. On appeal the supreme court affirmed,
reasoning that "appellant is not a creditor until such time as a
court of competent jurisdiction shall have determined whether or
not the estate of deceased is liable for the alleged negligent
7
wrong."P"
Apparently the probate court in Herring construed the
Collins line of cases as standing for the proposition that since a
claimant asserting an unliquidated tort claim is not a creditor
until his claim is reduced to judgment, a decedent's estate may
be finally distributed even though the tort action has not yet been
finally adjudicated, and even though the action was timely
commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction, and a copy of
the complaint was promptly filed in the probate court. Thus,
while Collins permitted recovery against an estate despite seeming noncompliance with the statutory scheme, the probate court
in Herring denied recovery even though plaintiff complied with
every requirement of the current version of the Code.""
Fortunately the state supreme court reached the only sensible result in Herring. "Whenever the probate court is put on
notice of the pendency of a tort action in another court by the
filing of a copy of the complaint, or by any other good and sufficient means," the court held, "the probate court must hold in
abeyance a final distribution of the

. . .

estate, pending the out-

come of a tort action.""' The court, however, did not overrule
Collins. Only "[bletter practice," not the Code itself, "demands
that the court in which the estate is being administered be put
165. 198 Tenn. at 169, 278 S.W.2d at 681.
166. 222 Tenn. 417, 436 S.W.2d 439 (1969).
167. Id.at 421, 436 S.W.2d at 441.
168, See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-510 to 511 (1977).
169. 550 S.W.2d at 662.
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on notice of the pendency of a tort action in another court. Filing
a copy of the complaint is sufficient to accomplish this."' 170
It seems likely that problems will continue to arise in this
area of the law until the state supreme court is willing to view
afresh the statutory language of the current version of the Code.
As the court itself noted in Herring,' nothing in the Code exempts unliquidated tort claims from its filing provisions. Instead,
the Code requires everyone seeking recovery out of the assets of a
decedent's estate to file a claim against the estate within six
months after the date of notice to creditors.' In the case of claims
founded on causes of action beyond the jurisdictional competence
of the probate court, the Code would seem to require that an
action be instituted on such a cause of action within the sixmonth limitation period "3 and that a copy of the complaint be
filed with the clerk of the court where the estate is being administered."' The Code specifically provides that in such circumstances
the court wherein the administration is pending shall hold in
abeyance any action on such claim until the final determination
of said independent suit, whereupon, on the filing of a certified
copy of such final judgment or decree with the clerk of the court
wherein the administration is pending, such court is authorized
to enter judgment accordingly.'75
If an action is instituted within the six-month limitation period
but a copy of the complaint is not filed with the probate court,
the plaintiff runs the risk that the probate court may finally
distribute the estate out of ignorance of his claim. If the plaintiff
fails to file a copy of his complaint but the probate court is aware
of the plaintiff's action against the decedent's administrator,
then dictum in Herring appears to require the probate court to
withhold final distribution of the estate, 7 ' although that sensible
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. TENN. CODE ANN. 4 30-510 (1977) requires "all persons . . . having
claims against the estate of the decedent" to file them within six months from
the date of notice to creditors.
173. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-513.
174. Id. § 30-511.
175. Id. § 30-518,
176. The state supreme court stated that final distribution of the estate
should be held in abeyance whenever the probate court has notice of a pending
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result is hard to square with the literal language of the Code.' 77
Moreover, in cases in which the plaintiff does not commence his
action within six months from the date of notice to creditors, the
Code appears to render the plaintiff's action untimely and
"forever barred.""'7 As long as the reasoning of Collins remains
authoritatively unimpeached, however, a confident statement of
the meaning of the Code can be offered only by one who walks
right in "while the angels wait outside and tremble." ''
Tennessee State Board of Education v. Cobb' was the third
and final decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court during the
survey period concerning the appropriate method of notffication.
Plaintiff in Cobb alleged that he had become tenured and had
been improperly discharged from his position as assistant superintendent of the Tennessee School for the Blind in Davidson
County. Plaintiff commenced his action in the chancery court for
Davidson County under the judicial review provision " ' of the general teacher tenure statutes.'' Under that provision a teacher
may obtain judicial review by filing a petition in the chancery
court of the county in which he was employed. Upon filing of the
petition the clerk and master is directed to gerve the named defendants by registered return-receipt mail. This method of obtaining judicial review had been made expressly applicable to
those teachers under its jurisdiction by a rule of the Tennessee
Department of Education.'" Plaintiff complied with the statute
in all respects, defendants being served with a copy of plaintiffs
petition by registered mail. However, defendants were never
served in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordinarily require the clerk to
issue a summons and to cause it, together with a copy of the
complaint, to be delivered to a person authorized to serve process
personally on the defendant.'" The supreme court rejected defendants' contention that process and service were insufficient for
tort action "by any.

177.

See

. .

good and sufficient means. . .

TE'N. CODE ANN.

."

550 S.W.2d at 662.

§§ 30-510 to 512 (1977).

178. Id, § 30-513.
179. The phrase is Professor Rosenberg's. Rosenberg, The Adversary Proceeding in the Year 2000, 1 PRospEcrus 5, 6 (1968).
180. 557 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. 1977).
181. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1417 (1977).
182. Id. §§ 49-1401 to 1425 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
183. 557 S.W.2d at 277.

184.

TENN. R. Crv. P. 4.
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failure to comply with the Tennessee rules.
Rule 4 itself, the court noted, recognizes "other methods of
accomplishing service of process, in addition to personal service
of a summons.'""' For example, rule 4.05 authorizes constructive
service in the manner provided by statute as do those portions of
rule 4.04 that deal with service on foreign corporations and nonresidents.'" The court concluded:
[W]e are of the opinion that whenever a special statute dealing
with a particular type of judicial action, such as review of a
Board of Education under the Teacher Tenure Law, contains
specific provisions for process and service, that method, in lieu
of the general provisions of Rule 4, is permissible and may be
followed. We are particularly persuaded to this view in the present case since the State Board itself, by its regulations, expressly authorized judicial review under the provisions of [the
Tennessee Code] .' 8
The court's holding in Cobb engrafts on Tennessee rule 4 a
provision comparable in some respects to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(7) and 4(e), which authorize service by use of
federal statutes in certain specified circumstances."" Only one
aspect of the court's opinion needs to be emphasized-namely,
that while service may be made in accordance with a statute,
nothing in Cobb expressly precludes service in accordance with
the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, even if a statute contains
specific provisions for process and service.
The remaining development during the survey period in this
area of the law is statutory. The Tennessee Code dispenses with
personal service in certain circumstances if the defendant is a
nonresident of this state. 18 In such cases, however, notice must
be given by publication"1 and, under a 1977 amendment to the
Code, a copy of the newspaper clipping containing the publication must be mailed to the nonresident's last known address by
return-receipt certified or registered mail.' "The return of the
185.
186.

557 S.W.2d at 277.
TENN. R. Civ. P. 4.04(5), (7).

187.

557 S.W.2d at 277.
See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1112-1118 (1969 & Supp. 1977).
189. TENN. CODE ANN. § 21-212 (1955).

188.

190.
191.

Id. § 21-214.
Id. § 21-218 (Cur. Supp. 1978).
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receipt signed by the defendant or his duly authorized agent, or
its return marked refused, evidenced by appropriate notation of
such fact by the postal authorities"'" is evidence of personal notice. If such evidence is lacking, "the court may find through
independent proof that the defendant had actual notice in compliance with notice requirements."" If the court fails to find that
a defendant had actual notice, "it may order new publication on
applicable grounds, or order such other and further action to be
taken to give the defendant notice.""'
The same amendment also adds a new provision to the Code
for divorce actions "[iln those counties where the divorce referee
mails notice of the filing of the divorce and a copy of the complaint to a nonresident defendant by certified or registered mail
return receipt requested . . . ."I" In those counties it is not necessary for the clerk of the court to mail further notice; "[n]otice
to the nonresident defendant from the . . . referee [is] sufficient.""' The amended section also provides, although probably
unnecessarily, that "[njothing in this section shall be deemed to
have changed or amended requirements of the law as to venue or
jurisdiction." 7
I1.

STANDING: AN ASPECT OF JUSTICIABILITY

Not all disputes properly brought before an appropriate
forum are considered susceptible of judicial resolution. The reasons for declaring a dispute not justiciable vary, one of which is
that the party presenting the dispute for adjudication lacks
standing, that is, he "is not properly situated to be entitled to
judicial determination of the dispute.""' While the Tennessee
Supreme Court was presented with two cases raising questions
concerning standing, the court found it necessary to answer the
standing question in only one of them.
In Roberts v. State Board of Equalization"' a trustee of
192. Id.

193. Id.
194. Id.

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & F. COOPER, FEDERAL PawncE AND
PROcEDURE § 3531, at 176 (1975).

199.

557 S.W.2d 502 (Tenn. 1977).
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Roane County sought judicial review in the chancery court of
Davidson County of the action of the State Board of Equalization
concerning tax assessments on enriched uranium owned by ten
Japanese utilities and located in that portion of the Oak Ridge
complex situated in Roane County. The county itself, however,
was not a party to the petition, and the chancellor ruled that it
was an indispensable party.2 mThe trustee was given an opportunity to have the county join his petition but the county, acting
through its quarterly court, resolved not to join in the trustee's
petition for review. Accordingly, the chancellor dismissed the petition, and the state supreme court affirmed.
The court stated that the issue before it was whether Roane
County was an "indispensable party" t ' to a petition seeking review of the action of the State Board of Equalization or, put
another way, "[clan the county trustee, acting independently of
the county court, petition for a review of the action of the State
Board of Equalization?" ' * Noting the difficulty in determining
whether review was being sought under the relatively new Uniform Administrative Procedures Act m or by way of common-law
certiorari,2 -the court observed that under either procedure review may be sought only by someone "aggrieved" by the action
sought to be reviewed.Y While the duties of a county trustee
include the obligations to make assessments and to collect taxes,
his duty to collect taxes "is a ministerial function . .

.

Moreover, the right to appeal to the State Board of Equalization
from assessments of the county trustee is given by statute only
to the state, the county, and the assessed party."' The county
trustee, therefore, is merely a " 'fiscal agent of the county,' "21

which acts through its quarterly court. Thus, the supreme court
200. Id. at 503-04; see TENN. R. Civ. P. 19.01-.02.
201. 557 S.W.2d at 503.
202. Id.
203. TENN. CotE ANN. § 4-507 to 527 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
204. Id. § 27-901 (1955).
205. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-523 (Cum.Supp. 1978) permits "[a] person
who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case" to seek judicial review,
and TENN. Coot ANN. § 27-901 (1955) permits review by "talnyone who may
be aggrieved by any final order or judgment of any board or commission .
206. 557 S.W.2d at 503.
207. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-832 (1976).
208. 557 S.W.2d at 503 (quoting Dulaney v. Dunlap, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.)
306, 312 (1866)).
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held that "[tihe real party in interest, the party that stands to
be affected by action of the State Board of Equalization, and the
proper party to question the board's actions with respect to assessments on property in Roane County is Roane County acting
through its governing body, the county court." '
Whatever else may be said of the opinion in Roberts, it provides a vivid illustration of the overlap among the concepts of
standing to sue, indispensable parties, and the real party in interest. In the portions of the opinion quoted above, the court itself
expressly refers to "indispensable part[ies]" and "the real party
in interest," and its discussion of whether the trustee was an
"aggrieved party" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedures Act or common-law certiorari refers implicitly to the notion of standing to sue, under which heading Roberts has been
conveniently placed for purposes of this survey. Professors Wright
and Miller have attempted to disentangle these three concepts,
but they observe that "there are situations in which a Rule 17(a)
objection [concerning the real party in interest] is enmeshed in
a question whether a particular person who is not before the court
should be considered indispensable under Rule 19.'1 Similarly,
they note:
To the extent that standing.

. .

is understood to mean that the

litigant actually must be injured by the governmental action
that he is assailing, then it closely resembles the notion of real
party in interest under Rule 17(a), inasmuch as both terms are
used to designate a plaintiff who has shown that he possesses a
sufficient interest in the action to entitle him to be heard on the
merits."'
It is, therefore, quite understandable why the court in Roberts
failed to distinguish among the concepts of standing to sue, real
parties in interest, and indispensable parties. The overlap of
these concepts also suggests that only rarely should differing procedural consequences turn on distinguishing among them.
A question concerning standing was also raised, though left
unanswered, in Blair v. Watts.2 ' Blair involved a challenge to the
209. Id. at 504.
210. 6 C. WrHT &A. MMLrn,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

at 640 (1971).
211. Id. § 1542, at 641 (footnote omitted).
212.

555 S.W.2d 709 (Tenn. 1977).

NOCwURu

§

1542,
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procedure utilized in appointing the assistant chief of police of
Columbia, Tennessee. After the incumbent to that office was
promoted to another position, the city manager notified the Civil
Service Board that a vacancy existed. Examinations were given
to the seven applicants for the position and the Board certified
to the city manager the three applicants obtaining the highest
test scores. Before any further action was taken, one of the three
applicants certified as eligible for the position advised the city
manager that he did not wish to be considered for the position.
The city manager notified the Board of this development and
requested a third candidate. The Board certified two additional
names because these applicants had obtained identical scores on
the examination. One of these two was appointed assistant chief
of police, and, as a result, a member of the police force of Columbia, who was eligible to take the examination but elected not to
be an applicant, brought an action for mandamus directing the
city manager to appoint one of the three applicants originally
certified for consideration. After this action was brought, two of
the original applicants certified by the Board, both of whom
sought appointment to the position, moved for leave to join as
parties plaintiff.2 ' Their motion was granted and apparently no
error was assigned concerning this action of the trial court. As a
result, the state supreme court did not pass on whether the original plaintiff had standing. The court did state that both plaintiffs
who joined the action had
a special interest in this litigation and [were] subject to a special injury not common to the public generally. . . . Either of
these plaintiffs, or both of them, clearly have standing to bring
this action and the issues for adjudication are the same whether
pursued by [all three], or only by [the joined plaintiffs].'"
Accordingly, the supreme court pretermitted the issue of the original plaintiff's standing.
IV.

PRETRIAL PROCEDURE

A.

Pleading

Once an appropriate forum has been selected for the adjudication of a justiciable controversy, the parties must advise the
213.

See

214.

555 S.W.2d at 710-11 (citations omitted).

TENN. R.

CIV. P. 24.
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court as well as one another of their respective claims and defenses. The pleadings, the first of the formal pretrial devices, serve
this notice-giving function. Historically, the pleadings have been
called upon to serve other purposes as well, including to narrow
and to define the issues for trial, to disclose the facts the parties
believe exist, and to dispose of claims and defenses."' "To a large
extent, of course, the formulation of a State's general pleading
rules will depend upon its views regarding the relative importance
to be attached to, and the efficacy of the pleadings as a means of
pursuing, each of these objectives."'6
In strict theory the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure deemphasize the importance of the pleadings as an issue-formulating
or discovery mechanism and as a means of speedily disposing of
claims and defenses. Other devices are provided to perform these
functions. For example, the relevant facts can be unearthed by
discovery,' 17 and the issues can be narrowed and defined by partial summary adjudication"' or by a pretrial conference.22 ' Similarly, summary judgment serves the end of speedily and inexpensively disposing of claims in cases in which there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact. m Yet, as cases like Swallows v.
Western Electric Co. '1 and Jose v.Equifax, Inc. n demonstrate,
there is still a generally held belief in the efficacy of the pleadings
to dispose of at least certain kinds of claims.
1. The Complaint
a.

Specificity and Substantive Legal Sufficiency

Plaintiff in Swallows sought recovery from his employer for
outrageous conduct and invasion of privacy. Plaintiff alleged that
two managerial level employees of Western Electric suspected
him of mailing to each of them, in envelopes without return addresses, an ace of spades, which they construed as threats on their
215. See 5 C. WRiHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1202, at 59-60 (1969).
216. M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, H. SMrr & H.KoRN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 568 (3d ed, 1976).
217. See TENN. R. Cxv. P. 26-37.

218. See id. R. 56.
219. See id. R. 16.
220. See id.R. 56.03.
221. 543 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. 1976).
222.

556 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1977).
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lives. Plaintiff further alleged that despite his denials and the
absence of any proof whatever, these employees, while acting in
the scope of their employment, " 'continued to harass and accuse
him' ,rn and ultimately prevailed on their superiors at Western
to have Pinkerton, a co-defendant in the action, investigate plaintiffs " 'background, his private life, and all other manner of
things. . . in the most minute and personal detail.' ,,1 Plaintiff
also alleged that Western and Pinkerton " 'knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence and good judgment, should have
known, that he had nothing to do with the mailing of the playing
cards . . . [but they nonethelessj continued to harass and investigate him for a period of approximately six (6) months.' "22 Furthermore, Western and Pinkerton had actual knowledge of mild
emotional difficulties in plaintiff's past and should have known
their conduct would have " 'a most deleterious effect upon
[plaintiff's] emotional stability and well being' "2 and in fact
did cause plaintiff to suffer " 'the most grievous mental and emotional . . . suffering . . . .' "2 On defendants' motion the trial
court dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim
for which relief could be granted, and the supreme court affirmed.
A recovery for the tort of outrageous conduct, the court
stated, requires conduct so "beyond the pale of decency [asl to
be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
society,"' ' n as well as resultant "serious mental injury.'"' Certain
trivialities, such as " 'mere insults, indignities, threats, petty
oppression [sic], or other trivialities' "m are inadequate bases of
liability. Invasion of privacy, on the other hand, " 'exists only if
the conduct is such that a defendant should have realized it
would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities; and . . .
it is only where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of de223. 543 S.W.2d at 582 (quoting amended complaint).
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. (quoting amended complaint).
Id. (quoting amended complaint).
Id. (quoting amended complaint).
Id. (quoting amended complaint).
Id. (citing Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 398 S.W.2d 270

(1966)).
229.

Id. (citing Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 398 S.W.2d 270

(1966)).
230. Id. at 582-83 (quoting Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co,, 217 Tenn. 469, 479,
398 S.W.2d 270, 274 (1966), which quoted 1 REarATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
46, Comment d at 73 (1965)).
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cency that liability accrues .... '"'
The court held that under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff in 'a tort action has "the burden of averring
facts sufficient to show the existence of a duty owed by the defendant, a breach of the duty, and damages resulting therefrom.""
Nothing in the simplified pleading rules permits allegations
"replete with conclusions, "W which fail to describe "the substance and severity ' " m of the allegedly outrageous conduct or invasion of privacy. "'[fln an action of this kind' "2' the rules
require that the "'actionable conduct' "m be "'set out' "n so
that the trial court can determine whether the defendant's conduct "may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous
as to permit recovery or whether the conduct is such as to be
classed as 'mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppression [sic], or other trivialities,' for which [defendants]
would not be liable."m Since plaintiff's complaint lacked the
requisite specificity it was properly dismissed.
In Jose v.Equifax, Inc.m plaintiff brought a workers' compensation action to recover for " 'a severe psychiatric illness' ",
occasioned by " 'a tremendous amount of pressure and tension' "'1 placed upon him as claims director and field representative for his employer. Plaintiff alleged that these pressures ultimately lead to his habitual alcoholism. Plaintiffs complaint did
not delineate the nature of his employment duties or the character of the psychiatric illness he suffered. No attempt was made
to amend plaintiff's complaint either before or after his employer
231.

Id. at 583 (quoting Martin v. Senators, Inc., 220 Tenn. 465, 473, 418

S.W.2d 660, 664 (1967)) (emphasis added).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (quoting Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 480, 398 S.W.2d
270, 275 (1966)).
236. Id. (quoting Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 480, 398 S.W.2d
270, 275 (1966)).
237. Id. (quoting Medlin v.Allied Inv. Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 480, 398 S.W.2d
270, 275 (1966)). The court's reliance on Medlin, which was decided prior to
adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, is questionable.
238. Id. (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d

(1965)).
239.
240.
241.

556 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1977).
Id. at 83 (quoting complaint).
Id. (quoting complaint).
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moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. As a result, the
supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal.
The court's opinion carefully defines the limits of its holding.
After a partial survey of prior Tennessee cases, the court noted
that mental and nervous illnesses are compensable in workers'
compensation actions "when shown to be caused by an industrial,
work-related accident."'' 4 Moreover, the court stated that it was
"not inclined to limit recovery to cases involving physical, traumatic injury or to impose any other artificial limitation upon the
coverage afforded by the compensation statutes."2' Quite to the
contrary, the court indicated its readiness in a proper case to
permit recovery for mental or nervous disorder even if the cause
is solely "a mental stimulus, such as fright, shock or even exces" " However, in order to fall
sive, unexpected anxiety ..
within the scope of the workers' compensation statute, a plaintiff
must prove he suffered an "injury . . . by accident,""' and this
statutory requirement "still does not embrace every stress or
strain of daily living or every undesirable experience encountered
in carrying out the duties of a contract of employment. Workmen's compensation coverage is not as broad as general, comprehensive health and accident insurance.'2s
Giving plaintiff "the benefit of the most liberal interpretation of the compensation law," ' his "general and conclusory allegations ' 12 attempted to set forth a claim "on the periphery of
coverage provided by the statute.""' When defendant challenged
the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint, "it was incumbent upon
[plaintiff] to state with some specificity and clarity what sort of
'accidental injury' was being claimed."m Accordingly, the court
held that the "conclusions and generalities""' set forth in plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim for relief under the workers'
compensation statute.
242.
243.

Id. at 84.

Id.
244. Id.
245. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-903 (1977).
246. 556 S,W.2d at 84.
247.

Id.

248. Id. at 83.
249. Id. at 84.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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The heart of the procedural question involved in both
Swallows and Jose is the meaning to be ascribed to rule 8.01's
requirement that the pleader set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."'
Nothing in the literal language of rule 8.01 requires the pleader
to allege the "facts" constituting his "cause of action," which was
typically required by the codes,"' nor does the rule proscribe the
use of "conclusions," which were typically considered forbidden
by the courts construing the requirement of code pleading that
the pleader allege the "facts constituting a cause of action."04 Yet
both Swallows and Jose condemn "conclusions," and Swallows
requires the pleader to aver "facts" sufficient to show a cause of
action. The mere use by the supreme court of obsolete nomenclature is not in itself harmful. "However," as Professors Wright and
Miller point out with regard to the federal rules, "there always is
the danger that the use of archaic terms . . . will tend to revive
the very distinctions that the , . . rules repudiated."'"

A partial explanation for the results in Swallows and Jose
may lie in the fact that rule 8.01 does not simply require the
pleader to set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim"
but also requires that the statement show "the pleader is entitled
to relief."'" As Professor Millar observed in commenting on the
identical language of federal rule 8(a)(2):
If the provision had stopped with requiring "a short and plain
statement of the claim," there would be little doubt that the
[rule dispensed with any requirement that the pleader state all
the essential elements of his claim]. But the addition of the
participial clause "showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"
is disturbing. A very fair argument could be made to the effect
that the pleading would not show entitlement to relief if it omitted an essential element of what we have been accustomed to
speak of as the cause of action, even though not necessary to
conveying adequate notice of the claim, because in the absence
of that element there could be no recovery.,'
252. TENN. R. Civ. P. 8.01.
253. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
1218 (1969).

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

254. See id.
255. Id. § 1218, at 141.
256. TENN. R. Civ. P. 8.01; see text accompanying note 252 supra.
257. R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECIVE 192 (1952).
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Based on their reading of a "host" of federal cases, Professors
Wright and Miller state that:
[Thel cases (suggest] that the complaint, and other reliefclaiming pleadings need not state with precision all elements
that give rise to a legal basis of recovery as long as fair notice of
the nature of the action is provided. However, the complaint
must contain either direct allegations on every material point
necessary to sustain a recovery on any legal theory, even though
it may not be the theory suggested or intended by the pleader,
or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be
drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced
at trialY2
A more convincing explanation of Swallows and Jose may lie
in the types of claims being asserted. Although rule 8.01 on its
face does not purport to establish special pleading requirements
for certain kinds of cases, nonetheless the standard for successful
pleading may be more stringent depending upon an unarticulated
desire to discourage what is viewed as vexatious or simply unmeritorious litigation. Thus, in Jose the court stressed the fact that
plaintiffs claim was "on the periphery of coverage provided by
the statute."I In Swallows the court may have looked askance
on the assertion of job-related claims for outrageous conduct and
invasion of privacy, particularly by an emotionally disturbed

employee.2
Whether it is appropriate to establish more stringent pleading requirements for certain kinds of claims is another matter.
Nothing in rule 8.01 itself gives fair warning of special pleading
requirements. Moreover, dismissal of a plaintiffs complaint followed by an appeal may only increase the duration and expense
of litigation, and thereby frustrate the purpose of the rules, if
plaintiff is permitted to amend after affirmance of the dismissal
on appeal. On the other hand, if plaintiff is not permitted to
258. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216,
at 120.23 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
259. 556 S.W.2d at 84.
260. Donaldson v. Donaldson, 557 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. 1977), which has
already been discussed in another context and which at base involved a dispute
over support, see text accompanying notes 63-79 supra,also admits of an explanation similar to that given for Swallows; that is, the court may have thought it
desirable at least in the context presented to discourage claims for "abuse of
court process." 557 S.W.2d at 64.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

1979]

amend after appeal, in short, if granting a rule 12.02(6) motion
to dismiss in effect means plaintiff has no claim as opposed to
meaning simply that the claim has not been adequately stated in
the complaint, then at least in some circumstances "there is the
possibility that plaintiff may not realize that more than his formal statement of the claim is being contested on a given Rule
[12.02(6)] motion [to dismiss] and may not prepare . .. to
defend the substantive merits of his claim.""' If it is desirable to
test the merits of plaintiff's claim in a preliminary motion, the
proper procedural device is a motion under rule 56 for summary
judgment. And if it is also desirable in a particular case to secure
immediate appellate review of the trial court's ruling on the summary judgment motion, an appeal not otherwise available should
be sought under the interlocutory appeals statute. '
In any event, the approach of the court to the pleading question in Swallows and Jose contrasts markedly with the approach
of the court to the same basic question in Ladd v. Roane Hosiery,
Inc." 3 and Adams v.CarterCounty Memorial Hospital.2" In Ladd
plaintiff brought an action against her employer and one of her
supervisors, contending that the latter induced her employer to
breach or to terminate her employment contract. On appeal
plaintiff effectively abandoned her claims against her employer.
With regard to plaintiff's claim against her supervisor, the state
supreme court held that the trial court improperly granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
When passing upon a motion predicated on the ground that
the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could
have been granted, the court stated, "the facts pleaded and the
allegations made must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, with every doubt resolved in his behalf."2" 5 Quoting
from the classic United States Supreme Court case of Conley v.
Gibson,"" the Tennessee Supreme Court also stated that a
"complaint should be dismissed only if it 'appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
261.

5 C. WRIGHr & A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

at 615 (1969).
262. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-305 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
-263. 556 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1977).
264. 548 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1977).
265. 556 S.W.2d at 759.
266. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).

§ 1357,
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which would entitle him to relief.' ""' In Ladd plaintiff alleged

that her supervisor " 'induced the corporation to terminate or
breach the contract of employment between [her] and the corporation,'

"n

and that her supervisor " 'had neither reason, nor

excuse [for doing so], and was actuated only through a spirit of
vindictiveness and malice . . . ,',,,1 These allegations, the cour
held, "are sufficient to set forth [an actionablel claim that [her
supervisor] unlawfully and without justification procured the
discharge of the plaintiff by [her employer]."2" Furthermore, it

was irrelevant that this theory may not have been the precise
theory plaintiff intended to set forth in her complaint.
IW]here, as here, the facts are sufficient to set forth a valid
claim for relief under some theory of recovery, it is immaterial
that this theory is not the one originally envisaged by the plaintiff. The complaint is still sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.'
Finally, the court rejected defendant's arguments that plaintiff
was not entitled to recover because her employment was terminable at will and because defendant was her supervisor. "While her
employment . . . may have been terminable at the will of [her
employer] this does not absolve defendant . . . from liability if

he wrongfully induced that termination."" While defendant may
not be liable if he acted within the scope of his employment,
at no point in her pleadings does the plaintiff admit that [her
supervisor's] acts were within the scope of his duties, and the
mere possibility that such a defense may be established at some
point does not justify the dismissal of the plaintiffs claim at this
stage of the proceedings. 3
Thus, "in light of the liberal construction that must be given a
complaint tested by a motion for judgment on the pleadings
under [Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure] 12.03,"2 the su267. 556 S.W.2d at 760 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957) (footnote omitted)).
268. Id. (quoting complaint).
269. Id. (quoting complaint).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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preme court reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs action against her supervisor.
In Adams v. Carter County Memorial Hospital"" a widow
brought a damage action for the wrongful death of her husband,
who committed suicide while a patient at defendant hospital and
while under the care and supervision of defendant physician. The
fatal injuries were sustained when plaintiffs husband plunged
down a staircase at the hospital. The trial court's dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted was summarily reversed by the supreme court.
Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules requires only a short and plain
statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief
along with a demand for relief. "The complaint," the court observed, "contained detailed averments of malpractice against
each defendant and alleged that these breaches of duty proximately caused the death of their patient, the plaintiff's husband.
It thus stated a cause of action under well settled rules of liability
in such cases.""' It was not necessary for plaintiff to refer expressly to the wrongful death statute because "[pjlaintiff does
not rely upon the violation of any statute as the basis of her cause
of action; hence, Rule 8.05(1) . . .does not apply. "27 Noting that
"neither the order of dismissal nor the motions to dismiss point
out any alleged particular deficiency of the complaint," ' the
court reiterated its conclusion that the allegations were sufficient.
Whatever the reason, the court seems to have ben far more
willing to construe the complaint in plaintiff's favor in Ladd and
Adams than it was in Swallows and Jose. It would not have been
difficult, for example, to label as mere "conclusions" plaintiffs
assertions in Ladd that her supervisor" 'induced the corporation
to terminate or breach the contract of employment between
[her] and the corporation,' ""' and that her supervisor " 'had
neither reason, nor excuse [for doing so], and was actuated only
275.
276.
277.

548 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1977).
Id. at 308.
Id. at 309. TENN. R. Civ. P. 8.05(1) provides: "The substance of any

ordinance or regulation relied upon for claim or defense shall be stated in a
separate count or paragraph and the ordinance or regulation shall be clearly

identified." The rule also requires "[the manner in which violation of any
statute, ordinance or regulation is claimed" to be set forth. Id.
278. 548 S.W.2d at 309.
279. 556 S.W.2d at 760 (quoting Ladd's complaint).
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through a spirit of vindictiveness and malice. . . .' " Thepoint
being made here is not that the court should engage in the fruitless enterprise of attempting to distinguish between "facts" and
"conclusions," but that in truth the detail required in the plaintiffs complaint does appear to vary from case to case.
b.

Timeliness

Adams v.Carter County Memorial Hospital"' also involved
a question concerning the timeliness of plaintiff's action. The
injuries from which plaintiff's husband died occurred on February 11, 1973, and plaintiffs complaint was filed on February 8,
1974. Process was served on defendant hospital the same day the
action was commenced, but defendant physician was not served
until August 14, 1974. He moved to quash and dismiss the action
against him, arguing the action was not properly commenced
because plaintiff did not "prosecute and continue the action" '
as required by law; that, as a result, service was wholly ineffective; and that in the meantime the one-year statute of limitation21' had run. The trial court granted the physician's motion,
and the supreme court affirmed except with regard to the trial
court's ruling that the action was barred by the statute of limitation.
Under rule 4.03 of the Tennessee Rules, the court noted, "the
efficacy of this summons terminated upon the expiration of thirty
days next following its issuance .. ..
Though the Tennessee
Rules contain no express provision dealing with the situation presented in which process is neither served nor returned within the
thirty-day period,
*"I"

plaintiff cannot sit idly by when confronted with such a situation. We hold that when the summons is not returned at the end
of thirty days following its issuance, the plaintiff must apply for
and obtain issuance of new process within six months, or recommence the action within one year, of the end of said thirty
days period in order to preserve the original commencement of
the action as a bar to the running of a statute of limitations.?'
280. Id. (quoting Ladd's complaint).
281. 548 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1977).
282. Id. at 308 (quoting a defendant's motion to quash the summons and
to dismiss the action).
283. See TE-rN. Cons ANN. § 28-304 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
284. 548 S.W.2d at 309 (citing TENN. R. Civ. P. 4.03).
285. Id. (footnote omitted).
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It followed that plaintiff could have applied for and obtained
issuance of a new summons until September 10, 1974; but, since
this was not done, the action was properly dismissed by the trial
court.?' However, it was error for the trial court to hold plaintiffs
action barred by the one-year statute of limitation because, under
the saving statute,2 7 "[pjlaintiff may timely recommence the
action against defendant [physician] by filing a new complaint
any time within one year of the entry of judgment of this Court
affirming the order of dismissal of the trial court."' "
The court's resolution in Adams of the problem of unserved
and unreturned process is substantially in accord with the illfated 1975 proposed amendments to the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure."' The proposed amendment to rule 3 provides:
[11f the process is not served or not returned within 30 days
from issuance, regardless of the reason, plaintiff, if he wishes to
rely upon the original commencement as a bar to the running
of a statute of limitations, must either prosecute and continue
the action by applying for and obtaining issuance of new process
from time to time, each new process to be obtained within six
months from issuance of the previous one, or plaintiff must
recommence the action within one year from issuance of the
initial process not served or not returned within 30 days from
issuance.
Similarly, rule 4.03 as amended would permit plaintiff to obtain
a new summons not only, as provided by current rule 4.03, when
any prior summons has been returned unserved but also "in the
event that such prior summons has not been returned within 30
days after its issuance." 2 0 Presumably the holding in Adams
effectively authorizes plaintiff to obtain a new summons as contemplated by the proposed amendment to rule 4.03. However,
Adams differs from the proposed amendments to the Tennessee
Rules in that the time for recommencing the action or obtaining
new process is measured not, as under the proposed rule, from
issuance of the original process, but thirty days following its issuance . " In addition, Adams goes beyond the proposed amend286. Id. at 309-10,
287. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-106 (1955); see note 144 supra.
288. 548 S.W.2d at 310.
289. See text accompanying note 456 infra.
290. PRoPosE DTENN,. R. Civ. P. 4.03.
291. See text accompanying note 285 supra.
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ments insofar as the court indicated that plaintiff there could
recommence her action by filing a new complaint "any time
within one year of the entry of judgment of this Court affirming
2
the order of dismissal of the trial court."

9

The court's tidying-up of this area of procedural law is welcomed, although it would seem even more convenient to permit
plaintiff to obtain issuance of new process any time within one
year from issuance of the initial process (or within one year following thirty days after issuance of initial process), thereby eliminating any need to recommence the action? 3 Moreover, if actual
notice is not a precondition to rendition of a valid judgment, 9 '
then there would be no constitutional impediment to eliminating
the current requirement of repetitious attempts to serve defendant as long as there were satisfactory evidence that there had
been compliance with a procedure that is itself reasonably designed to afford notice. The requirements of Adams and the proposed amendments to the rules, therefore, may exceed the requirements of due process.
Finally, at least passing attention should be given to the
question whether plaintiff in Adams would have been permitted
to recommence her action against defendant physician if she had
not appealed and if the only basis of dismissal involved the propriety and timeliness of the chosen method of initiating the action. Traditionally a judgment for the defendant bars another
action only if judgment is rendered "on the merits.'2 5 In the
hypothetical situation the trial court would not have passed on
the substantive sufficiency of plaintiff's claim, but only upon the
propriety and timeliness of the chosen method of initiating the
action. Therefore, under traditional notions of res judicata, plaintiff would be free to recommence her action, at least in a jurisdiction with a limitation period that had not expired. However, the
current version of the proposed Restatement (Second) of Judgments eliminates any requirement that a judgment in favor of the
defendant be on the merits."' Subject to certain exceptions not
292. 548 S.W.2d at 310 (emphasis added).
293. Apparently, however, some members of the bench and bar consider
the current six-month provision of rule 3 as being too long a period for obtaining
issuance of new process. See TENN. R. Cw. P. 3, Committee comment.
294. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
295. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 45(b), 48 (1942).
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUnotENTS §§ 45(b), 48 (Tent. Draft No.

1, 1973).
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here relevant,2? any "valid and final personal judgment rendered
in favor of the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff on
the same claim."" 8 Rule 41.02(3) of the Tennessee Rules is substantially similar. It provides that, "[uinless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies," an involuntary dismissal
"and any dismissal not provided for in this Rule 41, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack
of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits." ' Unless the state supreme court is willing to construe
the language of rule 41.02(3) concerning dismissals for lack of
jurisdiction expansively or is willing to hold the rule is subservient to the saving statute (a holding that would be difficult to
square with the statute under which the Tennessee Rules were
drawn), 0 it would seem to follow that rule 41.02(3), literally applied, would bar plaintiff from recommencing her action. The
desirability of such a result is certainly debatable, but until rule
41.02(3) is authoritatively construed to mean otherwise, an appeal in cases like that hypothesized seeking entry of a judgment
without prejudice seems the only prudent path to follow.
A novel question concerning the Tennessee saving statute
was resolved by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Lee
v.Crenshaw.' Plaintiff originally filed a complaint on January
31, 1975, alleging medical malpractice on February 1, 1974, by a
physician, a clinic, and a hospital. The action was commenced in
state circuit court, and on the day the complaint was filed plaintiffs attorney informed personnel in the clerk's office that a voluntary dismissal" 2 would be taken immediately. An affidavit submitted by a deputy clerk indicated that plaintiffs attorney also
gave instructions not to issue a summons because of plaintiffs
intent to take an immediate nonsuit. An affidavit submitted by
plaintiffs attorney denied the giving of any such instructions. No
summons was ever issued by the clerk, and plaintiff's attorney,
who obtained an order of nonsuit without prejudice from a judge
of the circuit court the same day the complaint was filed, was well
aware that no summons had issued. When plaintiff recommenced
297. Id. § 48.1.
298. Id. § 48.
299. TENN. R. Civ. P. 41.02(3).
300, See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-116 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
301. 562 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1977).
302. See TENN. R. Ctv. P. 41.01.
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his action in federal district court on January 28, 1976, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the one-year
statute of limitation governing personal injury actions " " had run.
The district court rejected plaintiff's contention that the action
was still alive by virtue of the saving statute" and granted summary judgment in defendants' favor. The Sixth Circuit reversed.
The federal court of appeals reasoned that rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules clearly provides that an action is commenced for
purposes of the statute of limitation when the complaint isfiled "
and does not require as a necessary component of commencement
of the action that process be issued." Accordingly, the court
concluded that "failure to issue process [does] not by itself preclude the commencement of [plaintiff si cause of action under
Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure."' ' However,
that conclusion did not dispose of the matter because plaintiff did
not rely on rule 3, but rather on the saving statute, which "predates Rule 3 and . . .was not repealed or modified by the promulgation of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.":41 Turning
to cases decided under the saving statute,""t the court concluded
that "notice to the defendant and diligence by plaintiffs counsel
are pertinent to the applicability of the saving statute." '1"" The
reason justifying the statute "'is that the bringing of a suit,
whether prosecuted to final judgment or not, gives the defendant
notice that the plaintiff has a demand which he proposes to assert.' ,,31
If the failure to issue process stemmed from no fault or
lack of diligence by plaintiff's counsel, then the saving statute
would apply? 2 But if plaintiff's counsel instructed that process
303. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
304. Id. § 28-106 (1955); see note 144 supra.
305. TENN. R.Civ. P.3 provides in part: "An action is commenced within
the meaning of any statute of limitations upon . . .filing of a complaint,

whether process be returned served or unserved ......
306. Id. R. 4.01 provides in part: "Upon the filing of the complaint the
clerk of the court wherein the complaint is filed shall forthwith issue the required summons and cause it, with necessary copies of the complaint and summons, to be delivered for service to any person authorized to serve process."
307. 562 F.2d at 382.
308. Id.
309. The Sixth Circuit relied principally upon Bums v. Peoples Tel. &
Tel. Co., 161 Tenn. 382, 33 S.W.2d 76 (1930).
310.

562 F.2d at 382.

311. Id. (quoting Burns v. Peoples Tel. & Tel. Co., 161 Tenn. 382, 387, 33
S.W.2d 76, 78 (1930)).
312. 562 F.2d at 383.
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not issue "in order to avoid giving notice to defendants of the
cause of action, there would be no justification for invoking the
saving statute." ' Since there was a factual dispute regarding
why the summons did not issue when plaintiff's complaint was
originally filed, it followed that summary judgment was improperly granted and the case should be remanded for resolution of
the factual dispute.
The court in Lee did not consider whether the tolling provision of rule 3 would have dictated the same result, since plaintiff
did not raise the issue in the district court.3 ' The saving statute
differs from rule 3 in that the statute simply provides that if an
action is timely "commenced" a plaintiff may recommence his
action if the judgment is rendered on "any ground not concluding
his right of action . . . . "I The tolling provision of rule 3, on the
other hand, assumes that process will issue and service will be
attempted as provided in rule 4.01.31, This distinction seems more
apparent than real, however, since the saving statute uses the
word "commenced" as it was defined under prior statutory law.
Under that law, "the suing out of a summons is the commencement of an action .... ",317 Thus, it would appear both the saving
statute and the rule require that process be issued, although there
is eminent good sense in the holding of Lee that the parties should
not be penalized because of the inadvertent actions of the clerk
of the trial court over whom the parties have no control." '
Moreover, it would be quite sensible to view the saving statute, as the Sixth Circuit apparently did in Lee, not as a tolling
provision but as a statute of limitation designed to require
prompt reassertion of claims by a plaintiff who, as contemplated
by rule 41.02(1), diligently prosecuted his initial action but had
judgment entered against him after expiration of the limitation
period "upon any ground not concluding his right of action" 3 '-language that can be construed as incorporating by

1).

313.
314.

Id.

315.

TENN. CODE ANN.

316.
317.

Id. at 382 n.2.

§ 28-106 (1955); see note 144 supra.
See notes 305-06 supra.
Code of 1858, § 2754 (repealed by 1972 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 565, §

318. See General Elec. Supply Co. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 546
S.W.2d 210, 214 (Tenn. 1977).
319. TENN. Cons ANN. § 28-106 (1955); see note 144 supra.
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reference the provisions of the Tennessee Rules. 320 So viewed, the

saving statute would not be available in cases like Lee or in any
other instance in which the plaintiff did not diligently prosecute
his initial action but utilized the saving statute as a tolling provision to extend the time otherwise available under the applicable
statute of limitation for commencing his action.
Because the Sixth Circuit decided Lee under the saving statute and not under rule 3, the opinion does not discuss the significance of the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs action without
prejudice. Since rule 41.01 provides that voluntary nonsuits are
generally without prejudice, 3 1 the trial court's dismissal was consistent with the rule. However, it is at least arguable that unless
an action is properly commenced the provisions of rule 41.01 are
inapplicable. If so, the outcome of cases like Lee would be wholly
unaffected by the trial court's dismissal without prejudice. In any
event, Lee makes clear that an attorney who directs the clerk not
to issue process does so at his peril.
c. Verification
The more limited purpose served by the pleadings under the
Tennessee Rules-a matter touched upon previously 3n-is reflected in rule 11, which eliminates the former equity requirement
that the pleadings be verified. The pleadings must still be verified, however, "when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute."2 In Blair v. Watts" defendants contended that plaintiffs action was fatally defective because the complaint was not
supported by affidavit as required by statute.' The state supreme court noted that the term "affidavit" at the time the Code
320. See TENN R. Civ. P, 41.
321. Tennessee rule 41.01 carves out exceptions for class actions and actions wherein a receiver has been appointed. See id. R. 23.05, 66. Rule 41.01(2)
also provides that "a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has twice dismissed in any court an action
based on or including the same claim."
322. See text accompanying notes 217-20 supra.
323. Under TENN. R. Civ. P. 11 pleadings are signed by an attorney of
record or, if a party is not represented by an attorney, by the party.
324. Id.
325. 555 S.W.2d 709 (Tenn. 1977).
326. The statutory provision involved was TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-2001
(1955), which provides that mandamus may issue upon a petition or bill
"supported by affidavit."
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section was enacted was synonymous with "sworn petition." '
The intent of the provision "is simply that the facts alleged...
be supported by oath or affidavit."3 Since both the original and
amended complaint were sworn to by plaintiff, the court quite
properly overruled defendants' assignment of error.
2.

Responsive Pleading

The defendant's correct procedural response for raising a res
judicata defense to the complaint was discussed in Usrey v.
Lewis.31 Defendants raised their res judicata objection in Usrey
by way of a motion to dismiss, and plaintiffs responded with a
motion to " 'strike, quash and dismiss' "" defendants' motion.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held:
[R]es judicata in an affirmative defense which must be plead
specially . . . . [T]he proper method to present the defense of
res judicata is by a pleading (answer), and not by a motion. If,
from affidavits or other evidence, the facts supporting the defense are made to appear uncontroverted, then a motion for
summary judgment would be in order.,"'
The court then treated defendants' motion as an answer presenting the defense of res judicata and as a motion for summary
judgment."' The court also stated that plaintiffs' motion to strike
was an appropriate method under rule 12.06 to raise a question
concerning the legal sufficiency of defendants' defense.3
The opinion in Usrey reflects a commendable willingness to
consider the substance of defendants' res judicata defense despite
noncompliance with what the court perceived to be the appropriate method for raising that defense. Moreover, the court's construction of the rules as requiring that a res judicata defense be
pleaded in defendant's answer is certainly credible and parallels
that given to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) by several
federal courts.Y However, a number of other federal courts per327. 555 S.W.2d at 711.
328. Id.
329. 553 S.W.2d 612 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
330. Id. at 613.
331. Id. at 614.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
1277 (1969).
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mit all affirmative defenses to be raised by motion, often by converting a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings into
a motion for summary judgment."' The results reached in these
federal cases seem sound since they avoid the wastefulness inherent in requiring defendant to prepare an answer to a case that
admits of a summary dispositionY.1 It would, therefore, seem best
not to construe 1lsrey as an impediment to a similar development
in the Tennessee case law.
Also, the court in Usrey was quite correct in stating that a
motion to strike is an appropriate mechanism to dispose of an
insufficient defense. 37 Only rarely, however, will a defense be so
obviously without merit as to permit the court to grant the motion without consideration of matters outside the pleadings. Typically, therefore, the appropriate mechanism to test the sufficiency of a defense is by way of a motion for partial summary
adjudication, which can be granted only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 3" "However," Professors Wright and
Miller contend, "it is questionable whether this procedure will be
worth the effort in many cases. As one [federal] court noted, the
partial summary judgment will narrow, but not terminate the
controversy between the parties, and thus smacks of 'polishing'
the pleadings." 33 '
3. Amendments
A peculiarly informative indication of the significance a
given procedural system attaches to the pleadings is reflected in
its attitude toward amendments. "At common law a litigant had
very little freedom to amend his written pleadings other than to
correct formal defects and remedy errors of oversight." 3"' Adams
v. Carter County Memorial Hospital"'1 and, more graphically,
335. Id.
336. Id. § 1277, at 337.
337. TENN. R. CiV. P. 12.06 permits the trial court to "order stricken from
any pleading any insufficient defense ......
338. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.
339. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1381,
at 804 (1969).
340. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC'rlCE AND PROCEDURE § 1471,
at 355 (1971).
341. 548 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1977).

1979]

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Farrar v. Farrar,34 2 on the other hand, are illustrations of the

increased freedom to amend sanctioned by the Tennessee Rules.
In Adams the state supreme court construed Tennessee rule
15.01 to mean exactly what it says: "[A] party may amend his
pleadings once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served." Accordingly, the court found error in the
trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint
since defendants had filed and served only motions to dismiss and
under the rules "[a] motion is not . . . a responsive pleading." '
3 " involved the distinguishable
By contrast, Farrarv. Farrar
problem that arises if there is a variance between the pleadings
and the proof. In Farrarboth plaintiff-husband and defendantwife sought a divorce, the former an absolute divorce and the
latter a divorce from bed and board, on the ground of cruel and
inhuman treatment. After repeated motions for a more definite
statement,'" defendant amended her counterclaim three times to
set forth the details of an open and continuous relationship between plaintiff and a named woman. The amended pleadings,
however, contained no specific charges of adultery. The supreme
court's review of the testimony, particularly plaintiff's, convinced
it that plaintiff engaged in a "persistent pattern of adulterous
conduct." 3" The court then held that "proof of adultery is admissible in a divorce action charging cruel and inhuman treatment
and may form the basis for a decree resting upon cruel and inhuman treatment.""' 7 While adultery was not specifically alleged,
the court took note of legislation3" attempting "to de-scandalize
divorce proceedings" 13 ' and construed defendant's detailed allegations as impliedly charging adultery. 0 "Moreover, this was the
major issue tried by the parties. Under these circumstances Rule
342. 553 S.W.2d 741 (Tenn. 1977).
343. 548 S.W.2d at 309; gee TENN. R. Civ. P. 7.01. It is somewhat anomalous that if defendant chooses to incorporate a rule 12 defense in his answer, he
no longer may amend as a matter of course more than 15 days after service of
his answer. However, the admonition of rule 15.01 that leave to amend be freely
given renders this anomaly without significant practical effect.
344. 553 S.W.2d 741 (Tenn. 1977).
345. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 12.05.
346. 553 S.W.2d at 744.
347. Id.
348. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-805 (1977).
349. 553 S.W.2d at 744.

350. Id.
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15.02 . . . comes into play and we may treat this issue as being
'tried by express or implied consent of the parties . . . as if they
[sicJ had been raised in the pleadings.'"1 Perhaps it would
have been "better practice""3 2 for defendant to have moved to
amend her counterclaim yet another time, but the court held that
"the failure to do so does not preclude this Court from deciding
the issues the parties tried in the Court below." 1 3 Having noted
that the parties were "fully apprised in advance of the nature of
the proof,"3" 4 the court concluded its discussion of the pleading
issue by agreeing with the dissenting judge in the court of appeals
that "[nlo useful purpose can be served by dismissing this case
and requiring the [wife] to institute a new suit, alleging adultery
and desertion and relitigating the issues anew."3"
At first blush it is somewhat startling that the court of appeals reversed the trial court's award of a divorce to the wife, but
"lulnlike most legal contests a suit for divorce is not regarded
as wholly in the hands of the two parties. The parties cannot
consent to a divorce. It is not surprising then that [a] court
examines with great care the process of proof." ' u This consideration, however, was not deemed to be significant by the supreme
court because it could not find "the slightest suggestion"M7 that
the evidence of adultery was the result of collusion or coercion,
Moreover, the recent addition of irreconcilable differences as a
ground for divorce in Tennesseew is reflective of changing societal
attitudes concerning the circumstances in which divorce should
be permitted and adds further support to the court's decision in
Farrar.
B.

Joinder of Claims and Parties

"In its simplest form, the paradigm of a lawsuit has a single
plaintiff asserting a single cause of action against a single defen351.
352.
353,
354.
355.

Id. (quoting TENN. R. Civ. P. 15.02).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Drowota, J., dissenting in the court of appeals in an

unreported opinion).
356.

J. COUND,

J.
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357.

553 S.W.2d at 744.

358.

TENN. CODE ANN.

92 (1970).

§ 36-801 (Cur. Supp. 1978).
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dant." ' As the complexity of society has increased and as more
intricate disputes have been generated, however, procedural devices have emerged by which the scope of civil litigation has
expanded by permitting the joinder of claims and parties. "' This
expansion in turn has given rise to novel procedural issues, one
of which involves the question whether a plaintiff, by instituting
his action, thereby waives a statute of limitation defense to a
counterclaim asserted by a defendant after the limitation period
on the counterclaim has run.
1. Counterclaims-Timeliness
In Brown v. Hipshire3 ' plaintiffs commenced an action on
July 28, 1976, for an alleged tort that occurred on August 27, 1975.
Defendant was served with process on August 3, 1976, and answered, denying liability, on September 7, 1976. Thereafter on
November 10, 1976, defendant moved to amend in order to assert
an omitted counterclaim. This motion was granted, and defendant filed his counterclaim on December 10, 1976, alleging assault and battery. Plaintiffs asserted that the applicable one-year
statute of limitationmi barred defendant's counterclaim and the
trial court sustained plaintiffs' plea. On an interlocutory appeal
the state supreme court affirmed.
In its 1969 decision in Lovejoy v. Ahearn, 3 the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that counterclaims sounding in tort must be
asserted within the applicable limitation period. Defendant in
Brown conceded that under Lovejoy his counterclaim was untimely, but sought to have the court overrule that decision. The
court refused to do so, reasoning that "Itlhe policy undergirding
limitation of actions is legislative policy, not judicial policy."M
Based upon this reasoning, the court further stated: "[lt is not
the prerogative of the courts to create an exception by grafting
upon the statute a waiver or a tolling provision for the benefit of
counterclaimants in tort actions. 3 15 The court recognized that in
359.

J. COUND, J.
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360.
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362.
363.
364.
365.
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E.g., TENN. R. Civ. P. 13-14, 18-20, 22-24.
553 S.W.2d 570 (Tenn. 1977).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
223 Tenn. 562, 448 S.W.2d 420 (1969).
553 S.W.2d at 571.
Id. at 572.
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another line of cases it has held that the statute of limitation does
not bar a defendant's plea of set-offP" and that,
while originally a purely defensive plea [set-off] has been expanded, so that, admittedly, there are some cases where a defendant in a contract action asserts as a set-off a claim that could
also be the subject of an independent action. But, in our opinion, it does not follow that this occasional similarity between a
set-off in a contract action and a counterclaim in a tort action
requires tolling of the limitation period for a tort counterclaim
that is in no circumstances a defensive plea. The courts, in
allowing all defensive pleas available to defendants, are not
grafting exceptions upon statutes of limitation governing the
commencement of independent actions. 7
Finally, the court noted that at the time defendant was, served
with process the limitation period had not run on his counterclaim, and that he did not even seek leave to file his omitted
counterclaim until over two months after he answered and without any factual assertion that his failure to include the counterclaim in his answer was the product of oversight, inadvertence or
excusable neglect "as required by [Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure] 13.06."'' 1 Accordingly, the court thought it doubtful
"that any jurisdiction would extend the lifeline to [a defendant],
who has so negligently responded to the stimulus of the statute
of limitations. " 36"
The holding of the earlier case of Lovejoy v. Ahearn373 adhered to in Brown has been more extensively criticized in an
earlier article."' The essential point made there is that none of
the purposes served by statutes of limitation are frustrated by
permitting adjudication of counterclaims that arise out of the
transaction or occurrence sued upon by plaintiff.
Generally speaking, statutes of limitation seek to provide
repose by establishing a specified time beyond which an individual may not be sued for his past misdeeds, and to prevent the
assertion of claims which may be stale in terms of availability
366. id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 573.
370. 223 Tenn. 562, 448 S.W.2d 420 (1969).
371. See Sobieski, Counterclaims and Statutes of Limitations: A Critical
Commentary on Present Tennessee Law, 42 TENN. L. REv. 291 (1975).
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of witnesses and other relevant evidence. By bringing his action,
however, plaintiff has made it abundantly clear that he does not
desire to lay to rest the transaction or occurrence upon which his
claim is founded. Adjudication of a claim of defendant based
upon the same transaction or occurrence would not entail inquiry into wholly unrelated matters which plaintiff justifiably
believed were beyond reawakening. Similarly, if a transaction or
occurrence is not so stale in terms of the availability of evidence
as to prevent litigation of plaintiff's claim, it would seem to
follow that the evidence would be equally available for purposes
of adjudicating defendant's claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence."'
Whether for these reasons or others, the holding in Lovejoy, con3 73
firmed in Brown, was recently set aside by legislation.
Still, it seems appropriate to express some dissatisfaction
with the court's approach to the resolution of the question presented in Brown. To say, as the court did, that the policy underlying statutes of limitation is legislative and not judicial provides
no answer to the question whether a defendant should be permitted to assert a counterclaim after the limitation period has expired. That question can be answered only by considering the
policies that statutes of limitation seek to further. Until that is
done it is hardly convincing to contend, as the Brown court did,
that "it is not the prerogative of the courts to create an exception
. . .[to] the statute"37 ' or that "it is doubtful that any jurisdiction would extend the lifeline to [a defendant], who has so negligently responded to the stimulus of the statute of limitations.":"'
Similarly, the court's reference to Tennessee rule 13.06 is somewhat mystifying since that provision is not designed to breathe
new life into a time-barred claim, but instead to provide an escape route from the barring effect of the failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim.371 Moreover, tort claims are expressly exempted from the compulsory counterclaim rule, 3" thus rendering
372. Id. at 293-94.
373. 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 758, §§ 1-2.
374. 553 S.W.2d at 572.
375. Id. at 573.
376. TENN. R. Civ. P. 13.06 provides: "When a pleader fails to set up a
counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment."
377. TENN. R. Civ. P. 13.01.
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rule 13.06 largely irrelevant. All of which simply says that the
fundamental weakness of Brown was its failure to ask why.
2. Impleader
Another procedural mechanism, besides counterclaims, with
which a defending party can expand the scope of civil litigation
is impleader, which permits a defending party, as a third-party
plaintiff, to "cause a summons and complaint to be served upon
a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
for all or a part of the plaintiff's claim against him.""37 In Velsicol
Chemical Corp. v.Rowe3"' the Tennessee Supreme Court considered the availability of rule 14 on impleader in a nuisance action
seeking damages. The original plaintiffs in Velsicol, residents and
homeowners in the Alton Park area of Chattanooga, brought their
damage action against Velsicol Chemical Corporation, alleging
that Velsicol's chemical manufacturing plant in Alton Park emitted pollutants that contaminated the air and water, and constituted both a nuisance and a trespass by depositing identifiable
pollutants on plaintiffs' properties. Plaintiffs also alleged Velsicol
acted in intentional disregard of the law and previously-issued
injunctions, entitling plaintiffs to punitive damages. Velsicol answered, denying liability, and filed third-party complaints
against five additional defendants, contending that each of these
defendants operated plants in Alton Park that emitted pollutants, thus rendering them liable for "whatever amount of recovery is made by said plaintiffs." ' The trial court granted the
third-party defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground that the
third-party complaint failed to state a claim for relief since the
original defendant and third-party defendants were not joint tortfeasors, and thus the original defendant was not entitled either
to contribution or indemnity. On an appeal from the order of
dismissal, the state supreme court reversed.
Most of the opinion of the court is devoted to the substantive
question whether Velsicol was entitled to either indemnity or
contributionY3' In language reminiscent of Swallows and Jose'"
the court concluded that "the third-party plaintiff has not alleged
378. Id. R. 14.01.
379. 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976).
380. Id. at 338.
381. Id. at 338-43.
382. See text accompanying notes 221-51 supra.
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facts sufficient to give rise to a possible right of indemnity against
the third-party defendants." 3 R
8 Contribution, however, was another matter. After an extensive discussion of the law of Tennessee and elsewhere, the court held that parties can be jointly and
severally liable "when an indivisible injury has been caused by
the concurrent, but independent, wrongful acts or omissions of
two or more wrongdoers, whether the case be one of negligence or
nuisance."8 4 This rule is subject to the statutory exception that
"one who intentionally causes or contributes to an injury has no
right of contribution. "1 5
Having settled upon the governing substantive law, the procedural issues involved in Velsicol presented little difficulty. Rule
14, the court stated, authorizes "a third-party complaint based
upon a claim of one tortfeasor for indemnity or contribution from
other alleged 'joint tortfeasors.' "I" Moreover, the "may be liable" language of rule 1411 means that the "allegations of the
third-party complaint need not show that recovery is a certainty;
the complaint should be allowed to stand if, under some reasonable construction of the facts which might be advanced at trial,
recovery would be possible."3' M Nor was the third-party complaint
premature. As noted by Professor Moore, whom the court quoted
approvingly:381
The fact that contribution may not actually be obtained until
the original defendant has been cast in judgment and has paid
does not prevent impleader; the impleader judgment may be so
fashioned as to protect the rights of the other tort-feasors, so
that defendant's judgment over against them may not be enforced until the defendant has paid plaintiffs judgment or more
than his proportionate share, whichever the law may require.3
Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the trial court's judgment dismissing the third-party action and remanded for further
proceedings.
The opinion in Velsicol does not expressly indicate whether
383.
384.
385.

543 S.W.2d at 339.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 343 n.4; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3102(c) (Cur. Supp. 1978).

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

543 S.W.2d at 338.
See text accompanying note 378 supra.
543 S.W.2d at 343.
Id. at 343-44.
3 MOORE's FEDERAL PAC'CE 14.11, at 322-23 (2d ed. 1974).
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intent within the meaning of the contribution statute is synonymous with the intent required to support an award of punitive
damages. Nor is the opinion entirely clear as to whether damages
are to be apportioned pro rata as provided by statutes" or according to the extent to which each defendant caused the harm for
which plaintiffs seek compensation.2" For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that the impleader issue involved in
Velsicol probably would be unaffected, regardless of how these
matters are resolved, since, at the time the third-party complaint
is filed, recovery is reasonably possible.1' 3
3.

Need to Make the Attorney General a Party

Generally speaking, the joinder of parties is permissive, not
mandatory."' Paty v. McDaniel,"' however, is a reminder of the
attorney general's right to be heard in certain types of litigation.
Paty, which ultimately reached the United States Supreme
Court, 3 involved the question of whether the Tennessee constitutional provision rendering ministers of the gospel and priests of
all denominations ineligible for a seat in the General Assembly"'
violates the Federal Constitution. A candidate for the 1977 constitutional convention brought an action to have a Baptist minister
declared ineligible to run for and serve as a delegate to the constitutional convention, the qualifications to serve as a delegate to
the constitutional convention being the same as those for membership in the House of Representatives.' In his answer, defendant alleged that the Tennessee constitutional prohibition on his
service as a delegate violated the United State Constitution.
Under the Tennessee Code, the attorney general in a declaratory
judgment action is entitled to be served and to be heard if a
391. See TENN. CODE ANN. J§ 23-3102(b), -3103 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
392. At one point in its opinion the court refers to Landers v. East Texas
Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952), which, the court
stated, permits a defendant to "reduce his liability by showing the amount of
damage caused by his acts only, or the amount that was caused by other defendants." 543 S.W.2d at 342. Later, the supreme court stated that it "adopts]
the rule of Landers." Id. at 343.
393. See text accompanying note 388 supra.
394. See, e.g., TENN. R. Civ, P. 20. But see id. R. 19.
395. 547 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1977).
396. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
397. TENs. CONST. art. 9, § 1.
398. 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 848, § 4.
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statute, ordinance, or franchise of statewide effect is alleged to be
unconstitutional" as defendant alleged in Paty. A similar but
even more expansive provision is contained in the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure.'0 Accordingly, on the first appeal to the
state supreme court, the case was remanded to the trial court to
permit the attorney general to be made a party.
C.

Disposition Without a Full Trial

Lawsuits are often disposed of without a full trial. The essential purpose of a trial is to present evidence on contested issues
of fact. Issues of law, on the other hand, can be resolved without
a trial; all that is'needed is a means of bringing the legal contentions to the court's attention. One such mechanism is a motion
for summary judgment, which may be granted, in the language
of Tennessee rule 56.03, only if "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and

. . .

the moving party is entitled to a judg-

ment as a matter of law."
The availability of summary judgment in medical malpractice actions was the central focus of the state supreme court's
attention in Bowman v. Henard.10 In response to plaintiffs allegations of professional negligence in the death of her husband,
defendants moved for summary judgment. Their motions were
supported by their own affidavits as well as the affidavits of other
practitioners of medicine and surgery and other radiologists. All
of the affidavits asserted essentially that defendants acted in conformity with the standard of care required by law. Plaintiff responded with an affidavit of one of her attorneys who stated that
based on his experience "a case of negligence can be made out
. . . [and that] based upon the facts . . . a jury will likely

conclude the defendants were guilty of negligence."'0 The trial
court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment; the
court of appeals affirmed, and on certiorari the supreme court
also affirmed.
399. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1107 (1955).
400. TENN. R. Civ. P. 24.04 provides:
When the validity of a statute of this state or an administrative rule or

regulation of this state is drawn in question in any action to which the
state or an officer or agency is not a party, the court shall require that
notice be given the attorney general, specifying the pertinent statute,
rule or regulation.

401. 547 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1977).
402. Id. at 529.
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The purpose of summary judgment, the court reasoned, is
"'to provide a quick, inexpensive means of concluding cases, in
whole or in part, upon issues as to which there is no dispute
regarding the material facts.' , 3 On the other hand, summary
judgment is not designed to resolve disputed questions of fact or
"to force a party to try his case on affidavits with no opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses."I'm As a general rule, therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate in negligence actions because,
as noted by two distinguished commentators cited by the court,
"[fjudge and jury each have a specialized function in negligence
actions and particular deference has been accorded the jury in
this class of cases in light of its supposedly unique competence
in applying the reasonable man standard to a given fact situaI Moreover, summary judgment is particularly inapprotion.""6
priate in medical malpractice actions because of "the natural
tendency of [defendants' professional] colleagues to be good
Samaritans and come to their rescue in a time of distress."" In
addition, the court conceded that it is also generally true that,
"'[biecause opinion testimony always is subject to evaluation
by the fact finder,' ""I expert opinion testimony is " 'not an appropriate basis for summary judgment.' "10s
None of these considerations, however, rendered summary
judgment inappropriate in Bowman. Unlike most negligence actions, a medical malpractice action requires expert testimony
unless the alleged malpractice is within the common knowledge
of a layman." Because the deceased died of" 'cardio-renal failure,' following 'an exploratory operation' revealing 'a mass in the
pelvis, probably a ruptured Mechel's Diverticulum,' ""I the
court concluded, quite safely it seems, that these are not matters
within the common knowledge of laymen but require expert testimony."' Accordingly, this case fell within an exception to the
403. Id. (quoting Evco Corp. v. Ross, 528 S.W.2d 20, 24-25 (Tenn. 1975)).
404. Id. at 530.
405. 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2729,
at 560 (1973), cited in 547 S.W.2d at 530.
406. 547 S.W.2d at 530.
407.

Id. (quoting 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

§ 2738, at 690-92 (1973)).
408. Id. (quoting 10 C. WRIGHT & A.
PROCEDURE § 2738, at 690-92 (1973)).
409. Id. at 530-31.
410. Id,at 531.
411. Id.
PROCEDURE
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rule disallowing summary judgment in most negligence actions:
"'[Ilf the only issue is one of the kind on which expert testimony
must be presented, and nothing is presented to challenge the
affidavit of the expert, summary judgment may be proper.' "2
Here, the only affidavit submitted by plaintiff was from one of
her attorneys, who simply was not a qualified expert on matters
of medical malpractice.1 3 Plaintiff, therefore, failed to comply
with Tennessee rule 56.05, which provides that
[wihen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial."'
Based on these considerations, the court held:
[Iln those malpractice actions wherein expert medical testimony is required to establish negligence and proximate cause,
affidavits by medical doctors which clearly and completely refute plaintiff's contention afford a proper basis for dismissal of
the action on summary judgment, in the absence of proper responsive proof by affidavit or otherwise. In those cases wherein
the acts are [sic] complained of are within the ken of the common layman, the affidavit [sic] of medical experts may be
considered along with all other proof, but are not conclusive. " '
The scope of the holding in Bowman is obviously intended
to be quite narrow, and the court's opinion as well as rule 56 itself
seem to support the following generalizations. In malpractice actions in which expert testimony is not required, summary judgment is rarely appropriate since usually there will be disputed
questions of fact or disputes concerning application of the governing legal standard to a given fact situation. In malpractice actions
in which expert testimony is required and expert evidence is presented by the plaintiff in support of his position, summary judgment is appropriate only if the defendant has an ironclad defense.

412. Id. at 530 (quoting 10 C. WRGrr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROcEDUrE § 2738, at 692-94 (1973)).

413. Id. at 531.
414. TENN. R. Cw. P. 56.05; see 547 S.W.2d at 531.
415. 547 S.W.2d at 531.
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Even if the plaintiff offers no contrary expert proof, summary
judgment may be denied on the ground that the plaintiff should
be given additional time to obtain the necessary evidence. "' Only
if the plaintiff offers no expert proof as required and is not deserving of additional time to obtain it, is summary judgment appropriate, at least if the defendant's motion is supported by expert
proof of persons not parties to the litigation.
The appealability of a denial of summary judgment was the
dispositive issue, or at least the supreme court so held, in Williamson County Broadcasting Co. v. Williamson County Board
of Education."' The underlying dispute involved the applicability of the Tennessee Open-Meeting Act" 8 to the Williamson
County Board of Education, defendant board and its members
asserting that the meetings involved were informal assemblages
not covered by the Act. Plaintiffs, insisting that the meetings
were covered, moved for summary judgment, supported by depositions. After a hearing on the motion, the chancellor held that
there were no genuine issues of material fact but decided the
questions of law adversely to plaintiffs. The motion for summary
judgment was therefore denied. The chancellor also concluded his
findings of fact and conclusions of law with the statement: "'If
plaintiffs elect to stand upon their motion for summary judgment, as indicated by plaintiffs' counsel in the course of argument, the complaint in this case will be dismissed at plaintiffs'
cost.' """ Shortly thereafter defendants moved for summary judgment and plaintiffs moved to amend the findings. The chancellor
never expressly acted on defendants' summary judgment motion
but, after overruling plaintiffs' motion to amend, entered a decree
dismissing the action. The court of appeals considered an ensuing
appeal on the merits, but the Tennessee Supreme Court held that
the case "is simply not ripe for appellate review.''420
Had the chancellor sustained defendants' motion for summary judgment, there would have been a final judgment.42 ' However, the chancellor only denied plaintiffs' motion for summary
416. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.06.
417. 549 S.W.2d 371 (Tenn, 1977).
418. TENN. ConE ANN. §§ 8-4401 to 4406 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
419. 549 S.W.2d at 372 (quoting the chancellor's findings of fact and conclusions of law) (emphasis added by the supreme court).
420. Id.
421. Id.
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judgment. "When a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment has
been overruled, he has simply lost a preliminary skirmish and
must proceed to trial."'2' If the plaintiff" 'stands' on his unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, the proper procedure is for
the trial judge to dismiss for want of prosecution.' 3 Since appeals generally lie only from final judgments and since overruling
a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory ruling, an
appeal as of right did not lie.' The supreme court recognized that
denial of summary judgment might be appealable by permission
under the interlocutory appeals statute, 2' but, on the facts presented, that statute "was neither pursued nor pursuable. .. .
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions
that the chancellor rule on defendants' summary judgment motion or direct plaintiffs to prosecute their action. The court then
concluded its opinion with a perplexing statement:
In the event, this action is fully and finally terminated on defendants' motion for a summary judgment, the additional record
thus made may be certified to the Court of Appeals for such
action as it may deem appropriate, and that Court may then
forward the record to us for consideration on the merits. If terminated after a trial on the merits the usual procedure on appellate
review shall govern.'"
Nothing in Tennessee rule 56 specifically discusses the power
of the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of the
nonmoving party. Federal rule 56 is equally silent:
A few [federal] courts, expressing a reluctance to enter a judgment in the absence of a motion requesting the court to do so,
have refrained from disposing of the original motion in order to
allow a cross-motion to be made. However, the weight of authority is that summary judgment may be rendered in favor of the
opposing party even though he has made no formal cross-motion
under Rule 56. n
422.
423.
424.
425,
426.
427.

Id.
Id. at 373,
Id.

428.

10 C. WRIGHT & A. MrLL , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND Paocin

TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-305 (Cum. Supp. 1978).

549 S.W.2d at 373.
Id.

at 467-68 (1973).
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Professors Wright and Miller contend:
The practice of allowing summary judgment to be entered for
the nonmoving party in the absence of a formal cross-motion is
appropriate. It is in keeping with the objective of Rule 56 to
expedite the disposition of cases and, somewhat more remotely,
with the mandate of Rule 54(c) requiring the court to grant the
relief to which a party is entitled "even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings." Indeed, in 1955 the
Advisory Committee proposed an amendment to Rule 56(c),
which was not adopted, codifying the power of the court to grant
summary judgment without waiting for a cross-motion and
some states have provisions to that effect in their summ~ary
judgment rules,'
If the state supreme court was unwilling to recognize the
power of a trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the
nonmoving party-an unwillingness that might be justifiable, at
least in some circumstances4s-it would have been helpful if the
court had explained why the trial court's decree dismissing the
action was not construed as a grant of defendants' summary judgment motion. Certainly the chancellor's admonition in his findings and conclusions put plaintiffs on notice that judgment would
be entered against them unless they demonstrated there were
genuine issues of fact and that defendants were not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Perhaps the key to the decision in
Williamson County lies in the court's observation, tucked away
in its rendition of the facts, that plaintiffs' motion to amend
"shows conclusively that there were unresolved and genuine issues of material facts."43 If so, reversal was appropriate not because the case was unappealable but because the standard for
granting summary judgment was not met. Moreover, reversal on
the ground that summary judgment is inappropriate avoids the
wastefulness that otherwise ensues if the chancellor subsequently, but erroneously, grants defendants' summary judgment
motion.
Reference has already been made to the perplexing last paragraph of the court's opinion in which the court stated that if
defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, the additional record may be certified to the court of appeals for whatever
429. Id. § 2720, at 470 (footnotes omitted).
430. Id. § 2720, at 471.
431. 549 S.W.2d at 372.
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action it deems appropriate, "and that Court may then forward
the record to us for consideration on the merits. If terminated
after a trial on the merits the usual procedure on appellate review
shall govern."' 32 The paragraph is perplexing because, while the
law in other jurisdictions authorizes the highest court to review
cases decided or pending in the intermediate appellate court
upon certification of that court or on the highest court's own
motion,"' no comparable procedure is expressly authorized in
Tennessee. Instead, existing law places the initiative for seeking
review by the supreme court in the hands of the parties.1"3 To be
sure, cases appealed to the wrong appellate court may be transferred to the proper court,435 but, as the supreme court itself noted
in Bowman v. Henard,/" "where a motion for summary judgment
is supported by 'evidentiary matters, such as depositions, affidavits, or exhibits,' the appeal is to the Court of Appeals.""' According to the supreme court's statement of the facts in
Williamson County, defendants' summary judgment motion was
supported by depositions,'s thus rendering the court of appeals,
under the law then in effect, the proper court to which to appeal.4 31 Perhaps the supreme court simply wanted to ensure compliance with its disposition of the case and desired to relieve the
parties of the burden of preparing further petitions for certiorari
and briefs in case of noncompliance on remand. Perhaps it had
some other good reason in mind for employing the procedure
outlined in its concluding statement, but for now that statement
remains somewhat of a mystery.
Only two published opinions of the court of appeals involved
summary judgment. One of them, Small World, Inc. v. Industrial
Development Board," does not meaningfully elaborate upon the
procedural law of summary judgment and will not therefore be
432.

Id. at 373. See also 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MIUZR, F. COOPER & E. GRESS-

§ 3937 (1977).
433. E.g., COLO. APP. R. 50(b); MASS. APP. R. 11(a); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
16-7-14(c) (1953); N.C. R. APP. P. 15.
434. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-452, 27-819 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
435. See id. §§ 16-409, -450.
436. 547 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1977).
437. Id. at 528 n.1 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 483 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tenn. 1977)) (emphasis omitted).
438. 549 S.W.2d at 372.
439. But see text accompanying notes 598-600 infra.
440. 553 S.W.2d 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
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discussed. Union Livestock Yards, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,"' however, is deserving of discussion.
Merrill Lynch obtained a judgment in federal district court
against Lambert and, in order to satisfy its judgment, had garnishments served on Cas and Virginia Walker to reach any property in the possession of the Walkers belonging to Lambert. About
a year before entry of the federal judgment, the Walkers and
Lambert had entered a written agreement, the terms of which
required the Walkers to pay Lambert royalties for the use of a
rock quarry. As a result of the garnishment the Walkers paid the
royalties due Lambert to Merrill Lynch.
The crux of the substantive law issue raised in Union
Livestock stemmed from the fact that prior to levy of the garnishment Merrill Lynch had knowledge that Lambert assigned his
royalties to Union Livestock Yards, though the assignment had
not been recorded. The Walkers, on the other hand, "had no
notice or knowledge of the assignment of these royalties by Lambert to [Union Livestock Yards].""' Union Livestock commenced an action against Merrill Lynch and the Walkers alleging that as a result of the assignment it had priority over Merrill
Lynch. The chancellor granted defendants' motions for summary
judgment and the court of appeals affirmed.
As one of its grounds for reversal, Union Livestock contended
that the chancellor erred "in accepting and considering on the
day of the hearing of motions for summary judgment [Merrill
Lynch's] sole affidavit in support of their motions, as the affidavit was not filed together with the motions for thirty (30) days
before time for a hearing.""44 The motion for summary judgment
itself had been filed more than thirty days prior to the hearing
on the motion, but the affidavit in support of the motion was filed
the day of the hearing. In support of its argument Union Livestock relied on that portion of Tennessee rule 6.04(2) requiring
affidavits to be served with the motion,"' and on the decision of
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Craven v. Lawson.""
In Craven plaintiff settled his case against one of two defen441.
442.
443.
444.
ported by
445.

552 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
Id. at 393.
Id.
TENN. R. Civ. P. 6.04(2) provides in part: "When a motion is supaffidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion ..
534 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. 1976).
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dants a few days before trial was to begin. On the day of trial the
other defendant moved to amend his answer and for summary
judgment on the ground that the release extinguished his derivative or vicarious liability. Plaintiff in turn moved to amend his
complaint to allege other independent acts of negligence, and also
moved to vacate summary judgment that had been granted the
same day defendant's motion was filed and presented to the trial
court. Vacation was urged on the ground that the motion itself
was not filed thirty days prior to the hearing on the motion as
required by Tennessee rule 56.03."' The supreme court held that
the thirty-day period prescribed by rule 56.03 "is mandatory and
not discretionary," but went on to state:
In this case the facts as pleaded bearing on the issue made
on defendant's summary judgment motion are undisputed and
the question presented is one of law only. In the interest of the
orderly and expeditious disposition of litigation and to serve the
manifest interest of the parties in this case we must finally
decide that legal issue on this appeal, the effect of which is to
render harmless the error of the trial judge. However, it should
be apparent that where there is the slightest possibility that the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment has been denied the opportunity to file affidavits, take discovery depositions or amend, by the disposition of a motion for summary
judgment without a thirty (30) day interval following the filing
of the motion, it will be necessary to remand the case to cure
such error. 4"
Relying on this portion of the opinion in Craven, the court
of appeals in Union Livestock held that, while the party moving
for summary judgment is required to file supporting affidavits
with the motion, on the facts presented this error was harmless.
The purpose of the affidavit filed on the date of the hearing was
to affirm that the Walkers had no knowledge or notice of the
assignment of these royalties from Lambert to [Union Livestock] prior to the service of the garnishment on the Walkers.
(Union Livestock] makes no claim it has been prejudiced by
this late affidavit or has been denied in any way an opportunity
446. TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.03 provides in part: "The motion [for summary
judgment] shall be served at least thirty (30) days before the time fixed for the
hearing."
447. 534 S.W.2d at 655.

448. Id.
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to counter same. To reverse on this assignment would serve the
interest of neither party and in fact impede the disposition of
the litigation for no purpose."'
On the merits of the substantive law question the court held that
Merrill Lynch had gained priority by serving its garnishment
prior to the time Union Livestock perfected its assignment by
notifying the Walkers. 4 The court concluded its opinion by rejecting Union Livestock's argument that a question of fact existed
as to whether the assignment by Lambert was intended as a
security instrument. That question would be relevant only if the
assignment were governed by the Commercial Code, but the
Code, the court held, is inapplicable to the kind of payments
involved in Union Livestock.41' Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court was affirmed.
The thirty-day period prescribed in rule 56.03 for serving a
motion for summary judgment, along with the requirement of
rule 6.04(2) that affidavits be served with the motion, is designed
to afford the party opposing the motion ample time to prepare
himself to demonstrate that summary judgment should not be
granted. The period is substantially longer than the five-day period prescribed in rule 6.04(1) for the service of other motions
because of the drastic consequence to the opposing party of the
grant of summary judgment and because of the difficulties often
encountered in adequately opposing such a motion.' On the
facts presented in Union Livestock plaintiff was given the full
time required by the rules to ascertain the state of the law since
the motion itself was filed thirty days prior to the hearing. On the
other hand, filing the affidavit on the day of the hearing deprived
plaintiff of a meaningful opportunity to inquire into the accuracy
of its factual assertion that the Walkers had no knowledge or
notice of the assignment by Lambert. In all probability, however,
plaintiff could have readily come forth with the evidence if it had
given notice to the Walkers of Lambert's assignment of his royalty payments. The court of appeals, therefore, was probably correct in holding the assigned error harmless; still, great caution
needs to be exercised lest summary judgment become a mecha449. 552 S.W.2d at 394.
450. Id. at 397,

451. Id.
452. See also 10 C.
§ 2719, at 449-52 (1973).
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nism to deprive the nonmoving party of his right to a trial of
disputed questions of fact.
D.

ObtainingInformation: Discovery

In most modern procedural systems, procedural rules are
designed in a way to ensure that lawsuits will be disposed of on
their merits." "Obviously, for this to occur, the merits of the case
must be made known to the court. Since pleadings are not required to do this and motions are not able to do it, the work of
uncovering the merits of a claim or defense has to be done by
other tools."' The mechanism used to serve this function is
pretrial discovery.'"
Somewhat paradoxically, the most notable development
during the survey period concerning discovery may be what did
not happen: the proposed amendments to the Tennessee discovery rules were not even submitted to the General Assembly for its
approval. Given the fact that the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules has recommended further amendments to the federal discovery rules,' it may be some time before a set of proposed
amendments to the Tennessee Rules is again submitted for legislative approval.
On the more positive side, there were two additions to the
Tennessee Code related to discovery. One of the additions provides that nonresident motorists who are served with process pursuant to the nonresident motorist statute are required to appear
in the county in which the action is pending to give pretrial discovery depositions."7 No sanction is specified in the statute for
noncompliance; presumably, the sanctions available are those
specified in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.1-1
The other addition to the Code involves the use of subpoenas
453. See, e.g., TENN.R. Civ. P. I ("These rules shall be construed to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."); id. R. 8.06
("All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.").
454. M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, H. SMrr & H. KORN,supra note 216, at
756.
455. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
456. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMEND-

MENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 6-36 (Mar.
457. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-224 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
458. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 37.02, .04.
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duces tecum for hospital records,"' whether the subpoena is issued for discovery, trial, or other purposes.4 Under this addition
to the Code, if a subpoena is served on the custodian of the records of any hospital "in an action or proceeding in which the
hospital is neither a party nor the place where any cause of action
is alleged to have arisen . . .,",' the custodian within five days
after service may file, either in person or by certified or registered
mail, a "true and correct" copy of all records described in the
subpoena." 2 Parties utilizing this addition to the Code must
"furnish the adverse party or his attorney a copy of the subpoena
duces tecum not less than ten (10) days prior to the date set for
trial of the matter for which the records may be introduced."'"
Further sections specify the procedure to be followed in sealing,
identifying, and mailing the records"' as well as the procedure for
opening of the sealed envelopes.'" The records must be accompanied by an affidavit of the custodian attesting to their authenticity and other matters rendering them admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule."' "The copy of the record shall be admissible
in evidence to the same extent as though the original thereof were
offered and the custodian had been present and testified to the
matters stated in the affidavit.""' 7 Similarly, "[t]he affidavit
shall be admissible in evidence and the matters stated therein
shall be presumed true in the absence of a preponderance of evidence to the contrary."' Another section specifies how personal
attendance of the custodian and production of the original records can be procured."' If the originals are produced and introduced into evidence, copies may be substituted "unless otherwise
directed for good cause by the court, officer, body, or tribunal
conducting the hearing."' 7 Virtually all "hospital records" as deSee TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 53-1501 to 1508 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
460. Id. § 53-1503.
461. Id. § 53-1502.
462. Id.
459.

463. Id.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Id. § 53-1503.
Id. § 53-1504.
Id. § 53-1505.
Id. § 53-1506.

Id.
Id. § 53-1507.
Id. § 53-1508.
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fined by the Medical Records Act of 1974'1" are covered by this
472
addition to the Code.

V.
A.

TRIAL PROCEDURE

Trial by Jury: Selection and Composition

Once discovery is complete and assuming the action has not
otherwise been terminated, it is ready for trial. If the action is to
be tried by a jury, one of the initial steps in the trial process is
the selection of the jury from among those eligible for jury service.
Under rule 47.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,
the trial court determines the method and scope of the examination of prospective jurors. The rule authorizes the court to conduct the examination itself or to permit the parties or their attorneys to do so. The rule also provides that if the court examines
the prospective jurors, "the court shall permit the parties or their
attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry
as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors
such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as it
deems proper."
By virtue of a new section added to the Tennessee Code, the
parties or their attorneys in both civil and criminal cases are
given "an absolute right to examine prospective jurors . . . notwithstanding any rule of procedure or practice of court to the
contrary."'' The extent to which this section affects the trial
court's discretion under rule 47.01 is not free from doubt. Construed most narrowly, this section is merely a legislative affirmation of the right accorded the parties under rule 47.01 to supplement the court's examination of prospective jurors. Somewhat
more broadly, this section might eliminate only that much of the
trial court's discretion as empowers the court itself to submit to
the jurors questions propounded by the parties or their attorneys.
Even more broadly, this section might also affect the trial court's
authority to limit the scope of the examination of prospective
jurors. The last two interpretations might result in abuse by some
counsel. 7' It seems likely, therefore, that the most narrow inter-

471.
472.
473.
474.
PRACTICE

Id. § 53-1320(B) (1977).
Id. § 53-1501 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Id. § 22-501.
See, e.g., 4 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL
7 4107.03-.06 (1977); Note, Voir Dire-Preventionof Prejudicial
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pretation will commend itself to the courts.

The Tennessee Code was also amended to exempt all practicing certified public accountants and public accountants from jury
service.7 As the editors of a leading casebook on civil procedure
have noted: "Needless to say, exemptions [from jury service]
may be founded on little more than a particular lobby's effectiveness in the legislature. 4
B.

Withdrawing the Case from the Jury

After the jurors have been selected and sworn, and after the
opening statements, the parties present their proof in support of
their respective positions. While the jury acts as the trier of disputed questions of fact disclosed by the evidence, the trial court
retains a significant amount of power to keep the jury in check.
"Of the means of withdrawing a case from the jury's consideration the directed verdict is the most dramatic and emphatic." '7
1. Directed Verdict
In only one case decided during the survey period did the
procedural law of directed verdicts receive extensive and explicit
attention. Although State v.Thompson was a criminal case, it
afforded the Tennessee Supreme Court an opportunity to say a
good deal, by way of dictum, about directed verdicts in civil
actions.
Defendant in Thompson was indicted and convicted for
counseling or procuring the burning of a building, a conviction
the supreme court held should have been simply for arson.' At
the conclusion of the state's largely circumstantial case, defendant moved for a directed verdict pursuant to the rather vague
provisions of the Tennessee Code authorizing directed verdicts in
criminal cases. ' The trial court overruled this motion, finding
Questioning, 50 MINN. L.REV. 1088, 1093 (1966).
475. TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-103 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
476. D. LOUlSELL & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE STATE AND FEDERAL 983 (3d ed. 1973).
477. M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, H. SMrr & H. KORN, supra note 216,
at 1008.
478. 549 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1977).
479. Id. at 944.
480. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2529 (1975) provides: "In a criminal prosecution the trial judge shall direct the jury to acquit the defendant if at the close
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that there was sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury.
Although defendant did not testify in her own behalf, she did
offer other testimony in her defense. On cross-examination of
defendant's witnesses, the state elicited testimony favorable to its
position. At the conclusion of all the proof, defendant did not
renew her directed verdict motion and the case was submitted to
the jury, which found defendant guilty. On appeal, the court of
criminal appeals reversed defendant's conviction on the ground
the trial court erred in overruling defendant's directed verdict
motion made at the close of the state's case-in-chief. The state
supreme court reversed the intermediate appellate court and
reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that defendant, by introducing evidence in her own behalf, waived her right
to obtain appellate review of the trial court's denial of her directed verdict motion."'
In discussing the law of directed verdicts as it has evolved in
civil actions, the court emphasized that the purpose of the motion, like its predecessor the demurrer to the evidence, is to test
the legal sufficiency of the facts in evidence.In The court continued:
[No party has an absolute right to have a directed verdict
granted until the close of all of the evidence. If a motion made
at the conclusion of the plaintiffs proof is overruled, the defendant must stand upon his motion, and rest his case without
offering proof, in order to have the record at that point preserved
for appellate review. If the motion is overruled and the defendant does not stand upon the motion, but rather proceeds to
offer evidence, then it is necessary for the defendant to "renew' t
his motion-actually to make another motion-at the end of all
of the evidence in order to have the same considered. Both the
trial and appellate courts then review the entire record, not just
the plaintiff's case-in-chief, in determining whether the defense
motion should be granted.i
While admitting there were some differences between criminal
and civil cases "which prevent complete adaptation of civil proceof the evidence for the prosecution, or at the close of all the evidence, the court
is of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to warrant a conviction."
481. 549 S.W.2d at 945-46.
482. Id. at 945.
483. Id.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

dure on directed verdicts into criminal trials,""'4 the court nonetheless concluded that the test for granting directed verdicts in
criminal cases is generally similar to the test utilized in civil
cases.1 5 The test in criminal actions, as developed by the court
of criminal appeals and expressly approved by the supreme court,
requires the trial judge and the reviewing court on appeal to look
at all of the evidence, to take the strongest legitimate view of it
in favor of the opponent of the motion, and to allow all reasonable inferences from it in its favor; to discard all countervailing
evidence, and if then, there is any dispute as to any material
determinative evidence, or any doubt as to the conclusion to be
drawn from the whole evidence, the motion must be denied.'"
Moreover, the supreme court was of the further opinion that
under the present statute the practice used in civil cases should
be used in criminal cases with respect to the times when a motion for directed verdict may appropriately be made on behalf
of a defendant in a criminal trial. The trial judge should not be
placed in error for overruling a motion at the conclusion of the
State's proof when the defendant has not then rested his case,
but has gone forward with the evidence in his own behalf. '
Applying this law to the facts of Thompson, the court held
that the action taken by the trial court on defendant's directed
verdict motion was no longer open to review.' u The court also
held, based upon a review of all the evidence, that even if a timely
motion for a directed verdict had been made at the conclusion of
all the evidence, it would not have been proper for the trial court
to grant such a motion and the judge was correct in submitting
the case to the jury."' Accordingly, the supreme court found error
in the "implicit conclusion" of the court of criminal appeals "that
the verdict is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence
"4S80

The court concluded its opinion with a comparison between
the trial court's role in directing a verdict of acquittal and the
484. Id.
485. Id. at 946.
486. Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 533 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tenn. Crim. App,),
cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1975)). See also text accompanying notes 512-13 infra.
487. 549 S.W.2d at 946.

488. Id.
489. Id. at 946-48.
490.

Id. at 948.
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appellate court's function in reviewing the adequacy of the evidence to sustain a conviction. "The directing of a verdict .
the court stated, "is entirely different from reviewing the preponderance, particularly in criminal cases, where well-settled rules
. . . govern the role and function of an appellate court." '' A
conviction will be set aside by an appellate court on the inadequacy of the evidence only if the evidence preponderates against
the guilty verdict and in favor of the accused's innocence."' This
limited scope of appellate review is based on recognition of the
fact that:
In this state, a trial judge has a unique function with respect to
jury verdicts, in criminal cases as well as in civil cases. He is
commonly referred to in the reported cases as a "thirteenth
juror", and is required either to approve or disapprove the findings of the jury. If he fails to exercise this function, the case will
be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Where, as in the present case, the trial judge has approved
a jury verdict, an appellate court should be reluctant to overturn
that verdict on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence.
That it has the authority to do so, in criminal cases unlike jury
verdicts in civil cases, however, is well settled, and this function
is an entirely different one from that of directing a verdict of
acquittal."'
The supreme court did not delineate precisely in what respect the function of the trial judge acting as the thirteenth juror
differs from the appellate court reviewing the adequacy of the
evidence. Nor did the court expressly indicate whether a similar
difference exists in civil actions. The scope of review by the trial
court of a jury verdict should be broader than that of the appellate court reviewing the same case. The trial court and jury are
in a position to take note of a number of factors affecting the
probative value of testimony that cannot be adequately conveyed
in the record on appeal."' It is quite sensible, therefore, for an
491. Id.
492. Id. But see

PROPOSED TENN. R. ApP. P. 13(e) & Advisory Comm'n
comment. The text of this proposed rule and the Advisory Commission comment are set forth in Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, 45
TENN.L. Rav. 271, 300, 302 (1978).

493. 549 S.W.2d at 948 (citation omitted).
494. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.11, at 23 (1977) [hereinafter cited
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appellate court in both civil and criminal actions to affirm a
verdict approved by the trial court if there is a conflict in the
testimony as long as there is evidence to support by the required
degree of persuasion whatever matters must be proven to obtain
the judgment entered below.4 ' 5 Similarly, as the test approvingly
cited by the supreme court provides,'" the trial court in passing
upon a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal must take the
strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, including all reasonable inferences that might be
drawn from the evidence. This much of the test is equally applicable to civil actions." ' If strictly adhered to, it would preclude
the trial court from weighing the evidence or passing on the credibility of the witnesses."' Thus, both the appellate court in reviewing the adequacy of the evidence to support the judgment '
and the trial court in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury'1 should be viewed as
deciding solely a common question of law. It is, therefore, somewhat unclear how appellate review of the evidence differs from
the directing of a verdict of acquittal, and whether this differentiation is also to be observed in civil actions.
On the other hand, the holding in Thompson that defendant
waived her right to appellate review of the trial court's denial of
her directed verdict motion made at the close of the state's casein-chief by introducing evidence in her own behalf is in accord
with the equivalent holding made in the earlier civil case of
Sadler v. Draper."' The practical effect of this holding is to encourage adjudications based on all the evidence and not merely
R. TRAYNOR, THz RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR
20-21 (1970).
496. See Sobieski, The Theoretical Foundationsof the Proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, 45 TENN. L. REv. 161, 203-04 (1978).
as APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS];

496.

497.
498.

See text accompanying note 486 supra.

See text accompanying notes 512-13 infra.
See text accompanying note 514 infra. See also 9 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2524 (1971).
499. See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 494, at 27.
500. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2524, at 541 (1971).
501. 46 Tenn. App. 1, 326 S.W.2d 148, cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1959). The
state supreme court in Thompson cited Sadler as "fain excellent discussion of
the nature and use of the motion for directed verdict, particularly that made at
the close of the plaintiffs evidence." 549 S.W.2d at 945.
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a part of it since only rarely will a defendant forego an opportunity to introduce favorable evidence, particularly if, as seems
likely, by standing on his motion defendant is precluded from
urging successfully on appeal that he should be given a new trial
to present evidence in his own behalf. Besides, by introducing
evidence, defendant does not waive his right to renew his motion
for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence and, if unsuccessful, to renew his motion yet again under rule 50.02 after entry
of judgment or discharge of the jury if a verdict was not returned.
2.

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

Typically a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
under rule 50.02"5 will be joined in the alternative with a motion
for a new trial, since "[ilf the losing party thinks that there is
insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support the verdict, he
will, in most situations, also think that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence."60 In Holmes v. Wilsonm the Tennessee
Supreme Court discussed the duty of the trial court if an alternative motion is made, as well as the complex problems of appellate
review that arise when a party has moved in the alternative for
judgment notwithsttinding the verdict or for a new trial.
At the close of all the evidence, defendant in Holmes moved
for a directed verdict on the ground the evidence Was insufficient
to establish his liability. The trial court overruled the motion and
the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. At this point defendant
made an alternative motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or a new trial. The trial court granted the judgment but
did not rule upon the new trial motion. Pursuant to rule 50.03,

502.

Rule 50.02 does not speak of a motion for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict, but rather a motion "to have the verdict and any judgment entered
thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with [the] motion for a directed verdict." TENN. R. Crv. P. 50.02. The motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict that was a recognized part of Tennessee practice
prior to adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure had a different
purpose than that specified in rule 50.02. See CARUTHERS' HISTORY OF A Lhwsurr
§ 391 (8th ed. 1963). However, the state supreme court in Holmes referred to a
motion under rule 50.02 as a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and the text of the present article also speaks of a rule 52.02 motion in those

terms.
503. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
at 608 (1971).
504. 551 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. 1977),
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which provides that the trial court must also rule on the new trial
motion if he grants a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the
court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court with directions that he review the verdict in his role as the thirteenth juror"
and specify the grounds for granting or denying the new trial
motion. s" On remand the trial court conditionally granted the
new trial because he disagreed with the jury's verdict. On plaintiffs second appeal to the court of appeals, that court reversed
both the judgment and the conditional grant of a new trial and
reinstated the verdict of the jury.
The state supreme court began its review of the second appeal by emphasizing the trial judge's duty to rule on an alternative motion for a new trial and to specify his grounds for granting
or denying the motion, even if he grants a judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The grant of the new trial is conditional
and becomes effective only if the judgment is thereafter vacated
or reversed.w In addition, the grant of the new trial motion does
not affect the finality of the judgment for the purpose of seeking
immediate appellate review.'" Because of the conditional nature
of the grant of the new trial motion, the case is at an end if the
appellate court affirms the judgment.?' 0 If, however, the judgment
is reversed, "the grant of the motion for a new trial springs to life,
and the case is remanded for a new trial, 'unless the appellate
court has otherwise ordered.' "I"
In passing upon the court of appeals' reversal of the judgment, the supreme court noted that a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is governed by the same standard as that utilized for
directing a verdict.' That standard requires
the trial judge, and the appellate courts, (to] take the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the opponent of the
motion, allow all reasonable inferences in his or her favor, discard all countervailing evidence, and deny the motion where
505. See text accompanying notes 543-62 infra.
506. The requirement that the trial court specify the gounds for granting
or denying a new trial is also contained in TENN, R. Civ. P. 50.03.
507. 551 S.W.2d at 684.
508, Id,; see TENN. R. Civ. P. 50.03.
509. 551 S.W.2d at 684; see TENN. R. Crv. P. 50.03.
510. 551 S.W.2d at 684.
511. Id. (quoting TENN. R. Civ. P. 50.03).
512. Id. at 685.
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there is any doubt as to the conclusions to be drawn from the
whole evidence. A verdict should not be directed during, or
after, trial except where a reasonable mind could draw but one
conclusion.51

Without elaboration, the court concluded the judgment notwithstanding the verdict was erroneously granted, particularly since
"[njeither the trial judge nor the reviewing court is privileged to
weigh the preponderance of the evidence when passing upon a
motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment [notwithstanding
the verdict]." 5 4
Having determined the judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not have been granted, the supreme court was required to pass on the lower courts' rulings with respect to the
alternative motion for a new trial. Different standards govern
granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granting a
new trial.
On motion for judgment [notwithstanding the verdict], the
sole concern of the trial judge is the existence of material evidence in accordance with the [standard previously set out]
whereas on motion for a new trial he has a substantially wider,
though not unbridled, latitude and may set the verdict aside
when it is against the weight of the evidence or when the interests of justice would be served thereby. Thus the trial judge
consistently may overrule a motion for directed verdict or judgment [notwithstanding the verdict] and grant or deny a new
trial. If he or she should sustain the motion for a directed verdict, consistency demands that there be a conditional award of
a new trial.""
If the appellate court holds that the judgment notwithstanding
the verdict was erroneously granted, it has the option of either
remanding for a new trial or reinstating the jury's verdict. 51' Generally speaking, the case should be remanded,"" and such will
always be true if the trial court acting as the thirteenth juror
expresses his dissatisfaction with the verdict because "his action
in awarding a new trial is not reviewable

Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
513.

516. Id.
517. Id.

518. Id. at 684.

...

,,", However,
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'Jaippellate courts . . .may exercise a sound judicial discretion
in the matter and may, under exceptional circumstances and in
the interest of justice, reinstate the verdict of the jury where the
trial judge erred in ruling on a controlling conclusion of law and
has approved the verdict of the jury." ' ' Finding no exceptional
circumstances justifying departure from the general rule,'" the
supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of the grant
of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict but reversed its reinstatement of the jury verdict and remanded for a new trial.
The opinion in Holmes, which is consistent with the interpretation given to federal rule 50 by the federal courts, 1 is a useful
reminder of the wholly distinct standards that govern allowance
of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial. In passing on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as well as the equivalent motion for a directed verdict, both the trial and appellate court consider only
the purely legal question of whether the evidence is sufficient to
make out a jury question. A new trial motion, by contrast, may
he granted by the trial court more freely and, as Holmes makes
clear, the exercise of the trial court's discretion will seldom be set
aside on appeal when it is based on the trial court's evaluation of
the weight of the evidence.
Holmes and cases like Sadler v. Draper2 illustrate some of
the procedural intricacies that must be observed in order to secure a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
They also illustrate the difficulty that arises in obtaining subsequent appellate review of rulings on those motions and a new trial
motion joined in the alternative with a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Much, though not all, of the complexity
of this area of procedural law is attributable to matters of historical significance aloneY1 The law in this area, therefore, would
only profit from simplification, but until then a thorough knowledge of the complexities is indispensable.
519. Id. at 687.
520. 1d.
521. See 9 C. WRIGHT

& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§

2537-2540 (1971).
522. 46 Tenn. App. 1, 326 S.W.2d 148, cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1959).
523. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
2522 (1971).
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C. Putting the Case to the Jury: Instructions
If the evidence is sufficient to make out a jury question, the
trial court must instruct the jury on the law.," In Haddock v.
Lummus Cotton Gin Co.,5 plaintiff sought damages for personal
injuries sustained when his head and arm were caught in a bale
press manufactured and sold by defendant. Although plaintiff's
complaint contained allegations based on negligence and breach
of warranty, the case was tried exclusively on a theory of strict
liability. After the trial court completed its charge, plaintiff noted
that the charge contained instructions that related to a claim
based on negligence. Plaintiff at that time did not object to the
instructions as given but instead moved that the pleadings be
amended to conform to the court's instructions. The court of
appeals noted that if plaintiff had made no comment on the instructions, under rule 51.02 he could assign error to any portion
of the given instructions.
However, since the Plaintiff took affirmative action by asking
for permission to amend his theory of the case to conform to the
charge of the Court and approved the charge, we hold that
Plaintiffs assignment of error in this Court is not authorized by
[Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure] 51.02.26
VI.

MOTIONS AFrER TRIAL

A.

Nunc Pro Tune

After the jury has returned its verdict or the trial court has
heard the evidence, judgment should be entered. Under rule
58.02, "[tlhe filing with the clerk of a judgment, signed by the
judge, constitutes the entry of such judgment, and, unless the
court otherwise directs, no judgment shall be effective for any
524. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 51.
525. 552 S.W.2d 390 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1976).
526. Id. at 392. After Haddock and beyond the period covered in this
survey, the state supreme court in Rule v. Empire Gas Corp., 563 S.W.2d 551
(Tenn. 1978), held:
Rule 51.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure has not abolished
or altered the rule ...

that in order to predicate error upon an alleged

omission in the instructions given to the jury by the trial judge Ithe
litigant assigning error] must have pointed out such omission to the
trial judge at trial by an appropriate request for instruction.

Id. at 554.
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purpose until the entry of same." Occasionally a judgment will
not be entered as required by rule 58.02, and important interests
may be adversely affected as a result. Entry of judgment nunc pro
tune serves the purpose of alleviating the harsh consequences that
might otherwise ensue by permitting entry of a judgment now
that is effective from some earlier date. Gil/is v. Eggelston5" is a
good example of the valuable purpose served by entry of judgment nunc pro tune.
Gillis grew out of the administration of the estate of Georgia
Gillis, who died intestate. In 1925, Georgia and her husband filed
a petition seeking to adopt their nephew, Andrew Gillis, one of
the claimants to decedent's estate. The adoption was contested,
and a decree entered paroling Andrew to his aunt and uncle for a
three-month period. The decree also retained the adoption petition for further action and granted petitioners the opportunity to
apply for adoption again at the expiration of the three-month
period. In his petition to the probate court of Shelby County for
entry of a decree of adoption nune pro tune, Andrew alleged that
after this three-month period his aunt and uncle successfully petitioned for his adoption but that, due to inadvertence or oversight on the part of their attorney or the clerk of the court, the
decree was not signed by the judge or entered on the court's
minutes. The other claimants to the decedent's estate sought
dismissal of Andrew's petition, contending that no official record
demonstrated the trial court ever signed an adoption decree. The
state supreme court reversed the probate court's dismissal of the
nunc pro tune petition. The supreme court relied upon its earlier
decision in Rush v.Rush5 1 in which the court stated:
It is equally clear that a party whose rights are injuriously affected by a clerical omission to extend upon the record a judgment of the court regularly pronounced may present the matter
to the court, and upon a proper showing have the judgment
entered nunc pro tunc.
All courts have the right, and it is their duty, to make their
records speak the truth, and a court, therefore, in a proper case,
of its own motion, may order a nunc pro tunc entry to be made;
and no sound reason can be suggested why they should not
exercise this right and discharge this duty upon the suggestion
of one whose rights are impaired by the failure of the record to
527.
528.

543 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. 1976).
97 Tenn. 279, 37 S.W. 13 (1896).

1979]

CIVIL PROCEDURE

state the truth. . . And the lapse of time between the announcement of judgment and the making of this motion is of no
importance; that which is important is, that the proof be clear
and convincing that the judgment which it is sought to have
entered is the one pronounced in the cause.m
The supreme court held that Andrew's allegations, that the court
permitted his adoption and that the failure to have the decree
signed and entered on the minutes was due to the inadvertence
or oversight of the attorney or clerk, "if proven by clear and
convincing evidence, would justify the entry of the decree of
adoption nunc pro tunc."'m Since Andrew had stated a claim for
relief, the supreme court concluded that the trial court erred in
dismissing Andrew's petition without affording him an opportunity to introduce evidence in support of his claimY.3
There are limits to the notion that a judgment may be entered nunc pro tune, however, as Zeitlin v. Zeitlin'f demonstrates. In that case, the trial court entered a final decree of
divorce in September 1973, that approved a separation agreement
requiring defendant to pay $200 per week in alimony and child
support. The very next month plaintiff filed a petition seeking to
have defendant held in contempt for failure to make the agreedupon payments. Defendant sought to have his payments reduced.
Apparently no action was taken by the court with regard to either
the contempt petition or defendant's petition for reduction of his
payments. Plaintiff filed a second petition for contempt approximately one year after her first petition, and defendant again
sought reduction. Plaintiff also sought a judgment for the delinquent payments. Although the statement of the facts is confusing, it appears that defendant alleged that the parties entered
into an agreed order after plaintiff's first contempt petition and
that through inadvertence this order was never entered. Defendant sought to have the agreed order entered nune pro tune to
take effect from October 1973. The trial court refused nune pro
tune entry of the agreed order and, although "in sympathy with
his situation insofar as the Order not having been filed as it, of
course, should have been . . . "5 the court also entered judg529.
530.
531.
532.
533.

Id. at 281-82, 37 S.W. at 14 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
543 S.W.2d at 848.
Id.
544 S.W.2d 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
Id. at 105.
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ment against defendant for an amount in excess of $14,000. That
judgment, apparently based on the payments specified in the
original divorce decree, was "to be held in abeyance, at least until
the financial activity of [defendant] increases to a reasonable
extent where [sic] this arrearage could be paid."'' - The court of
appeals affirmed in an opinion affording defendant reason to believe that he might yet obtain the relief he sought.
The intermediate appellate court rejected defendant's reliance on various subsections of rule 60.02 as authority for entry of
the agreed order nunc pro tunc.11 Essentially the court reasoned
that rule 60.02 is available only to afford relief from judgments
that have previously been entered and not to permit entry of a
judgment not previously entered.X Although the parties may
have intended that the agreed order be entered, there was no
evidence that the trial judge ever intended that the order be
entered, 37 a fact that distinguishes Zeitlin from Gillis. For substantially the same reason, the court of appeals also held relief
was unavailable under rule 58.02,m which defines precisely when
a judgment is entered, or rule 60.0 1,"3 which permits relief from
clerical mistakes. Having rejected defendant's arguments in support of entry of judgment nunc pro tunc, the court stated that it
too was not without sympathy for defendant's plight."' Noting
that the judgment for the delinquent payments was not immediately enforceable, the court concluded its opinion by intimating
the trial court could still "retroactively forgive or modify delinquent installments of alimony or support.'
The concluding point made by the appellate court in Zeitlin
is fundamental both in the sense of its obvious importance and
in the sense that it should not be overlooked. Orders for the support of a spouse or a child are apparently modifiable retroactively
in Tennessee 2" If the trial court had kept this fact in mind, it
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539,
540.
541.
542.
Mayer v.

Id.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 106.

Id.
Id,at 108.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 109.
See, e.g., Morton v. Morton, 223 Tenn. 491, 448 S.W.2d 69 (1969);
Mayer, 532 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1975);
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seems unlikely that it would have felt compelled to enter judgment for the past due installments, which it appears it thought
was for a fixed, unmodifiable amount. While it might have been
preferable for the appellate court to reverse with directions that
the trial court determine whether the payments should be modified retroactively, it seems highly likely that the trial court's sympathy for defendant's plight will cause it to do so.
B.

New Trial

In addition to the power of a trial court to direct a verdict or
enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict, "[the power of the
trial judge to grant a new trial is one of his most effective devices
to control the jury."5 3 As James E. Strates Shows, Inc. v.
Jakobik' " and Sherlin v. Roberson 4 make clear, the power to
grant a new trial is more than an effective power-it is a power
-that must be exercised if the trial court is not satisfied with the
jury's verdict.
Jakobik was a personal injury action in which the trial court
granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Thereafter, in response
to defendants' motion to reconsider, the trial court reinstated the
jury verdict in defendants' favor. In its initial order granting a
new trial, the trial court, acting as the thirteenth juror, expressed
its dissatisfaction with the jury's verdict. In its order reinstating
the jury's verdict, the court stated it was "of the opinion that
there was evidence to support the verdict of the jury in its finding
for the defendants and . . . [could not) say that the verdict was
unreasonable in light of the evidence presented by both sides in
this case."""
In affirming the court of appeals' reversal, the state supreme
court emphasized that "[w]here the motion for a new trial asserts that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence
it is the duty of the trial judge to weigh the evidence and determine whether it preponderates against the verdict, and if so, to
Daugherty v. Dixon, 41 Tenn. App. 623, 297 S.W.2d 944 (1956), cert. denied,
id. (Tenn. 1957).
543. M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, H. SMrr & H. KoRN, supra note 216, at
976.
544. 554 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. 1977).
545. 551 SW.2d 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
546, 554 S,W.2d at 615,
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grant a new trial.".147 In acting as the thirteenth juror when passing upon the verdict, the trial court is not required to state the
reasons for its action, "[blut . . . if it appears from reasons
assigned or statements made, that the trial judge was not satisfied with the verdict, it is the duty of the appellate courts to grant
a new trial. ' " Here, the court's initial unequivocal expression of
dissatisfaction with the verdict "was an implicit adjudication
that the evidence preponderated against the verdict." ' The
court's later reinstatement of the verdict was not based on a
weighing of evidence to "determine whether it preponderated in
favor of the plaintiff or defendants or was equally balanced, but
merely determined that there was some evidence to support the
verdict."'" It is improper to sustain a verdict, however, merely
because there is some evidence to support it,"' and accordingly
the case was remanded for a new trial.
The opinion in Jakobik placed extensive reliance on Sherlin
v. Roberson."M There, the trial court in overruling the plaintiffs'
motion for a new trial stated that it could not say whether the jury
verdict was right or wrong. The court also stated that before it
would set aside the verdict "it would have had to have been a
verdict that I couldn't have lived with ... ,""' but here the case
was so close "I can't say I can't agree with what the jury did."' S
The court of appeals reversed.
The intermediate appellate court in Sherlin reasoned that
the trial court's inability to say the jury verdict was right "was a
clear disavowal of approval."'"5 Taking all the trial court's statements together, "they would indicate that the judge had no opinion either way." 1"1 Accordingly, the appellate court concluded
that the trial court "was deferring to the verdict of the jury and
disclaiming any opinion of his own. When he stated he could not
say the verdict was right he failed to do precisely what he must
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 616.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 615-16.
552. 551 S.W.2d 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
553. Id.
554. Id. at 701.
555. Id.
556. Id.
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do before rendering judgment on the verdict.""' The court continued:
The . . remarks of the judge make it appear he disassociated himself from the deliberative process which is the peculiar and exclusive province of the jury of which the presiding
judge is as much a member as jurors sitting in the jury box.
Indeed, it must be said that, by reason of his training as a lawyer
and his experience in weighing testimony, he is the most important member of the jury.
To say, as the trial judge did in this case, that before the
trial judge, acting as the thirteenth juror, should set aside a
verdict it would have to be a verdict that he could not live with
would be to adopt a standard relieving the judge of the duty to
take an unbiased and dispassionate view of the evidence, weigh
it and determine whether the evidence preponderates in favor
of the plaintiff or defendant or is equally balanced.
If the trial judge abdicates this important duty justice could
often miscarry. On appeal the evidence cannot be weighed as in
the trial court. As has been said so often, a verdict in a civil case
approved by the trial judge cannot be overturned if there is any
credible material evidence to support it. In view of the finality
of his determination of the weight of the evidence as the thirteenth juror, it will not do to weaken the rule by implying [sic]
approval by the trial judge from countervailing and irreconcilable remarks. To do so would be to strike at the very foundation
of our judicial system as it pertains to jury trials."
In order to shore up the foundation of the judicial system, the
action was remanded for a new trial.
Certainly the court of appeals in Sherlin could have taken
a more sympathetic view of the trial court's ruling on the new
trial motion. In light of the trial court's statement that the case
"could have gone either way,"' ' it seems more realistic to say
that the trial court concluded the evidence was evenly balanced
rather than to conclude, as the appellate court did, that he "disclaim[ed] any opinion of his own""" and "disassociated himself
from the'deliberative process""' thereby "abdicat[ing] 5 2 his
557.

Id.

558.
559.
560.
561.
562.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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duty to weigh the evidence. Taken together, however,
Jakobik and Sherlin leave little doubt as to the importance
the appellate courts place on the trial judge's role as thirteenth
juror.
An entirely different sort of problem, one related to the right
to trial by jury itself, was involved when the trial court passed on
plaintiff's new trial motion in Welch v. T.F.C. Marketing Service,
Inc."3 Welch involved an action for breach of contract in which
the jury returned a verdict for damages in defendant's favor on
its counterclaim. In ruling on plaintiff's new trial motion, the trial
court granted a new trial and at the same time entered judgment
for defendant but in an amount less than that awarded by the
jury. Both parties appealed, defendant contending that the trial
judge should have ordered a new trial before a new jury and
plaintiff contending that the trial judge properly decided the case
himself but should not have awarded defendant damages. The
court of appeals held that at no time did defendant waive his
right to a jury trial"4 and that, while the trial judge acting as the
thirteenth juror may grant a new trial before a new jury, he cannot enter judgment based on his opinion as to who should prevail
on the facts." The appellate court also noted in passing that the
fact that plaintiff, not defendant, initially demanded the jury was
quite irrelevant"' since under trial rule 38.05 a party may not
withdraw his demand for a jury "without the consent of all parties
as to whom issues have been joined."
C. Relief from Judgment
Even after judgment has finally been entered either on a jury
verdict or otherwise, the trial court retains the power for some
time to relieve a party from the judgment. 7 In Brown v. Brown"'
the state supreme court held that relief from a judgment under
rule 60.02 is available to amend a final judgment after the expiration of thirty days from its entry. The court's opinion is so clearly
correct that the only regrettable aspect of the case is that the
563.
564.
565.
566.

554 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
Id. at 646.
Id.
Id.

567.

See TENN. R. Civ. P. 60.

568. 548 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1977).
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appellant had to appeal all the way to the state supreme court
after the intermediate appellate court failed to vindicate his
right to attempt to secure relief from the judgment.
In Campbell v. Archermg the state supreme court emphasized
that rule 60.02 is designed to afford relief only from final judgments and that a rule 59 motion for a new trial is the appropriate
vehicle for remedying errors affecting a judgment not yet final.
The difficulty involved in Campbell arose because the case had
to be reset for trial on three separate occasions. When the case
was set for trial the third time, the clerk sent notice of the new
trial date to defendants' attorney approximately one month before the scheduled trial date. Four days before trial, defendants
employed new counsel and their original attorney agreed to withdraw. Defendants' original attorney denied that he was aware of
the new trial date until trial had actually begun, and neither
defendants nor their new counsel had notice or knowledge the
case was set for trial until the day of the trial itself. After learning
on the day of trial that defendants' original counsel had withdrawn and would not appear, the trial court nonetheless determined to proceed with the trial. The court also refused to sign an
order brought to its attention in the midst of the trial permitting
defendants' original counsel to withdraw. Upon learning from
defendants' first attorney on the day of trial that the trial was
proceeding, defendants' new counsel and defendants themselves
went to court and requested permission to approach the bench
but permission was denied. Plaintiffs completed presenting their
proof, and after the jury retired, one of the defendants and his
new counsel explained to the trial court what had happened. The
jury returned verdicts for substantial damages against defendants for wrongfully diverting surface waters. After judgments
were entered on the verdicts, defendants moved for a new trial
alleging, among other matters,10 that they had a meritorious defense and no notice or actual knowledge of the trial date. Defendants further alleged that their failure to appear amounted, at
most, to excusable neglect. The trial court denied the new trial
motions, and the court of appeals affirmed.
569. 555 S,W.2d 110 (Tenn. 1977).
570. Defendants also argued that the judgments entered against them
were default judgments within the meaning of rule 55.01, and invalid because
five-days notice of application for the entry of judgment had not been served
upon them. The supreme court pretermitted this question. Id. at 112.
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Before the state supreme court, defendants relied on the portion of rule 60.02 that permits the court to relieve a party from a
final judgment on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect. However, the supreme court held that
"[tihe function of this Rule is to give relief from final judgments;
Rule 59, providing for motion for new trial, is the appropriate
remedy for asserting alleged errors affecting a judgment which
has not yet become final."'' On the merits of the new trial motions, the court further held that a new trial may be granted for
the mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect of a
party's attorney.' Here it was clear the parties themselves were
not at fault either in the initial choice of counsel or otherwise and
that the fault rested primarily with defendants' original counsel
in not taking note of the notice of the trial date forwarded to him
by the clerk51 The court also determined that other than the
additional expenses incident to a retrial, plaintiffs would not suffer any prejudice if a new trial were awarded. 74 Accordingly, the
supreme court remanded for a new trial on condition that defendants tender into court all court costs accrued to date and reasonable attorney's fees for plaintiffs' representation at the trial. 75 It
seems likely defendants would willingly pay these incidental expenses in order to make out a meritorious defense.
VII,

APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE DISPOSITION

If relief cannot be obtained in the trial court, redress may be
sought in an appellate court. As the numerous decisions handed
down in this area demonstrate, the paths of the parties in obtaining a decision on the merits are strewn with a number of obstacles. The proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which seek to simplify existing law and which are discussed more
fully elsewhere,' were not submitted for legislative approval in
1978 but will be submitted to the 1979 session of the General
571. 555 S.W.2d at 112 (emphasis ih original).
572. Id.
573. Id. at 112-13.
574. Id. at 113.
575. Id.
576. See Sobieski, The Procedural Details of the Proposed Tennessee
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 46 TENN. L. Rnv. 1 (1978); Sobieski, supra note
495.
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Assembly. Until they take effect, the requirements of existing
practice remain a vital area of concern.
A.

The Timing of Appellate Review

An appeal as of right lies only upon entry of a final judgment." In FrayserAssembly ChristianSchool v. Putnam7 ' and
HighlandConstructionCo. v. K.L T. Coal Co.5" ' the state supreme
court dealt with the problem of the meaning of finality in the
context of civil actions involving multiple claims or multiple parties.
Putnam was a workers' compensation action in which plaintiff sought recovery for medical expenses and temporary and permanent disability. The trial court entered a decree that awarded
plaintiff accrued medical expenses and benefits for temporary
disability. The decree expressly reserved for a future hearing any
claim for further medical expenses and permanent disability.
After an appeal was taken by defendant from this decree to the
supreme court and after the assignments of error and briefs were
filed, but prior to oral argument, plaintiff moved to have the
appeal remanded to the trial court for its consideration whether
an appeal by permission should be allowed pursuant to the interlocutory appeal statute.'" Defendant also moved for a remand
but for the purpose of entry of a final decree adjudicating all
issues and claims for relief. The state supreme court reiterated its
earlier"' holding that
a decree in a workmen's compensation case which, like this one,
adjudicates compensability and awards benefits for temporary
total disability but reserves to a future date the determination
of the employee's claim of permanent disability [is] not a final
decree and, therefore, lis] not appealable to this court in the
absence of a statute conferring jurisdiction of such an interlocutory decree or judgment.'
577. See, e.g., Cockrill v. People's Say. Bank, 155 Tenn. 342, 347, 293 S.W.
996, 997-98 (1927) (writ of error); Carrol v. Caldwell, 8 Tenn. (1 Mart. & Yer.)
78, 79 (1827) (appeal in the nature of a writ of error); Moore v. Churchwell, 27
Tenn.. App. 443, 446, 181 S.W.2d 959, 961, cert. denied, id, (Tenn. 1942) (appeal).
578. 552 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn. 1977).
579. 557 S.W.2d 67 (Tenn. 1977).
580. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-305 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
581. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Miller, 491 S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. 1973).
582. 552 S.W.2d at 747 (citing Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co. v. Miller, 491 S.W.2d
85 (Tenn. 1973)).
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Without expressing an opinion, the supreme court noted that an
interlocutory appeal might be permitted under the interlocutory
appeal statute. However, such an appeal requires strict compliance with the certification requirements prescribed in that statute. "A compliance with such requirements is an absolute prerequisite to an appeal under this statute." ' Since a proper certification "is essential to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate
court" and since no such certification was in the record, the
supreme court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the
trial court for such further action as deemed appropriate on the
parties' suggested courses of proceeding.
Highland Construction Co. v. K.LT. Coal Co. was disposed
of in a cryptic opinion in which the state supreme court noted
that the action among the multiple parties involved multiple
claims, all of which apparently had not been adjudicated. The
action was therefore remanded to the trial court since there had
been no compliance with the certification requirements of the
interlocutory appeal statute. Interestingly, the court went on to
suggest certain issues that should be addressed upon remand, and
offered the further opinion that another issue probably could not
be determined from the face of the complaint. 56 These gratuitous
suggestions were probably prompted by an understandable desire
to avoid a later reversal, and they also intimate that, contrary to
the holding reiterated in Putnam, certification is not as essential
to confer jurisdiction as might otherwise be supposed. In any
event, Putnam and Highland Construction Co. reaffirm the principle that if multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are
involved in an action, any order that adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties
is not appealable of right before entry of a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties. 7
B.

The Availability of Appellate Review by Way of Writ of Error

The intricacies of existing appellate practice have been remedied to some extent by the writ of error, which serves as a salutary
device permitting review otherwise unavailable because of non583. Id.
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. 557 S.W.2d at 67.
587. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-305 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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compliance with the technical requirements of review by way of
appeal or appeal in error."s There are limits, however, on the
extent to which the writ of error can be so used, as Hamby v.
Millsapst8' illustrates.
At the conclusion of an action awarding death benefits under
the workers' compensation law,118 defendant prayed for and was
granted an appeal in the nature of a writ of error to the supreme
court. Defendant timely filed an appeal bond and bill of exceptions, but did not file assignments of error and brief within the
time specified in rule 14 of the supreme court rules."t On plaintiffs motion defendant's appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with rule 14. Defendant then sought review by writ of error
and the supreme court held that review was unavailable.
The Tennessee Code provides that review by writ of error is
available "in all cases where an appeal in the nature of a writ of
error would have lain."''51 This language, the supreme court noted,
"implies that the remedy of an appeal in the nature of a writ of
error, although available, has not been perfected or utilized." 53
Thus, the court stated in a summary of previous decisions, the
writ of error is available if the appealing party has not perfected
an appeal in the nature of a writ of error by failing to file in timely
fashion an appeal bond or oath in forma pauperis or a transcript
of the record.14 However,
if the appeal in the nature of writ of error is fully perfected by
timely filing of appeal bond or pauper's oath and transcript of
the record, the remedy of writ of error is no longer available.
This is true even though a review of the merits of the appeal is
not obtained, whether due to voluntary abandonment of the
appeal by the appellant . . . or to the dismissal of the appeal
by the appellate court because the appellant fails to file assign588. See, e.g., Ward v. North Am. Rayon Corp., 211 Tenn. 535, 366
S.W.2d 134 (1963); Burcham v. Carbide & Carbon Chem. Corp., 188 Tenn. 592,
221 S.W.2d 888 (1949).
589. 544 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 1976).
590. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-901 to 919, -1001 to 1029, -1101 to 1109, -1201
to 1211 (1977 & Cur. Supp. 1978).
591. Under supreme court rule 14 a party has 25 days after the date of the
filing of the transcript of the record to file his assignment of errors and supporting brief.
592. TENN. Co ANN. § 27-601 (1955).
593. 544 S.W.2d at 361.
594. Id.
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ments of error and brief within the time required by law or rules
of the court or for other good cause.'
Since defendant had perfected his appeal in the nature of a writ
of error by timely filing of the appeal bond and transcript of the
record,
he has had the benefit of the remedy of appeal in the nature of
a writ of error, even though he lost the right to a review of the
merits of his appeal by reason of the dismissal thereof because
of his failure to file assignments of error and brief within the
time required . .. . He, therefore, is not entitled to review now
by writ of error .
There is something odd about saying that defendant had the
benefit of an appeal in error even though he lost the right to a
review of the merits. It seems equally as odd to deny access to the
writ of error to litigants more diligent than those to whom the writ
is available. An appellate court should finally dismiss an appeal
if appellant fails to prosecute his appeal diligently, but it seems
somewhat mechanical to refuse a writ of error to a litigant merely
because he timely filed his appeal bond and transcript but failed
to file his. assignments of error and brief in timely fashion. If, as
may have been the case," ' appellant's dereliction were egregious
and inexcusable, refusal to afford review on the merits would be
understandable, but nothing in the court's opinion indicates the
outcome would have been any different if appellant's assignments
and brief had been filed only a day or two late and for an unavoidable reason. Hamby, therefore, sounds a warning that cannot
safely be ignored.
C. Choosing the Correct Appellate Court
If an appeal is taken at the appropriate time and in the
correct fashion, problems still may arise in determining the court
to which to appeal. Unlike the allocation of subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal appeals, the allocation of subject-matter
jurisdiction between the supreme court and court of appeals is a
595. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
596. Id. at 361-62.
597. The transcript of the record on the first appeal in error was filed on
December 3, 1975. The opinion in Hamby was handed down December 6, 1976.
These dates, separated by over a year, suggest appellant may have delayed
seeking a writ of error for a considerable time.
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hodgepodge."' One of the most troublesome provisions of the
Code allocating subject-matter jurisdiction in civil appeals has
been that which permits direct review by the supreme court of
cases "which have been finally determined in the lower court on
demurrer or other method not involving a review or determination of the facts, or in which all the facts have been stipulated."'I
The legislature eliminated this provision during the survey period
and all such cases are now appealable to the court of appeals.' 00 The legislature also significantly lessened the burden
that otherwise would have been placed on the supreme court by
amending the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act to provide for appellate review in the court of appeals"' and not in the
supreme court as that Act originally provided.m2
Finally, in Ezell v. Buhleri " the state supreme court held
that the circuit court did not err in holding it had no jurisdiction
over an appeal from a county court judgment overruling exceptions to a claim filed against an estate being probated in the
county court. After the county judge dismissed the exceptions of
the executrix and awarded judgment against the estate, the executrix appealed from county court to circuit court, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that jurisdiction was exclusively
in either the court of appeals or the supreme court. The supreme
court affirmed. In so doing, it reiterated a prior holdinr that the
relevant statute provided for review of judgments of a county or
probate court concerning exceptions to a claim against an estate
only in the court of appeals or supreme court.'" Whether review
is to one or the other appellate court depends on the statutes
allocating subject-matter jurisdiction between them."' The supreme court also held it was not in a position to review the merits
of the county court judgment because "no appeal from that court
was prayed and granted to this Court; only the judgment of the
Circuit Court was appealed to this Court."' '
598. See Sobieski, supra note 495, at 182 n.114.
599. 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 100, § 10.
600. See TENN.CODE ANN. § 16-408 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
601.

Id. § 4-524,

602. 1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 725, § 18.
603.
604.

605.
606.
607.

557 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn. 1977).
Rowan v. Inman, 207 Tenn. 144, 338 S.W.2d 578 (1960).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-518 (1977).
557 S.W.2d at 63; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-408 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
557 S.W.2d at 63.
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Since the purpose of praying for and granting an appeal is
to provide a record of the intent to appeal,' it seems overly
technical to deny appellate review altogether because the executrix appealed to the wrong court. In cases appealed to the supreme court that should have been appealed to the court of appeals, and vice versa, the case is simply transferred to the appropriate appellate court, not dismissed.'" The same procedure
would seem equally appropriate in cases like Ezell.
D.

Who May Appeal

The standing of a party, who has otherwise properly taken
an appeal, to seek review before the appropriate appellate tribunal seldom raises problems since typically a party has no incentive to appeal unless he is disappointed with the trial court's
judgment in some way, and generally any aggrieved party may
appeal. Cole v. Arnold"'1 and Carey v. Jones,' both of which
dealt with the identical question of who may appeal, are therefore
somewhat unusual. In those cases the supreme court and the
court of appeals independently arrived at the conclusion that a
defendant with the right of contribution is an aggrieved party who
may appeal a judgment in favor of his codefendant.
Plaintiffs in Cole brought an action for damages to their
building sustained as a result of a collision between defendants'
vehicles. Neither defendant offered evidence at the trial of the
action in general sessions court and a judgment was entered in
favor of one of the defendants and against the other. Defendant
against whom judgment was entered appealed to circuit court
both the judgment against him and the judgment in favor of his
codefendant. The circuit court held defendant had no right to
appeal the judgment exonerating his codefendant from liability,
but the supreme court disagreed.
The supreme court conceded that prior to enactment of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act"2 a defendant
could not appeal the dismissal of his codefendant because he was
not aggrieved nor was his liability affected, since the substantive
608. See Wicker, A Comparison of Appellate Procedure in Tennessee and
in the Federal Courts, 17 TENN. L. REv. 668, 674 (1943).
609. See TENN. COE ANN, §§ 16-408, -450 (Curn. Supp. 1978).
610. 545 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1977).
611. 546 S.W.2d 814 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
612. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3101 to 3106 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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law did not recognize a right of contribution."' However, under
the Act a defendant has a right of contribution from a co4
defendant whose negligence contributed to a plaintiffs injury,"
and therefore a defendant's liability is affected by a judgment in
favor of his codefendant."' Accordingly, the defendant in such
circumstances is an aggrieved party having the right to appeal the
judgment exonerating his codefendant.'' The issue presented in
Carey was the same as in Cole and the court of appeals, in an
opinion initially handed down before Cole, reached the same result."7
The opinion in Carey does not indicate whether defendants
cross-claimed against each other, but it seems reasonably clear
from the opinion in Cole that no claims had been asserted between defendants there."' Presumably the rule of law announced
in these two cases is therefore applicable even in the absence of
claims for contribution being asserted by the defendants against
one another. The availability of appellate review also seems to
leave little doubt that issues actually and essentially litigated
between the defendants are precluded from relitigation,"' assuming the rules of collateral estoppel are otherwise fully satisfied.
The question after Cole and Carey, therefore, is not whether a
defendant may appeal a judgment in favor of her codefendant
but whether she can afford not to.
613. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. Pewitt, 44 Tenn. App. 572, 316 S.W.2d
17 (1958).

614.

See

TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 23-3102(b), -3103 (Cum. Supp. 1978).

615. 545 S.W.2d at 97.
616. Id.
617. 546 S.W.2d at 817.
618. After plaintiffs commenced their general sessions court action and
during the time that that action was appealed to circuit court, one of the defendants instituted an independent action against the other. 545 S.W.2d at 97. It
seems unlikely that this second action would have been brought if defendants
had asserted claims against one another in the first action.
619. See RTATM
mENT (SECOND) OF -JuDoMErrs
§ 68.1(a) (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973), which provides in part:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment,
relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is
not precluded in the following circumstances:
(a) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a
matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment by an appellate court in the initial action. ...
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The belatedly reported opinion in Gouger v. American Mutual Insurance Co. ,' an opinion rendered by the state supreme
court in 1974, involved a distinguishable but equally vital question concerning who may appeal. Gouger was a workers' compensation case in which the successful plaintiff accepted payment of
the judgment-voluntarily and not under protest, according to
the appellees-at some point prior to rendition of the supreme
court's opinion. The supreme court denied appellees' motion to
dismiss the appeal, holding that an appellant could accept payment under a judgment he deems inadequate and still obtain
appellate review. Appellant took the chance that on appeal he
might end up with a less favorable judgment and therefore might
be required to make restitution, but such was his right.'"' The
court in Gouger did not indicate whether a defendant against
whom judgment is entered may pay the judgment in full and still
appeal, and there is authority that he may not.'2 It seems somewhat artificial to distinguish between these two situations, but
the matter deserves more careful attention than can be given
here.
E.

Security on Appeal

Perhaps the occasional arbitrariness of the current law of
appellate procedure in Tennessee is nowhere better illustrated
than by the bonding requirement on appeal of a money decree.
In Ligon v. Ligon'" the circuit court entered a divorce decree that
awarded $600,000 in lump-sum alimony and a $60,000 attorney
fee. On an appeal by the husband, the wife moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the $250 cost bond filed by the husband
was insufficient. The wife argued that under the Code decrees for
a specific sum of money require a bond for the amount of the
decree, damages, and costs, and not just costs alone."' The intermediate appellate court did not deny that the wife's argument
would have been well founded if the action had been tried in
chancery court, but the court held the statute was inapplicable
620. 548 S.W.2d 296 (Tenn. 1974) (reported in advance sheet but withdrawn from publication at the request of the Tennessee Supreme Court).
621. Id. at 297.
622. Metropolitan Dev. & Hous. Agency v. Hill, 518 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1975).
623. 556 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. Ct, App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
624. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-313 (1955).
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to actions tried to a circuit court. n The historical distinction
between actions tried at law and actions tried in equity thus
remains, even though there is no sensible contemporary reason in
this area to distinguish between the two.
F. Informing the Appellate Court of the ProceedingsBelow
The impact of history on the current law of appellate procedure is also strikingly evident with regard to preparation of the
appellate record. For example, the bill of exceptions can be traced
back to the Statute of Westminster of 1285. 2 Given this ancient
lineage, it is not surprising that highly technical questions concerning preparation of the bill of exceptions continue to beset the
participants in the appellate process. Of all the areas of appellate
procedure that received explicit consideration in the reported
opinions during the survey period, that pertaining to the bill of
exceptions generated the greatest number of opinions.
1. Preparation of the Bill of Exceptions
The most significant opinion concerning preparation of the
bill of exceptions was the state supreme court's opinion in Arnold
v. Carter."' The opinion in that case disposed of two separate
appeals that presented the same basic question of appellate procedure. In Arnold itself, the bill of exceptions, which consisted of
a transcript of the evidence and exhibits and which had previously been approved and signed by counsel for all parties, was
taken directly to the chancellor instead of being filed with the
clerk as specified in the relevant statute.M2 The chancellor examined the bill and signed, approved, and dated each of the exhibits, but he inadvertently did not sign the transcript itself. The bill
was filed in that condition only four days after entry of the judgment appealed from, well within the time for filing the bill.'" The
chancellor's missing signature was not detected by the parties,
and the appeal was duly docketed and briefed in the court of
appeals. That court noted the omission and called the matter to
the attention of counsel for appellant, who obtained an affidavit
625,

556 S.W.2d at 765-66.

626. 13 Edw. 1, c. 31; see Sobieski, supra note 495, pt 242-43.
627. 555 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. 1977).
628. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-110 (Cum. Supp. 1978).

629. See id. § 27-111.
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from the chancellor in which he stated he had examined and
approved the bill but inadvertently had failed to sign the transcript. The court of appeals, however, held that the bill had to
be signed within ninety days of judgment and, since the bill had
not been signed within that time, it could not consider the bill
but only the technical record.N The court of appeals, therefore,
did not consider those assignments of error directed to the evidence contained in the transcript.
In Flynn v. Jenkins, the other appeal decided in the same
opinion, the bill, as in Arnold, had been approved by counsel for
the parties and timely filed with the clerk. Unlike Arnold.the bill
was signed by the trial judge, but, again as in Arnold, more than
ninety days after judgment. This bill too was held fatally defective by the intermediate appellate court.
Reversing and remanding both cases, the state supreme
court held that nothing in the current version of the Code requires the trial court to sign the bill of exceptions within thirty
days or, if an extension has been timely sought and granted,
within ninety days after entry of the judgment being appealed. 3
The Code simply requires that the bill be filed within the designated time,0 2 and the bill may be filed by the clerk when it is
lodged with him bearing the "certificate of approval of the parties
or the certificate of the court stenographer . .

. . ,,'

If, however,

the bill has not been approved by all the parties, then the filing
party must also certify that notice of the filing has been given to
all other interested parties.M Notice need not be given if all the
parties have previously approved the bill because, in the indisputably sensible opinion of the supreme court, "it would be redundant indeed to require that notice be given to the other parties of the filing of the bill of exceptions, in order that they might
make objections, when they have already previously approved its
contents."' M5 The Code also provides that if notice must be given
to the other parties, they have ten days from filing of the bill (not,
it needs to be emphasized, ten days from receipt of notice of the
630. For a discussion of the distinction between the bill of exceptions and
the technical record, see Sobieski, supra note 495, at 242-43.
631. 555 S.W.2d at 723.
632. Id.; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-111 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
633. TENN. ConE ANN. § 27-110 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
634. 555 S.W.2d at 723.
635. Id.
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filing) to file written objections with the clerk.6' Once the record
has been timely filed, the Code directs the trial court to affix his
certificate of approval to the bill "as soon as practicable after the
filing""' or as soon as practicable after the ten-day notice period."' The action of the trial court in affixing his certificate of
approval to the bill of exceptions comprises the requisite authentication."'
These provisions, which were initially incorporated into the
Code in 1972,"'4 simplify prior law, but as State v. Williams"'
illustrates, the bill of exceptions must still be timely filed and
signed by the trial court. The importance of these requirements
is highlighted by the fact that the supreme court left little doubt
that it wanted very much to decide the issue presented. "The
time is opportune,""' the court stated, to decide the question
whether a non-lawyer juvenile judge may constitutionally incarcerate a juvenile or deprive him of his liberty, a question the court
characterized as "of far-reaching significance"614 and "of vital
public importance.""1 But the court concluded that it could not
reach the merits because the bills in the consolidated cases were
fatally defective."15 This was so for two reasons. First, the trial
judge never signed the bills."' Second, the bills were not filed
within thirty days after judgment and no motion for an extension
was made until after expiration of the thirty-day period. Limiting itself to a review of the technical record, the court also found
it insufficient since the record did not indicate whether the juvenile judge was or was not a lawyer."' Accordingly, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeals, which held due process was
not satisfied by nonlawyer juvenile judges," and affirmed the
trial court's judgment.
636.

TENN. COVE ANN. § 27-110 (Cum. Supp. 1978).

637. Id.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.

Id.
Id.
1972 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 497, *§ 2-3.
547 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1976).
Id. at 896.
Id.

644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 896-97.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 895-96.
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Williams was decided before Arnold and the court in Arnold
did not overrule Williams.1O Nevertheless, the continued precedential value of Williams is certainly open to some doubt. In
criminal cases the Code empowers the appellate courts for good
cause to order at any time the late filing of the bill of exceptions."' The appeal in Williams was taken to the court of appeals,1 and the statute authorizing the late filing of the bill of
exceptions does not expressly include the court of appeals.m It is
somewhat more than simply discomforting to think, however,
that a juvenile's interest in obtaining review of his conviction is
valued less dearly than that of an adult similarly situated. It
seems only fair, therefore, to permit the late filing of a bill of
exceptions in a juvenile appeal like that in Williams. If this difficulty can be surmounted, then the remaining defect with the bill
in Williams-the absence of the trial court's signature-can also
be remedied pursuant to the rationale of Arnold by remanding
the appeal to the juvenile judge for the affixing of his certificate
of approval on the bill of exceptions.
5' which was preGouger v. American Mutual Insurance,"
viously discussed in connection with the parties entitled to appeal, ' also involved a question concerning the timeliness of the
filing of the bill of exceptions. The decree from which the appeal
was taken was entered on December 12, 1972, A few days earlier
appellant filed a motion in which he excepted to the decree prepared by appellees because it did not contain a provision granting
an appeal. On December 27, 1972, the court entered an order
allowing appellant ninety days within which to perfect his appeal,
and the bill of exceptions was filed within ninety days of the
order. The supreme court held that appellant's motion that resulted in the order of December 27, 1972, suspended the effective
date of the decree until the motion was ruled on,'" and since the
650. See 555 S.W.2d at 723-24.
651. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-111 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
652. See 547 S.W.2d at 895.
653. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-111 (Cum. Supp. 1978) provides in part: "Ilin
criminal cases the Court of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court. . . shall
be empowered at any time to order the filing of the bill of exceptions. . . so as
to give the appellate court jurisdiction to consider the same . ... "
654. 548 S.W.2d 296 (Tenn. 1974) (reported in advance sheet but withdrawn from publication at the request of the Tennessee Supreme Court).

655. See text accompanying notes 620.22 supra.
656. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-111 (Cum. Supp. 1978), which provides
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bill was filed within ninety days from the order, the court denied
appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal."7
Appellee's motion to dismiss was equally unavailing in
Zeitlin v. Zeitlin,'" which also has been discussed previously."'
Appellee in Zeitlin sought dismissal of the appeal on the ground
that appellant failed to give him notice of the filing of the bill of
exceptions, a requirement discussed in connection with Arnold.'"
However, appellee admitted to the court of appeals that, after
learning that the bill had been filed, he filed no objections and
made no other effort to reform the bill of exceptions, While authentication of the bill by the trial court prior to expiration of the
notice period is generally invalid, the court held that under the
circumstances it would consider the bill."' The fact that the court
found no reversible error "from an informal examination 1111 of the
bill of exceptions was offered as an additional reason for the
court's decision to deny appellee's motions to strike the bill and
to dismiss the appeal.
2. Incomplete Bill of Exceptions
Even if the bill of exceptions is timely filed and properly
authenticated, difficulties arise if the bill does not contain "the
mandatory recitation that 'this was all the evidence heard in this
case', or words of like import.""' In State v. Williams"' the supreme court held that this "historic requirement"'" and "matter
of universal knowledge""' does not preclude consideration of the
bill of exceptions if it is signed by counsel for all the parties and
the trial judge.
in part: "The period of pendency of any motion or other matter, having the
effect of suspending .

.

. final judgment or action, shall be excluded in the

"
computation of the period [for filing the bill of exceptions] ...
657. 548 S.W.2d at 297 (reported in advance sheet but withdrawn from
publication at the request of the Tennessee Supreme Court).
658. 544 S.W.2d 103 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id, (Tenn. 1976).
659. See text accompanying notes 532-41 supra.
660. See text accompanying note 634 supra.
661. 544 S.W.2d at 106.

662. Id.
663. State v. Williams, 547 S.W.2d 895, 896 (Tenn. 1976).
664. 547 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1976).
665. Id. at 896.

666. Id.
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Similarly, in Yett v.Smoky Mountain Aviation, Inc.,"' the
court of appeals held that appellate review is not precluded simply because a partial bill of exceptions is filed. All the evidence
bearing on the purely legal issue presented for review appeared
in the partial bill; a transcript of all the evidence, in the court's
opinion, would have been superfluous.'
Finding the procedure
employed by appellant "commendable,""" the court denied appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal and to affirm the judgment
below.
Failure to include all the evidence in the bill of exceptions
proved surprisingly beneficial in Fischer v. Cromwell Co.' Plaintiff prevailed ingeneral sessions court and moved to dismiss defendant's appeal to circuit court on the ground that defendant
had not timely filed the appeal bond under the provision of the
'
Code allowing ten days to appeal a judgment of a sessions court. 71
In a written response to this motion, defendant contended the
sessions court judgment was entered nunc pro tune on a date later
than that appearing in the record and that the appeal bond was
filed within ten days from the date of actual entry of the sessions
court judgment. In a hearing pursuant to rule 43.05 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, a circuit court judge overruled the
motion, his order reciting that he had considered defendant's
response to the motion. The bill of exceptions also disclosed that
when the case came on for trial before a special judge of the
circuit court, plaintiff's motion to dismiss was renewed orally and
again denied. The court of appeals reversed, and in a rather cryptic and uninformative opinion, the supreme court affirmed the
court of appeals' reversal. The basis for the supreme court's holding was that the appeal to circuit court from sessions court was
untimely and that the appropriate remedy for an untimely appeal
is by certiorari.'
In a persuasive dissent, Justice Harbison joined by Justice
Brock noted that matters outside the appellate record were considered by at least one of the circuit court judges and possibly by
667. 555 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
668. Id. at 868.
669. Id.
670. 556 S.W.2d 749 (Tenn. 1977). The facts set forth in the text are taken
from the dissenting opinion. Id. at 749-50 (Harbison, J., dissenting).

671.

TENN. CODE ANN.

672.

556 S.W.2d at 749.

§ 27-509 (Cur. Supp. 1978).
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both. This evidence, however, was not included in the record by
plaintiff who sought reversal of the circuit judge's findings that
the appeal to circuit court was timely. Absent a complete bill of
exceptions, the dissent argued, the supreme court "should presume that there was sufficient evidence before them to sustain
their respective findings that the appeal bond was in fact timely
filed."" ' This presumption applied even though defendant took
the appeal to the court of appeals. Plaintiff was the party attacking these particular findings, and "it was incumbent upon plaintiff, not upon the defendant, to preserve a proper bill of exceptions, including all matters considered by the trial judges, and
this simply has not been done." 74 The dissent, therefore, was of
the opinion the case should have been remanded to the court of
appeals for consideration of the merits of defendant's assignment
of errors that were properly supported by a transcript of the evidence heard at the trial.'"
3. Wayside Bill of Exceptions
In addition to the ordinary bill of exceptions, Tennessee law,
unlike the common law,16 recognizes a wayside bill of exceptions,
the unique purpose of which was discussed in Overturf v. State."
Although Overturf was a criminal appeal, the law set forth
therein is equally applicable to civil appeals.7 8
Defendant Overturf was indicted with a-codefendant for larceny of an automobile and joyriding. He offered no evidence on
his own behalf and moved for a directed verdict both at the close
of the state's case-in-chief and at the close of his codefendant's
case. His motions were denied, and he was convicted and sentenced to not less than three nor more than five years in the penitentiary. The trial court, however, granted Overturf a new trial
on the ground the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. A timely filed and duly authenticated wayside bill of exceptions was made of these proceedings. Defendant was convicted at
his retrial, and his motion for a directed verdict or, in the alterna673. Id. at 750 (Harbison, J., dissenting).
674. Id. (Harbison, J., dissenting).
675. Id. (Harbison, J., dissenting).

676. See Sunderland, A Simplified System of Appellate Procedure, 17
L. REv. 651, 659 (1943).
677. 547 S.W.2d 912 (Tenn. 1977).
678. Id. at 914.

TENN.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

tive, for a new trial made at the conclusion of the second trial was
overruled. On his appeal to the court of criminal appeals, defendant assigned as error the failure to direct a verdict in his favor
at the first trial. The intermediate appellate court held that issue
was not properly before it because the issue had not been included
in defendant's new trial motion made after the second trial. The
state supreme court reversed.
The form and content of the wayside bill of exceptions, the
court noted, are virtually the same as those of an ordinary bill of
exceptions, the distinction being that the wayside bill refers to an
earlier stage of the proceedings or a former trial."' "Essentially,
the purpose of a wayside bill of exceptions is to preserve a record
of the first trial proceedings, in the event that a party is unsuccessful after a subsequent trial and desires to seek appellate review with respect to specific action taken by the trial court in the
previous trial."6 m By utilizing a wayside bill, errors in the first
trial can be assigned as error upon an appeal after the second
trial, including errors such as the failure to direct a verdict or the
granting of a new trial. t' If a wayside bill of exceptions is properly
before the appellate court, the wayside bill and the assigned errors relating to it must be considered prior to consideration of
errors relating to the subsequent bill of exceptions. " 2 If the trial
court committed no error in granting a new trial, the appellate
court will then consider the bill of exceptions concerning the second trial.1' If, however, the trial court erred in granting a new
trial, the appellate court will enter judgment on the results of the
original trial and will not consider the succeeding trial.A
Applying these principles to the facts of Overturf, the supreme court held the court of criminal appeals was incorrect in
concluding defendant could not obtain appellate review of errors
that occurred at his first trial.
By filing a wayside bill of exceptions with respect to the first
trial, [defendant] preserved and made a part of the proceedings in this case on appeal his assignments of error relevant to
that previous trial. His original motion for new trial relating to
679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 915.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the wayside bill of exceptions remains just as viable on the
present appeal as his subsequent motion for new trial relating
to the bill of exceptions of his second trial."u
Since the question of whether the trial court erred in not directing
a verdict after the first trial was open to appellate review but
undecided by the court of criminal appeals, the supreme court
remanded the case to that court for its consideration of the question.
4.

Matters Includable in the Technical Record

The only remaining reported opinion concerning the appellate record concerned the matters includable in the technical
record. In Farrarv.Farrar,gua divorce action discussed earlier in
regard to amendments to the pleadings,'1 the husband assigned
as error before the court of appeals the trial court's decree dated
May 24, 1976, awarding his wife's attorneys a $5,000 fee for their
representation of her on appeal to be paid by him. The technical
record had been filed in the court of appeals on May 18, and on
May 24 a judge of that court remanded the case to the trial court
so that it could set an award of counsel fees for the appeal. It was
in response to the appellate court's order that the trial court
ordered the disputed attorneys' fees. That order was entered on
June 1, though dated and signed earlier, and was filed with the
court of appeals the next day. The supreme court held that the
decree awarding fees was properly before the court of appeals
"notwithstanding the fact that no appeal therefrom was prayed.
The sole purpose of the remand was for the fixing of attorneys'
fees. Certainly the amount so fixed, and certified, is a legitimate
issue on appeal."'"
G.

DiscretionaryReview by the State Supreme Court of
Judgments of the Intermediate Appellate Courts
1.

Assignment of Errors and Supporting Brief

As cases like Farrarand others discussed in this survey illustrate, the state supreme court hears not only cases appealed di685. Id. at 916.
686. 553 S.W.2d 741 (Tenn. 1977).
687.

See text accompanying notes 344-58 supra.

688. 553 S.W.2d at 745.
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rectly to it from the trial court but also cases that have been
considered by the intermediate appellate courts."' Review of final
determinations of the intermediate appellate courts is sought by
petitioning for certiorari."' The supreme court during the survey
period modified its rules governing the procedure for so petitioning. Supreme court rules 11 and 12 were amended, first, to make
clear that they govern petitions for certiorari (or certiorari and
supersedeas) to review judgments of both intermediate appellate
courts and not just those of the court of appeals."" In addition,
rule 11 as amended eliminates the five-days notice of the intent
to file the petition for certiorari that previously had to be given
opposing counsel."' The most extensive changes, however, were
in supreme court rule 12. Verification by affidavit of the petition
is no longer necessary.'" Also, while rule 12 still permits use of
briefs filed in the intermediate appellate court, the rule now requires that the assignment of errors be redrafted to indicate specifically in what respects the opinion of the intermediate appellate court is in error."' The brief in support of the assignments
must also be redrafted along similar lines."'
It is not . . . acceptable . . . to attach a copy of the brief filed
in the intermediate court to a skeleton petition for the writ of
certiorari, making a single reference to said brief, as a substitute
for assignment of errors and brief in support thereof, which must
be directed to alleged error by the intermediate court, rather
than the trial court."'
See TENN. CoD ANN. §§ 16-452, 27-819 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
690. Id.
691. This was accomplished by deleting reference to the "court of appeals," Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, 12, 218 Tenn. 811-12 (1967), and substituting the
phrase "intermediate courtts]." TENN. SuP. CT. R. 11, 12.
692, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 11, 218 Tenn. 811-12 (1967), provided in part for
"five days' notice of the filing of the petition being first given opposite counsel
689.

693. Compare Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 12, 218 Tenn. 812 (1967), with 'ENN. SUP.
CT. R. 12 (as amended, effective Jan. 1. 1977).
694. TENN. SuP. CT. R. 12 provides in part: "[A]saignments of error in
this Court must be redrafted expressly directed to error in the judgment or
decree of the intermediate court, showing specifically wherein the opinion of
that court is erroneous."
695. TENN. SuP. CT. R. 12 provides in part: "Each section of a brief in
support of the assignment of errors. . . must also be redrafted .
696. TENN. SuP. CT. R. 12.
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Reply briefs must respond to each section of petitioner's assignment of errors and supporting brief, and are subject to the same
requirements as those governing petitioner's assignment and
brief.9 7
2.

Effect of Denial of Review

Many petitions for certiorari are not granted, and in Adams
v. State"I the state supreme court reaffirmed its previously expressed view that the mere denial of certiorari " 'does not commit
us to all the views expressed in a particular opinion. We are
primarily concerned on such application with the result
reached.' "'" The effect of denial of certiorari accompanied by an
opinion, however, proved to be a far more difficult question for
the state supreme court to resolve.
Pairamorev. Pairamorewl was a divorce action in which the
supreme court denied a first petition for certiorari in 1974. The
court accompanied its denial of certiorari with a memorandum.
opinion suggesting that the wife's claim for homestead be given
consideration on remand. Though the wife had not expressly
asked for homestead in her complaint, she had asked that her
husband's interest iri the family residence be vested in her. The
supreme court in an earlier unrelated case held that request to be
a sufficient prayer for relief to support an award of homestead."'
Neither the trial nor intermediate appellate court considered the
wife's homestead claim. The decree of the court of appeals simply
awarded nominal periodic alimony and remanded the case for
enforcement of its decree and retention of the case in the trial
court for any modification required by changed circumstances.
On remand after the denial of certiorari, the general sessions
court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to order the sale
of the family residence in order to award homestead, and the
court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the supreme court's
memorandum opinion denying certiorari had no force or effect
whatever on its earlier decree. The supreme court granted a second petition for certiorari and affirmed.
697. Id.
698. 547 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1977).
699. Id. at 556 (quoting Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 611,
130 S.W.2d 85, 88 (1939)) (emphasis added by Adams court).
700. 547 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1977).
701. Trimble v. Trimble, 224 Tenn. 571, 458 S.W.2d 794 (1970).
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Three separate opinions were voiced by the state supreme
court. In one, Justice Fones, speaking for himself and Justice
Harbison, noted that there are two inconsistent lines of cases, one
suggesting the court acquires jurisdiction upon timely filing of a
petition for certiorari and another suggesting jurisdiction attaches only if certiorari is granted.7 2 Justices Fones and Harbison
concluded jurisdiction exists when the petition for certiorari is
filed.0 3 The denial of certiorari accompanied by a published opinion means the supreme court agrees only with the result but not
the disposition of the issues by the intermediate appellate
court.0 Any principles of law enunciated in a published opinion
of the supreme court upon the denial of certiorari are entitled to
70
stare decisis effect. 5
In a second opinion Justice Brock, with the concurrence of
Justice Cooper, distinguished between the lawful authority of the
supreme court to grant or to deny a petition for certiorari and its
authority to pass on the merits.?" In their opinion, authority to
pass on the merits is acquired only if certiorari is granted.7 7 An
opinion filed on the denial of certiorari "should be limited to a
statement of reasons for refusal to take jurisdiction of the merits
of the case; anything more is dictum and amounts to an advisory
opinion which we are not authorized to give."701
Finally, in a third opinion Justice Henry argued that upon
the filing of a petition for certiorari, the court acquires jurisdiction to determine whether certiorari should be granted. 7" However, Justice Henry was also of the view that the denial of certiorari accompanied by an opinion "becomes the law of the case and
is conclusive in subsequent proceedings."' 710 Justice Henry also
appears to agree that any principles of law enunciated in an opinion accompanying the denial of certiorari are entitled to stare
decisis effect."'
702. 547 S.W.2d at 546-47.
703. Id. at 547.

704. Id. at 548.
705. Id.
706.
707.
708.
709.
710.

Id. at 549 (Brock, J., concurring).
Id. (Brock, J., concurring).
Id. at 550 (Brock, J., concurring).
Id. (Henry, J., now C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
Id. at 551 (Henry, J., now C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in

part).
711.

If the supreme court denies certiorari but accompanies the denial
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Two conclusions seem justified by the views expressed by the
respective justices in Pairamore. First, the denial of certiorari
leaves the judgment of the intermediate appellate court unimpaired; only Justice Henry thought otherwise. Second, opinions
issued on the denial of certiorari are entitled to stare decisis effect
although Justices Brock and Cooper disagree. The desirability of
giving these opinions such an effect would certainly be open to
question if the proposed Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure
were adopted by the General Assembly. Under those rules, appellant's request for supreme court review will be just that, a request
and demonstration to the supreme court that the case is of such
extraordinary importance that it is an appropriate one for granting review." 2 Such a request will typically give only incidental
consideration to the correctness of the intermediate appellate
court's opinion since the supreme court cannot realistically be
expected to correct every efror made by the intermediate appellate courts.7"3 If the proposed appellate rules are adopted, the
most desirable approach to the question raised in Pairamore,
therefore, would appear to be that of Justices Brock and Cooper.
H.

The Scope of Appellate Review
1. Administrative Proceedings

If the parties have successfully avoided the obstacles strewn
along their path to a review on the merits, they must next concern
themselves with the appropriate scope of appellate review. In
with an opinion, "[tjhis means," in Justice Henry's view, "that the Court has
elected to decide the controversy, or clarify the law, or considers it desirable to
outline procedure on remand or that it has used this means of advising the trial
court and counsel of the Court's views on a controllingprinciple of law . .. ."
Id. at 550-51 (Henry, J., now C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(emphasis added). Later in his opinion Justice Henry speaks of "the right to
hand down a binding opinion on certiorari denials." Id. at 552 (Henry, J., now
C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). While Justice Henry's views on
the matter are not unambiguously clear, he does appear to agree with Justices
Fones and Harbison that principles of law enunciated in an opinion accompanying the denial of certiorari are entitled to stare decisis effect.
712. See PROPOSED TENN. R. App. P. 1l(b).
713. See Sobieski, supra note 576, at 19-20; Sobieski, supra note 495, at
231-35. The supreme court and the litigants are also deprived of oral argument
if questions of law are decided upon the denial of certiorari. See Pairamore v.
Pairamore, 547 S.W.2d 545, 551 (Tenn. 1977) (Henry, J,, now C.J., concurring
in part & dissenting in part).
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Metropolitian Government of Nashville v. Shacklett"' the Tennessee Supreme Court clarified the law concerning the scope of
appellate review of the action of administrative agencies subject
to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act."5
Shacklett arose as the result of a municipal ordinance
adopted by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County that restricted the location of retail liquor
stores to a specified area of the Urban Services District. The
Metropolitan Government refused to issue certificates of good
moral character and retail liquor licenses to certain applicants
solely because their proposed outlets were outside the specified
area. Based on an evidentiary record made before it, the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission on review held the municipal
ordinance to be arbitrary and unreasonable and granted the
applications of twelve -of the nineteen applicants who had been
denied licenses by the Metropolitan Government. On review
before the chancery court of Davidson County the chancellor
also held the ordinance arbitrary and unreasonable but reversed
the denial of the seven applications on the ground that the Commission established no satisfactory criteria or standard for the
granting of some of the applications and the denial of others.
The state supreme court initially held that judicial review of
orders of the Alcoholic Beverage Commission was properly sought
in chancery court by way of a petition for review under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act."6 The court also thought it
"clear from the language of the statute that the review provided
in the chancery court is in no sense a broad, or de novo, review.""'
Instead, review is limited to the record made before the agency
unless, as provided by statute, there are "alleged irregularities in
procedure before the agency not shown in the record . .

.

Moreover, review is confined to the purely legal issues of
whether the agency acted within the scope of its statutory authority, and in conformity generally with statutory and constitutional provisions, whether it followed proper procedures,
whether its decisions were arbitrary, capricious or in abuse of
714. 554 S.W.2d.601 (Tenn. 1977).
715. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-507 to 527 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
716. 554 S.W.2d at 602-04.
717. Id. at 604.
718. Id.; see TENN. CoDE ANN. § 4-623(g) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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discretion, and whether its conclusions are supported by material and substantial evidence in the record.'
It is against this background that the court then discussed
the appropriate scope of appellate review. The Uniform Administrative Procedures Act itself provides for appellate review "as in
chancery cases." 2 0 "This language," ,the court stated, "is not
without difficulty.""' The difficulty arises because review of
chancery cases on appeal is ordinarily governed by a statutory
standard that entitles the appealing party in an equity case to "a
reexamination. . . of the whole matter of law and fact appearing
in the record. 7 21 2 In nonjury cases the Code specifies that such a
reexamination "of any issue of fact or of law in the appellate court
shall be de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied
by a presumption of the correctness of the judgment or decree of
the trial court, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." 7
The court quite sensibly held that the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act was not intended to permit broad or de novo
appellate review of the chancellor's decision "when his action,
initially, is confined to a narrow and statutorily prescribed review
of the record made before the administrative agency."7 2 It would
not be practicable, the court stated, "to afford any broader or
more comprehensive review to cases arising under the Act than
is afforded to them by the trial court in the first instance
. . ,"I" Therefore, the court construed the language in the Act
providing for appellate review "as in chancery cases" as referring
only to the general procedures to be followed in taking a case from
chancery court to the appellate court if that procedure is not
otherwise specified in the Act itself.'"
The appropriate scope of review by the chancellor of administrative action was also considered in two later decisions of the
state supreme court, United Inter-Mountain Telephone Co. v.
719. 584 S.W.2d at 604 (citing TENN. CODE

ANN. § 4-523(h) (1977)).
§ 4-524 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
721. 854 S.W.2d at 604.
722. Id.; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-301 (1955).
723. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-303 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
724. 554 S.W.2d at 604.
725. Id.

720.

TENN.

726. Id.

CODE

ANN.
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Public Service Commission7" and Public Service Commission v.
General Telephone Co. 2 " Both were telephone rate cases. In
United Inter-Mountain, review of the rate fixed by the Public
Service Commission was sought in chancery court by way of a
complaint and petition for certiorari. The record made before the
Commission was certified to the chancery court, which received
substantial additional evidence and affirmed the action of the
Commission. On appeal the state supreme court held that the
Uniform Administrative Procedures Act applied to the Commission and that the only available method of judicial review of a
contested case is by way of a petition for review."' In addition,
the court emphasized, as it had in Shacklett,1"' that judicial review is limited to the record made before the agency unless there
are alleged irregularities before the agency and that factual determinations may be set aside only if unsupported by material and
substantial evidence.' It was error, therefore, for the chancellor
to receive additional evidence. While normally it would be appropriate to decide the appeal on the basis of the record before the
Commission, the supreme court concluded that in the interest of
justice the case should be remanded to the Commission since
both counsel and the chancellor had proceeded under the old,
superseded statutes."'
In the General Telephone Co. case, the company argued that
if a constitutional issue of confiscation is presented in a rate case,
the appropriate scope of review is that established by the United
States Supreme Court in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough.133 In that case the Supreme Court stated that in rate
cases "if the owner claims a confiscation of his property will result, the state must provide a fair opportunity for submitting that
issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order
is void because in conflict with the due process clause, Fourteenth
Amendment ...
The authors of one leading administrative
",,

727.
728.
729.
730.
731.
732,
733.
734.

555 S.W.2d 389 (Tenn. 1977).
555 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. 1977).
555 S.W.2d at 391-92.
See text accompanying note 718 supra.
555 S.W.2d at 391-92.
Id. at 392.
253 U.S. 287 (1920).
Id. at 289 (citations omitted).
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law casebook state that "[p]robably no administrative law decision ever gave rise to more instant, voluminous, or steadily critical comment by legal writers." 7 Moreover, the Tennesee Supreme Court's review of subsequent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court as well as the decisions of the courts of
other states led it to the conclusion that Ben Avon's independent
judgment rule was no longer good law and that the substantial
evidence rule satisfied federal constitutional law.' ": "We reject
the independent judgment rule as controlling Tennessee constitutional law and hold that the scope of review articulated in Ithe
Uniform Administrative Procedures Act] provides adequate
standards within constitutional limits, for judicial determination
of the issue of confiscation in rate cases." 37 Most significantly,
the state supreme court also stated that if the rates prescribed by
the Public Service Commission are confiscatory, its order can be
set aside because it would be "in violation of constitutional provisions, and arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion."3 8 In
short, the state supreme court seems to have arrived at the proper
conclusion that determinations of fact by the Public Service
Commission will not be set aside if supported by substantial evidence. The further question, however, of whether the rate fixed
on those facts is confiscatory raises a question of constitutional
law that is subject to plenary review in the courts.
2. County Court to Circuit Court
In administrative review cases like those just discussed, the
trial court functions like an appellate court, initially reviewing
the action of the administrative agency pursuant to the limited
review provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.
There are other cases, however, appealed to the trial court from
inferior tribunals in which the trial court exercises plenary powers
of review. Delffs v. Delffs"' is a case in point.
The dispute in Delffs was between an intestate's widow and
his eldest son over the right to administer decedent's estate. The
county court issued letters of administration to the son, and intes735.

W.

GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS

409 (6th ed. 1974).

736. 555 S.W.2d at 399-402.
737.

Id, at 402.

738.
739,

Id.
545 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1977).

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

tate's widow sought revocation of the letters on the ground that
as decedent's widow she had a superior statutory right to administer the estate.740 The county court denied the petition, and she
appealed the order of denial to the circuit court. Decedent's son
sought dismissal of the appeal on the grounds that the record did
not show an appeal was prayed and granted, that the transcript
was not timely filed, and that no bill of exceptions of the county
court hearing was made and filed in circuit court. The circuit
court overruled the motion to dismiss and heard the case, without
receiving additional proof, on the technical record. That court
concluded that the letters had been issued without notice to the
widow and remanded the case with directions that the widow be
appointed administratrix unless an evidentiary hearing, on notice
to all parties, demonstrated she was unfit to serve in that capacity. On appeal to the court of appeals, decedent's son renewed his
arguments that the appeal to circuit court should have been dismissed. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that a bill
of exceptions was essential to review but had not been made or
filed. Accordingly, the intermediate appellate court held the circuit court did not have authority to entertain the appeal and
ordered that the widow's petition be dismissed. The state supreme court reversed.
The supreme court initially distinguished the earlier court of
appeals decision in Griffitts v.Rockford Utility District."'In that
case the intermediate appellate court held that an appeal in the
nature of a writ of error, and not an appeal, was the proper
method of review to circuit court from a county court order establishing a utility district. In those kinds of proceedings, the supreme court in Delffs reasoned, the county judge acts as an administrative agency, and therefore the narrower review of appeal
in error, rather than the de novo review of an appeal, is appropriate.42 There was dictum in Griffitts that all appeals from county
court to circuit court should be reviewed as appeals in error,"'
except in jury and chancery cases. The supreme court denied
certiorari in Griffitts, but that denial of certorari "must not be
considered as approval of the dictum . . . but only as approval
740.

See

741.
742.
743.

41 Tenn. App. 653, 298 S.W.2d 33, cert. denied, id.(Tenn. 1956).
545 S.W.2d at 741.
41 Tenn. App. at 655-58, 298 S.W.2d at 34-35.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 30-109 (1977).
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of the narrow holding . .. 7'" The court then construed the

statute that authorized an "appeal" from county court to circuit
court of orders appointing executors and administrators as
being intended to permit a de novo hearing. "[Upon review by
an appeal of an order of the county court appointing an administrator or executor, the case is to be heard de novo in the circuit
court." '' Since the hearing in circuit court is de novo, no bill of
exceptions is required, and the court of appeals decision to the
contrary was in error. ' Besides, the court stated, a bill of exceptions is never required if the error complained of appears in the
technical record, and the error raised by the widow in circuit
court-failure of the county court to give notice to her of its initial
hearing-was an error found in the technical record.74' The court
concluded its opinion by noting that all other requirements for an
appeal from county court to circuit court had been met.7 '
3. Interlocutory Review
As many of the previous cases demonstrate, the proper scope
of appellate review is a multifaceted conqept. No single, allinclusive rule exists to guide an appellate court in its review of
proceedings below. Rather, the scope of review depends on the
kind of legal controversy and the particular lower-court (or
agency) function upon which the appellate court must pass.7 2 In
Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty,"' the Tennessee Supreme
Court indicated that the scope of review also depends, at least to
some extent, on whether the appeal is being taken from an interlocutory order.
Patty is best known for its holding concerning the permissible rate of interest that may be charged on the loan of money.
However, in its petition to rehear, Cumberland Capital sought to
have the state supreme court rule on matters not within the scope
of the issues certified by the trial court for interlocutory review."
744.

545 S.W.2d at 741; see text accompanying notes 698-99 supra.

745.
746.
747.
748.
749.

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-110 (1977).
545 S.W.2d at 742.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 742-43.

750.

See

751.

556 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1977).
See TENN. CoDE ANN. § 27-305 (Cum.Supp. 1978).

752.

APPELLATE COURT STANDARDS,

supra note 494, § 3.11, at 19.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

IVol. 46

The supreme court refused to consider the merits of a due process
and commerce clause argument made by Cumberland Capital in
its rehearing petition because "the nature of the appeal and the
established principles of appellate review have combined to produce a narrow consideration of limited issues. . .

.""

Without

any explanation for the difference, however, the court proceeded
to consider whether its holding should be given retroactive effect,
even though that issue also was not expressly certified for interlocutory review. 54
In dissent, Justice Harbison noted that Cumberland Capital
and the other lending institutions as amici curiae emphasized in
their principal briefs that the only issues open for review were
those certified by the trial court.7" These issues were fully and
completely addressed in the court's principal opinion,7"' Moreover, in Justice Harbison's opinion, the earlier case of Tennessee
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v.

Hughes75 established that "in dealing with interlocutory appeals
the Court requires the exact and precise questions to be reviewed
to be stated in the order granting the appeal, and limits its decision to those specific questions." ' Accordingly, he thought it was
inappropriate to consider any additional questions pertaining to
the court's opinion in light of the incomplete and undeveloped
record before the court. "Interlocutory appeals, no doubt, serve a
useful purpose, but parties utilizing this special appellate procedure, occurring, as it were, in the midst of the handling of the case
in the trial court, should not expect the Court to respond to any
issues except those certified here." '
The proper scope of appellate review on an interlocutory appeal presents a difficult question. 7" Whatever the appropriate
scope of review, an appellate court, as Justice Harbison correctly
noted, should not pass upon an issue that raises questions of fact
upon which the parties have not been heard. Consideration of
753. 556 S.W.2d at 538.
754. Id. at 538-42.
755. Id. at 543 (Harbison, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
756. Id.
757. 531 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tenn. 1975).
758. 556 S.W.2d at 543.
759. Id.
760. See Sobieski, supra note 495, at 192-94. See also 16 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER, F. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3937
(1977).
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such an issue raises a serious due process problem. Besides, the
purpose of a petition to rehear is to point out errors in the opinion
of the appellate court, not to raise for the first time a question of
law not raised on the first argument, especially when the question
has not been raised in the trial court and turns on disputable
matters of fact."'
4. Assignment of Errors
On the other hand, an appellate court may appropriately rest
its decision concerning an issue raised by the parties on any available grounds.6 2 For example, in State ex rel. Polin v. Hill,"3 four
realtors brought a mandamus action to compel the issuance to
them of licenses pursuant to the Business Tax Act.7" The realtors
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 7" but the motion
was overruled. No specific assignment of error was directed toward the failure to grant judgment on the pleadings. However,
the state supreme court sensibly reversed the judgment of the
trial court on the ground that the motion should have been
granted. The assignments of error that were made, the court observed, "adequately invoke the same legal principles upon which
' 7
said motion should have been decided in favor of realtors.

"

I. Relief; Waiver
Not all errors occurring at a trial justify relief on appeal.
"[A]n appellant who has failed to take whatever action is available to him to nullify any harmful effect runs the risk that his
passivity may be deemed a waiver of the error."'

77

The doctrine

of waiver, however, cannot be mechanically applied. For example, in Tennessee State Board of Education v. Cobb,' " the Board
contended that plaintiff had not complied with the appropriate
method of notification in his suit challenging his discharge. The
761. See Louisell & Degnan, Rehearing in American Appellate Courts, 44
L. REv. 627, 635 (1956).
762. See Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27
FORDHAM L,REv. 477, 479-81 (1959).
763. 547 S.W.2d 916 (Tenn. 1977).
764. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-5801 to 5829 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
765. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 12.03.
766. 547 S.W.2d at 917.
767. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 494, at 76.
768. 557 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. 1977).
CALIF.
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state supreme court held, as noted previously, " that the Board's
position was without merit. However, the court also held that
there was no waiver of the issue by the Board, " which had raised
its objection to the method of service utilized by a motion to
dismiss and a later prayer for an interlocutory appeal. Apparently the trial court and court of appeals suggested that the Board
waived its right to appellate review by filing an answer and participating in the trial. "From a practical standpoint," the supreme court stated, "a defendant who has properly raised the
question of the sufficiency of process and its service has no alternative, after being overruled, except to answer and defend or
suffer judgment by default." '' Although the court did not expressly say so, it apparently thought requiring defendant to suffer
a default in order to obtain appellate review was unreasonable.
On the other hand, it has previously been noted that as long
as a defendant has timely and complete notice of the action
against him, no due process problem is presented,"' and it is
certainly questionable whether the results of an otherwise errorfree trial should be set aside to ensure strict compliance with the
prescribed method of giving notice. Any error, though open to
review under the rationale of Cobb, would therefore appear to be
harmless.
J.

FrivolousAppeals

Perceived abuses of the appellate process can be remedied in
a number of ways. All too often the remedy employed is to penalize the offender, rather than to modify the system that encourages
such abuse. 7 Whatever the proper remedy in the long run, Davis
769. See text accompanying notes 180-87 supra.
770. 557 S.W.2d at 277.
771. Id,at 278. The doctrine of waiver, however, was invoked against
defendant in State v. Thompson, 549 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1977). See text accompanying notes 478-500 supra. Based on the reasoning of Cobb, it could be argued
defendant in Thompson had no practical alternative other than to defend or
forfeit her right to present evidence in her own behalf. The different results in
these two cases may be justifiable, but it is difficult to distinguish the cases on
the basis of the reasoning utilized in Cobb.
772. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
773. "The way to insure prompt and proper disposition of appellate work
is not to penalize abuse of an unworkable system but to insure efficiency and
dispatch in the system itself." Louisell & Degnan, supra note 761 at 642 (quoting
Roscoe Pound).
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v.Gulf Insurance Group"' sounds a clear warning that, for the
present, certain kinds of abuse will be penalized.
Davis, a tractor-trailer driver, brought a workers' compensation action, alleging that he injured his back on May 14, 1973. He
further alleged that on suffering the injury he visited his family
physician and that on the day following his injury he was forced
by the pain to stop driving and leave his truck. Davis continued
hauling for his employer, however, making three long distance
trips in the next four weeks. In mid-June he was fired and, on
June 19, 1973, he notified his employer of the alleged injury. The
notification was beyond the thirty-day period for notification
specified in the Workers' Compensation Act.17 In a deposition,
Davis claimed he had been unable to work since the accident,
although at trial he admitted working full time for two different
employers since the accident. He also admitted at trial that he
told one employer he had never filed a workers' compensation
claim or suffered a back injury. The chancellor dismissed the
action on the ground Davis had not carried the burden of proof,
finding " 'plaintiff's explanation of the events surrounding the
alleged occurrence [of the injury] not entirely plausible' and his
testimony 'impeached on the record.'

",

On appeal the state supreme court affirmed. "This court has
repeatedly pointed out that on factual issues in workmen's compensation appeals it is concerned solely with whether any material evidence supports the findings below." 777 In light of this well-

settled law, the court found Davis' arguments on appeal-which
went to the sufficiency of the evidence-"obviously without
merit. '7' Moreover, "a careful examination of the record

' 77'

con-

vinced the court that no other error could legitimately have been
raised on appeal. The court then went on to observe:
[T]his case goes beyond mere meritlessness, however. It has no
reasonable chance for success, for reversal of the decision would
require revolutionary changes in fundamental standards of appellate review. . . .There is no basis for believing such revolu774. 546 S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. 1977).
775. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1001 (1977).
776.
inal).
777.

546 S.W.2d at 585 (quoting chancery court opinion) (brackets in origId.

778. Id.
779.

Id. at 586.
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tionary changes might take place ....
. . . [Tihi appeal is recognizable on its face as devoid of
merit. It presents no justiciable questions-neither debatable
questions of law nor findings of fact not clearly supported. It is
difficult to believe that such an appeal could serve any purpose
other than harassment. It is equally difficult to believe that
counsel could honestly believe in its merits .... "
On its own motion, the court ordered that expenses incurred in
defending the appeal, including court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, be assessed as damages against appellant.'
The reach of Davis is probably quite narrow. The supreme
court itself correctly noted that too strict an interpretation of the
statute permitting the awarding of damages for frivolous appeals
might discourage legitimate appeals38 The court also noted that
workers' compensation suits are particularly susceptible to the
abuse of frivolous appeals.3 These considerations, along with the
difficulty of formulating a satisfactory definition of a frivolous
appeal, suggest that damages will be awarded only in the clearest
of cases.
K.

Publicationof Opinions

Perhaps one of the most controversial and difficult questions
concerning appellate practice that has generated a significant
amount of recent legal writing is the question of which opinions
of an appellate court should be published. These difficulties have
been explored in an earlier article on certain aspects of the proT
posed Tennessee Rules of Appellate ProcedureM
and will not be
reexamined here. However, some attention needs to be given two
developments that occurred during the survey period. First, the
state supreme court modified its rule 31 on the publication of
opinions to provide that no opinion designated not for publication
"shall be cited in any court unless a copy thereof shall be furnished to the court and to adversary counsel." Second, the General Assembly, apparently dissatisfied with the court's rule on the
publication of opinions, enacted a statute that requires all opinions of the supreme court to be published, as well as the opinions
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.

Id.
Id.; see TENN.

CODE ANN. § 27-124 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
546 S.W.2d at 586.
Id.
Sobieski, supra note 495, at 265-68.
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of the court of appeals if certiorari has been denied by the supreme court?' 5 The statute exempts from its mandatory publication requirement
appeals from any state boards or commissions, including public
service commission, appeals involving revenue matters and/or
taxes, and appeals where the only grounds for a new trial were
that there was no evidence to support the verdict and/or that the
verdict of the jury was contrary to the weight and preponderance
of the evidence.'"
Nothing in this addition to the Code speaks to publication of the
opinions of the court of criminal appeals.
The statute differs from the supreme court's rule in several
respects. Most notably, the court's own rule does not require publication of all its opinions but only those that establish a new rule
of law or alter or modify an existing rule, involve a legal issue of
continuing public interest, criticize existing law, resolve an apparent conflict of authority, or update, clarify, or distinguish a
principle of law.7 Also, the court's rule does not permit publica-

tion of the opinions of the intermediate appellate courts in which
the supreme court grants or denies certiorari but concurs in the
result only."5 Presumably, the statute supersedes the court's rule
to the extent the two are inconsistent, unless the statute invades
the court's inherent rulemaking power.
VIII.

THE BINDING EFFECT OF ADJUDICATIONS

After an action has been finally adjudicated, the law of res
judicata steps in with its command that one judicial contest of a
claim or issue is generally enough.'" Traditionally res judicata is
broken down into three categories. "Merger" arises when a judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff's cause of
action is deemed to merge in the judgment and is extinguished,
being replaced by the plaintiff's right to sue on his judgment.'"
"Bar" refers to the situation in which a judgment is rendered in
785.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 8-612(b)-(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978),

786. Id. § 8.612(b).
787.

TENN. SuP. CT. R. 31(2).

788. Id. R. 31(4).
789. See RESTATEMENT
1973).
790. Id. §§ 45(a), 47.

(SECOND) OF JUDOMENTS §

45 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
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defendant's favor, the judgment operating as a bar to a subsequent action on the same cause of action."' Under modem terminology, the merger and bar effect of a prior adjudication are
collectively referred to as claim preclusion. "Collateral estoppel,"
or issue preclusion, prescribes that issues actually litigated and
determined in one action are precluded from relitigation in subsequent litigation on a different cause of action if their determination was essential to the first judgment.7 " Both claim preclusion
(merger and bar) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) also
require some identity of parties, as both Grundy County v. Dyer 3
and Usrey v. Lewis"' illustrate.
A. Persons Affected
Dyer was arrested for public drunkenness by two deputy
sheriffs of Grundy County, who, in route to the county jail, allegedly beat him without justification. As a result of this incident,
Dyer instituted suit in federal district court against the deputies,
the county sheriff, and the county. That court dismissed the
action against the county, apparently on the ground the county
could not be sued in federal court. 15 A judgment for damages was
awarded against the deputies but not against the sheriff. Dyer
then filed suit in state court against the county seeking recovery
of the balance of the federal court judgment that remained unsatisfied. Apparently the trial court in the state action entered judgment against the county based on the earlier federal judgment.
The state supreme court held that in so doing the trial court
erred.
The county argued that entry of judgment against it based
on the earlier adjudication to which it was not a party deprived
it of its day in court. The state supreme court quite correctly
791. Id. §§ 45(b), 48.
792. Id. §§ 45(c), 68.
793. 546 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1977). The court in Dyer also overruled Dyer's
motion to dismiss because the motion for a new trial and appeal bond were filed
prematurely. "It would be manifestly unjust, absent prejudice to the complaining party, to dismiss this appeal and penalize a lawyer and his client for prompt-

ness." Id. at 579.
794. 553 S.W.2d 612 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
795. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). But see Monell
v. Department of Social Serv., 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978) (a city is a person under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), but is not vicariously liable for the torts of its employees).
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agreed. Noting that an action like Dyer's could be brought directly against the county, the court nonetheless stated it "cannot
conceive of the county being held liable on a judgment rendered
in a case in which it did not participate fully and as an adversary.'""' Accordingly, the supreme court remanded the case so
that the county "may litigate liability and damages to the same
manner and to the same extent as if the Federal Court judgment
7
had not been awarded.""

This last-quoted statement must be construed in light of the
facts before the state supreme court. Because the county was not
a party to the earlier litigation, the judgment could not fairly be
used against it. However, Dyer was a party to the previous litigation, and it would be appropriate to limit him to no more than
the amount of damages he recovered in the first action unless the
measure of damages in the two actions differs."' Similarly, if
Dyer had not prevailed in the first action, he might well be prevented from bringing an action against the county if the county's
liability depends solely on the wrongdoing of its deputies.7 "
The extent to which a party, who would be precluded from
relitigating an issue with an opposing party, should also be precluded from relitigating that issue with another person not a
party to the first action raises a difficult and controversial question.'" But, even though a nonparty to the first action may be
able to take advantage of the judgment in the previous litigation
against a party to that litigation, Dyer demonstrates that the
result of the first action cannot be used against someone not a
party (or in privity with a party) to the previous litigation. Usrey
v. Lewis' is another example.
The litigation in Usrey arose out of a two-car automobile
accident, in which all the occupants of the automobiles were either killed or injured. Apparently eight separate actions were
instituted, six of which were tried together. In each of those six
796. 546 S.W.2d at 581.
797. Id. at 582.
798. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or JUDGMENTS § 99(2) (Tent. Draft No.
4,1977).
799. See id: § 99(3).
800. Compare, e.g., id. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975), with, e.g., Overton,
The Restatement of Judgments, Collateral Estoppel, and Conflict of Laws, 44
TENN. L. REv. 927 (1977).
801. 553 S.W.2d 612 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
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actions, Barbara Usrey, the driver of one of the vehicles, had
judgments entered against her. The other driver, Phyllis Lewis,
had judgments entered in her favor in those actions to which she
was a party, including a judgment in her favor against Barbara
Usrey. The two actions before the court of appeals in Usrey involved plaintiffs who were not parties (or in privity with any of
the parties) to the previously tried actions. The defendants in the
untried actions included Barbara Usrey and Phyllis Lewis, who
moved to have plaintiffs' actions dismissed on a plea of res judicata. The court of appeals quite properly held that the trial court
erred in dismissing plaintiffs' actions.
The intermediate appellate court reasoned that while the
issue of liability was the same, the parties were different and
''
"[ildentity of parties is required.MZ
This statement by the court
of appeals appears to be referring to the mutuality requirement
under which one who invokes the conclusive effect of a prior judgment must have been bound if the judgment had gone the other
way.803 Many courts have relaxed the requirement of strict mutuality8 "4 but, as noted previously, not to the extent of completely
depriving a litigant of his day in court. The court of appeals also
rejected the argument that because plaintiffs did not participate
in the consolidated trial of the other actions, they were bound by
the results of that trial. Such a result, the court reasoned, would
defeat one of the purposes of granting a severance or separate
trial, which is to try an action "unhindered by other cases."IM
Finally, the court conceded that the verdicts in the action yet to
be tried may turn out to be inconsistent with the verdicts previously rendered, "but no known legal principle prohibits a plaintiff from seeking his remedy because another plaintiff has been
unsuccessful before a previous jury upon the same or similar evidence."m
802. Id. at 615.
803. See Developments in the Law-Res Judicata,65 HARV. L. REv. 818,
862 (1952).
804. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88, Reporter's Note, at

98-99 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
805. 553 S.W.2d at 616.
806. Id. The court of appeals also held defendant's reliance on the presumption of correctness that arises if there is no bill of exceptions was misplaced. "Such presumption relates only to findings of fact and not to conclusions
of law." Id.
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B. Issue Preclusion
Issue preclusion may also be denied for reasons other than
those going to the identity of the parties. Generally speaking, an
issue is conclusive in a subsequent action only if that issue was
actually litigated and determined in the prior adjudication.m7 If
several issues are litigated in an action, it sometimes cannot be
ascertained which issue was determinative in the prior action.
Cole v. Arnold "' illustrates that in such a situation none of the
issues are precluded from being relitigated.
Plaintiffs in Cole, it will be recalled," sought to recover for
damages to their building sustained as a result of an accident
between Cole and Medic Ambulance Service. After plaintiffs' suit
had been appealed from general sessions court to circuit court,
Cole brought an action in circuit court for personal injuries and
property damage against Medic. That action resulted in a general
verdict for defendant. The trial court held in plaintiffs' action
against Cole and Medic that the effect of the circuit court verdict
was to establish Cole's negligence, and accordingly the trial court
awarded plaintiffs a judgment against him. The state supreme
court quite rightly held this to be error. Essentially the state
supreme court reasoned:
[T]he general verdict in favor of Medic in the tort action
brought by [Cole] was not necessarily predicated upon a finding of negligence on the part of [Cole]. It is just as likely to have
been predicated upon a finding that [Cole], as plaintiff in the
circuit court action, failed to carry the burden of proof, which
would not make [Cole] liable to [plaintiffs] in the sessions
court case.I 0
Since it could not be ascertained whether the jury found Medic
not negligent or whether it found Cole contributorily negligent,
no issue preclusion effect was given the jury's general verdict. 11
C.

Law of the Case

Thus far this discussion has been concerned with the effect
807.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O JUDGMENTS §§ 45(c), 68 (Tent. Draft

No. 1, 1973).
808. 545 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1977).
809. See text accompanying notes 610-17 supra.
810. 545 S.W.2d at 97.
811, Id.
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that an adjudication in one case has on a subsequent case. "Issues
previously decided recur, however, not only in successive suits
but in successive stages of a single suit, and the principles that
underlie the rules of res judicata are not without force in the latter
situation."'1 1 Rogers v. Ware"' provides a good example.
Various heirs of decedent brought an action to have a deed
declared void and to have the land conveyed by the deed resold
and the proceeds distributed among the heirs. Named as defendants were the purchasers, the successor trustee who sold the land
at a public auction, a life tenant, and other heirs. At the first trial
the chancellor held the successor trustee was properly appointed
and that plaintiffs were estopped to attack the deed. On a first
appeal, the court of appeals disagreed with the first holding but
agreed that plaintiffs were estopped to deny the validity of the
deed. However, the appellate court also concluded that not all the
persons with an interest in the litigation were parties and remanded to permit them to be brought into the action, and to
permit the rights of the life tenant to be settled. A petition for
certiorari was not sought from the state supreme court. On remand, the trial court held that all persons with an interest were
before the court, ratified the deed subject to the life estate, and
ordered the proceeds from the sale distributed to the heirs. On a
second appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.
The assigned errors, the court observed, appeared directed
primarily to errors in the first trial, especially the holding that
plaintiffs were estopped from challenging the validity of the
deed," That assigned error, however, had been decided on the
first appeal. "Our previous holding has become final and is now
the law of the case and may not be reargued and relitigated.'
Moreover, no error was assigned on the second appeal that the
trial court erred in holding that all parties were before the court."
Finally, since plaintiffs were estopped to deny the validity of the
812. J. CouND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, supra note 359, at 1153.
813. 555 S.W.2d 409 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
814. Id. at 410. The court of appeals found it difficult to determine exactly
what plaintiffs thought was error since the assignments of error did not refer to
the pages of the record where the alleged errors appeared. Id.; see TENN. CT. APP.
R. 12(2).
815. 555 S.W.2d at 410.
816. Id.
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deed, the court also did not consider an assigned error relating to
the life estate. " '7
IX.

MISCELLANEOUS

By way of a conclusion to this survey only two other miscellaneous matters need to be mentioned. First, the Code was
amended to provide that "any person who is required to deposit
a bond for any reason by this state or any political subdivision of
this state may deposit an amount of cash or a certified or cashier's
check equal to the amount of the required bond in lieu of such
bond." " This provision is inapplicable to appearance bonds in
criminal cases. "It Second, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
2
Judgments Act "11 was amended to correct a drafting error, 1
817. Id.
818. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-1958 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
819, Id. The statutes governing release in criminal cases are TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-1201 to 1247 (Cum.Supp. 1978), -3405 (1975), -3406, -3407 (Cum.
Supp. 1978), -3408 (1975).
820. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 26-801 to 807 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
821. Id. § 26-803(c). The word "creditor" was substituted for the word
"debtor." See 1977 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 50, § 1.

